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Chapter 1

Measuring Amenities and Disamenities in the
Housing Market: Applications of the Hedonic
Method
Joshua Hall, Kerianne Lawson, and Jacob Shia

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Introduction
The hedonic method is an econometric technique used to measure the value of or
demand for a good. By considering the characteristics of the good, the method allows for analysis of how each part contributes to the good’s value (Lancaster, 1966;
Rosen, 1974). Houses have many attributes that are not directly sold but which affect their value. This can include parts of a house – such as a pool or half bathroom
– but also publicly-provided goods whose usage is associated with the home, such
as public schools. This explains the widespread use of the hedonic method in economics. There are thousands of research articles that employ the hedonic model and
there are various modifications and contexts studied (Ekeland et al., 2004; Goodman and Thibodeau, 2003; Maclennan, 1977; Malpezzi, 2002; Simons and Saginor,
2006).
The hedonic method is useful when researchers want to understand how some
external factor that can not be directly purchased affects house prices. The external
factors are often broken down into two categories, amenities and disamentities. In
theory, amenities should be incorporated into the value of a home. An amenity has
a positive relationship with house prices if it is desirable to a specific group, or
groups, that have a higher willingness to pay for the home due to its relationship
with or proximity to the amenity. A disamenity would have a negative relationship
with house prices.
In many cases, distance to the amenity affects house prices, or the amenity is
specific to a certain area or neighborhood. Therefore, the real estate economics literature has extended the general hedonic method to include spatial analysis (Anselin,
1998; Anselin and Lozano-Gracia, 2009; Basu and Thibodeau, 1998; Bourassa
et al., 2007). Locational aspects of the home are related to an amenity and are
therefore incorporated into the econometric model. First, these models may include
Joshua Hall
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA e-mail: joshua.hall@mail.wvu.edu
Kerianne Lawson
North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58108-6050, USA e-mail: kerianne.lawson@ndsu.edu
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a dummy variable to designate whether the observations are positioned in a geographic area. Additionally, models can use the relative positioning of an observation
or distance from an observation to the amenity in question to understand the spatial
relationships.
Aside from physical attributes of the house itself, there are many external factors that could affect an individual’s willingness to pay for a house. Therefore, there
are many opportunities for research that applies the hedonic method. The following chapters of this book identify various amenities and disamenities, discuss which
houses would be impacted by their presence, and then measure the relationship between the amenity or disamenity with house values. This book’s objective is to be
a guide of the current real estate economics literature through applications of the
hedonic method. It is our hope that readers can gain a better understanding of the
hedonic method and feel inspired to contribute new research to the field.

1.2.1 Environment
Many articles in the hedonic literature focus on the relationship between environmental factors and real estate (Boyle and Kiel, 2001). This is because the environment can be affected by human activity or nature, and there are many components
of the environment. To name a few, scholars study the effect of storms and wildfires
(Cohen and Coughlin, 2009; Gourley, 2021; Hansen et al., 2014), air quality (Amini
et al., 2021; Chattopadhyay, 1999; Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Lang, 2015; Nelson,
1978; Nourse, 1970; Zabel and Kiel, 2000), water quality (Walsh et al., 2011), and
invasive species (Hansen and Naughton, 2013; Zhang and Boyle, 2010) on house
prices.
Cohen and Coughlin (2009) examine the differences in the expectations of flooding (based on the FEMA flood zones) and actual flooding in New York City after
Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For those who were further from the storm surge than
expected, there was no price effect. However, for those who experienced a negative shock, which meant their homes were closer to the storm surge than expected,
there was a significant difference in house prices depending on their distance from
the storm surge, about 6-7% for every mile. With time this effect dissipates, as the
shock of the storm wears off.
Liu et al. (2017) study the impact of water quality on house prices in Narragansett
Bay on the north side of Rhode Island. They find that poor coastal water quality corresponds with negative house prices, and this effect diminishes with distance to the
shoreline. They also find evidence that house prices are most impacted by extreme
environmental conditions, which make the poor water quality more noticeable.
In Chapter 6 of this volume, Meder and Johnson (2021) measure the effect of
the zebra mussel infestation of lakes in Wisconsin on local house prices. While
zebra mussels are devastating to the native species, they are also associated with
increased water clarity. Meder and Johnson (2021) find no measurable effect on
lakefront properties on infested lakes. This finding may explain the difficulty around
enforcing policies aimed at containing the spread of zebra mussel infestation.
When the environment is affected by an industry, or accident, it may be difficult
to accurately measure the environmental impact. Yet, it is still possible to measure
how this event has affected house prices. For example, after the Three Mile Island
accident, proximity to the nuclear plant meltdown would be considered a disamenity
(Nelson, 1981). Additionally, the environmental externalities associated with animal
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agriculture facilities has a negative impact on house prices (Kuethe and Keeney,
2012).
Noise is another externality associated with industry, construction, and development. There is a large literature that uses the hedonic method to measure the
disamenity value of noise. For example, airports (Nelson, 1980), windmills (Jensen
et al., 2014), and traffic (Swoboda et al., 2015; Theebe, 2004), are all sources of
noise that can affect house prices.
Jensen et al. (2014) employ a dataset of over twelve thousand homes within 2,500
meters of a wind turbine and find that wind turbines pose significant and negative
effects on house prices. They look at two different ways in which wind turbines may
affect the desirability of a home. First, visual pollution, which means that the wind
turbines are visible from the home. This could have a negative impact as it makes
the surrounding land seem less rural and perhaps ruin a good view of the terrain.
Next, they measure the impact of the noise pollution generated when the turbines
run on house prices. They find that there is a negative impact of about 3% for visual
pollution and 3-7% for noise pollution, depending on the specification.
In Chapter 4, Lawson (2021) measures the impact of an addition of a runway
at the airport in Columbus, Ohio on house prices. The airport’s runways only run
east-west, making a cone of noise pollution projecting from each side of the airport,
but very little noise pollution occurs to the north and south of the airport. This provided a control group of homes that are a similar distance to the airport, but are not
experiencing the same noise pollution. Lawson finds that the airport’s expansion led
to an increase in air traffic and noise, which resulted in a decline in house prices by
2-10%, depending on the distance from the airport.

1.3 Crime
Many studies have shown that proximity to registered sex offenders is negatively
related to house prices (Caudill et al., 2015; Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008).
Criminal activity in general is also associated with lower house prices, and can even
offset the value of other amenities, like parks (Troy and Grove, 2008). House prices
are negatively associated with drug-related deaths (Ajzenman et al., 2015), violence
(Bishop and Murphy, 2011), terrorism (Besley and Mueller, 2012), when they occur
within a close distance to a house.
In Chapter 2, Bian et al. (2021) expand on the existing literature about the negative relationship between the proximity to registered sex offenders and house prices.
Their contribution looks at the effects of clusters in a neighborhood and discuss the
sorting mechanisms at work, as registered sex offenders would not be uniformly
distributed across a city or neighborhood. The study finds that there is a discount
associated with homes near a cluster of 4 or more registered sex offenders.
In Chapter 5, Alexander (2021) uses data from Baltimore to measure various
impacts of crime on house prices. First, the overall level of crime, based on historical
averages is not significantly related to house prices. However, when crimes occur
near the house while the house is listed for sale do decrease house prices and this
effect varies with the distance to the house. Additionally, there are differential effects
on house prices depending on the type of crime that occurs nearby.
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1.4 Location
There are many outdoor amenities and land-use that can positively affect the value of
a home (Fischel, 2004; Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). In Chapter 1, Jauregui et al.
(2021) contribute to this area of the hedonic literature by highlighting how open
space amenities change over time. Their study shows that preferences surrounding
land use are dynamic and the impact on land values depends on the use, but also the
surrounding areas. There are a number of papers in the economics literature that support this finding. Open and green space can be an amenity, depending on quality. For
example, the literature finds that people are willing to pay a premium for proximity to parks (Espey and Lopez, 2000; Hoshino and Kuriyama, 2010; Poudyal et al.,
2009). This is also the case with golf courses (Do and Grudnitski, 1995), woodlands
(Garrod and Willis, 1992; Tyrväinen and Miettinen, 2000), lakes (Lansford Jr and
Jones, 1995a,b; Nelson, 2010).
In Chapter 7, Stephens (2021) discusses the possible amenity and disamenity
effects of living near a lake by examining houses on or near Lake Erie in Ohio. The
previous literature suggests that buyers are willing to pay a premium for proximity
to bodies of water, but in the Great Lakes Region, living near the lake may mean
living near industrial sites or factories. Stephens (2021) finds that there is a positive
effect on house prices for homes located directly on Lake Erie, but as the homes
get further away from the lakefront, the effects begin to shift, depending on the
proximity to manufacturing facilities. These results are meaningful for the Great
Lakes Region as residents may positively value less industrialization near the lake
and view the lake as a natural and recreational amenity instead.
Depending on the preferences of the buyers, neighbors can also influence the
value of a home. For example, purchasing a home near a foreclosed or vacant property is often viewed as a disamenity (Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Mikelbank,
2008). On the other hand, there are many other neighborhood attributes that can be
viewed as amenities. For example, residential community associations (Grace and
Hall, 2019), historic landmark designation (Noonan, 2007), and historical districts
(Zhou, 2021), correspond with higher property values.
In Chapter 3, (Ursey, 2021) examines how the proximity of rental homes may
affect the value of homes sold in a neighborhood. Utilizing an econometric approach
that is new to the literature with this research question, Ursey (2021) finds that
rentals within a quarter mile of a sold home had a negative impact on price, while
rentals between a quarter and half mile had a positive impact on price.

1.5 Locally provided goods
There is also a substantial literature associated with proximity to establishments
that provide goods and services to the community. Some establishments may be
valuable to those living nearby, but the congestion and noise associated with the
establishment may harm house prices. For example, proximity to places of worship,
are associated with house price premiums (Carroll et al., 1996; Do et al., 1994; Simons and Seo, 2011; Makovi, 2019; Babawale and Adewunmi, 2011). The literature
about living near hospitals is mixed. It may be desirable if individuals value being
close to where they can receive medical treatment, but on the other hand, noise from
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ambulances and helicopters can be seen as a drawback (Peng and Chiang, 2015;
Rivas et al., 2019).
In Chapter 10, Russell Kashian et al. (2021) study the relationship between the
distance to the nearest hospital and house price. In a contribution the existing literature on this research question, the article focuses on homes in rural and exurban
locations in Wisconsin. Their results suggest that in rural communities living near a
hospital is an amenity.
For schools, there are various factors that determine if the school is viewed as an
amenity or disamenity. The literature finds that quality, type, and distance to schools
are positively related to real estate prices (Bayer et al., 2007; Black, 1999; Bogart
and Cromwell, 2000; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; Jud and
Watts, 1981). Whereas school district consolidation contributes to a drop in house
prices (Brasington, 2004).
In Chapter 8, Batson (2021) studies a policy in Rockford, Illinois in 1996. The
school district implemented a Controlled Choice school assignment policy, which
resulted in students moving schools. There was considerable variation in the quality
of schooling prior to the policy, and Batson (2021) finds that when the neighborhood
school was high quality, homes in that neighborhood lost an average of 9.3% of
their value. Alternatively, there was a positive effect on price for homes previously
assigned to poor quality schools.
In Chapter 9, Hearn (2021) discusses the relationship between public-school
quality and house prices. Using a natural experiment from Charlotte, NC, Hearn
(2021) finds that people were willing to pay a premium to live in areas with higher
exam scores, especially in the areas that were experiencing large increases in the
pass rates on the standardized examinations. And unlike the results in Batson (2021),
there is no evidence that there is a negative impact on price for houses that were reassigned for lower quality public high schools.

1.6 Conclusion
The papers in this volume provide an overview of how the hedonic method can
be used to measure a number of amenities and disamenties. While some of these
topics have been studied before, it is important to remember that willingness to pay
depends on the tastes and preferences of individuals living and purchasing homes in
an area. Empirical estimates from hedonic studies will therefore vary across space
and over time. For this reason, there will always be a need for well done empirical
work measuring amenities and disamenties using the hedonic method.
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Chapter 2

Open Space at the Rural-Urban Fringe: A Joint
Spatial Hedonic Model of Developed and
Undeveloped Land Values
Andres Jauregui, Diane Hite, Brent Sohngen, and Greg Traxler

Abstract We examine the impacts of different open space amenities on sales prices
of developed and undeveloped land in two time periods ten years apart in a rapidly
urbanizing county in central Ohio. Buffers within 0.25 and 0.5 miles are created that
include percentages of agricultural, residential, park and golf course uses around
each land sale and are used as explanatory variables. We contribute to the literature
by estimating a unified model that accounts for spatial heterogeneity as well as for
cross-correlations in developed and undeveloped land sales. Our findings suggest
interactions between the land markets examined are complex and dynamic.

2.1 Introduction
There is widespread concern that the largely unplanned production of new housing
stock at the urban frontier reduces open space and other amenities, and that externalities associated with development ultimately lead to a reduction in the value of
suburban residences (Fischel, 1999). Given that most land use decisions that shift
land from agricultural to developed uses are “irreversible,” at least within a 20–50
year period, if developers make decisions that do not account for the spillovers from
development, the effects are capitalized into land values for long periods of time
(Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). Numerous studies (e.g., Irwin (2002); Ready and
Abdalla (2003)) have used the traditional hedonic price model to estimate homeowners’ valuations of environmental amenities surrounding their homes. Their findings suggest that development processes that cause too much development at the
rural fringe can have negative consequences. However, they have not addressed the
fundamental questions posed by Fischel (1999) and Heimlich and Anderson (2001):
Do unplanned development processes accumulate over time, and reduce the value
of other nearby houses and land, and if there are effects, are they irreversible?
Andres Jauregui
California State University Fresno, Fresno, CA 93740
e-mail: andresjauregui@mail.fresnostate.edu
Diane Hite
Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849 e-mail: hitedia@auburn.edu
Brent Sohngen
Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 e-mail: Sohngen.1@osu.edu
Greg Traxler
University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 e-mail: gtraxler@uw.edu

11

12

Andres Jauregui, Diane Hite, Brent Sohngen, and Greg Traxler

To test these hypotheses, we focus on jointly estimating and comparing values of
local open space amenities on developed (land with houses) and undeveloped land
(land without houses). In contrast, traditional hedonic models estimate the value of
amenities on developed land alone. In comparing estimates for developed and undeveloped land, we provide insights into the extent of spillover capitalization into the
housing and land markets. The land market, in fact, may provide a clearer picture
of the value of environmental amenities to households because one does not need
to account for the potential endogeneity between structural amenities in homes and
the value of nearby amenities caused by sorting. By estimating hedonic equations
for undeveloped land, we are able to assess whether open space amenities are incorporated into the value of land before it is developed. Showing that amenities are
incorporated into land values before development occurs suggests that the development process accounts for environmental amenities. Further, if the estimates for
developed and undeveloped sites are the same sign and scale, it would indicate that
the buyers and sellers of bare land pay close attention to the amenities that currently
drive homeowner decisions.
In addition to assessing both developed and undeveloped land, we also assess
how amenity values change over time by comparing estimates in 1988 with those in
1998 for the same county. If unplanned development processes reduce welfare, one
would expect that development near home sites would have stronger disamenity effects over time, and that remaining open space would have stronger benefits. Further,
one would anticipate that if developed or undeveloped sites in 1998 were endowed
with the larger percentages of surrounding open space amenities than those in 1988
had, then the overall value of the homes would be greater. We also examine the
counterfactual by predicting how 1988 prices would have been affected had land
surrounding undeveloped sites been developed to the extent of the 1998 data. By
assessing changes over time, we can also address whether the irreversible nature of
land use change leads to permanent reductions in land value.
To empirically test the questions raised above, we develop methods to jointly estimate hedonic equations for bare land sales and house and land sales in the same
county of Ohio for two different time periods, 1988 and 1998. A two-step procedure
is developed to account for both the spatial nature of the data, and the likely correlation between house sales and land sales. To account for unobserved heterogeneity,
we first run regressions on the developed and undeveloped land equations separately,
employing spatial econometric techniques to account for unobserved variables that
may be spatially correlated with the error terms. To account for potential correlation
between land sales and house sales, a second regression is conducted where the two
hedonic equations are estimated jointly as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
The covariance matrix from the first-stage spatial estimates is used in the SUR to
account for unobserved variables related to the location of the observation. By using this two step procedure, we are able to account both for potential correlation
with unobserved spatial variables, and for likely correlation between house and land
sales. In addition, we are able to decompose the effects of open space amenities on
land and capital.
This is obviously not the first study to assess how development and environmental amenities affect home values with hedonic methods, however it is the first we are
aware of to investigate whether environmental values and the development process
affect home and land values similarly. Existing studies have by and large concluded
that the value of open space to local landowners depends on the type and quality of
the open space. Irwin (2002) suggests that open space provides benefits, but that the
largest benefits accrue only if the land is preserved from future development. Ready
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and Abdalla (2003), Palmquist et al. (1997), and Irwin et al. (2003) find that some
types of farming operations, even though they provide open space for neighbors,
can have negative consequences. Garrod and Willis (1992), Tyrväinen and Miettinen (2000), Espey and Owusu-Edusei (2001), and Paterson and Boyle (2002) show
that the value of open space depends on the quality of the open space. In the context
of this study, we account for differences between permanent and temporary protection of open space, although we do not account for different types of land use
(i.e. livestock versus crop operation, or forest versus agricultural land.1 There have
been some hedonic studies investigating the value of agricultural land (e.g., Boisvert
et al. (1997); Roka and Palmquist (1997); Xu et al. (1993); Kennedy et al. (1997),
but these studies did not consider local environmental amenities located around the
site. Bastian et al. (2002) and Pearson et al. (2002) examined the influence of scenic
views on farmland values, but these studies were conducted in locations with particularly scenic viewing opportunities.
Thus, this paper innovates in several ways. First, it innovates by considering how
open space amenities change over time. Over the 10 year period in the study region
(Delaware County, Ohio), population and per capita income increased by around
60%, and 80% respectively, and around 8,843 agricultural parcels were developed
into residential uses (Hite et al., 2003). One would expect in this context that the
value of environmental amenities would change. Not only would the nature of the
landscape be altered, but new urban migrants with different sets of values would increasingly inhabit the area. Most studies to date have only considered a single time
slice, but the results in this study show that environmental values are susceptible to
potentially large changes over time. Second, the paper accounts for likely correlation between land sales and house and land sales that occur in the urban frontier.
Third, the paper shows how open space values and local residential development
influence the value of two different types of sales that are important in regions with
substantial development-–land sales and house and land sales. Our results indicate
that local amenities are capitalized into both types of sales in similar ways and that
the amenities are about the same proportion of the total value of the sale. This implies that farmers not only provide open space, but also receive a share of the benefits
of open space.

2.2 Analytical Framework
Following Rosen (1974) we apply the hedonic framework to the markets for undeveloped and developed land characteristics. The traditional (non-spatial) hedonic
undeveloped price model is specified as:
lnVi = Li α1 + Oi α2 + Ni α3 + Si α4 + εi

(2.1)

where lnV is a vector of natural logarithms of undeveloped land prices, L is a matrix
of land characteristics, O is a matrix of neighboring land use variables, N is a matrix
of neighborhood characteristics, S is a vector of structural and other environmental
variables, and the s represent parameters to be estimated for properties i = 1...M.
The traditional hedonic developed land price model adds H, a matrix of house
characteristics, to the land only equation:
1

The agricultural land in the study area is primarily row crop. Examination of different types of
agricultural land uses in the area uncovers very few livestock operations of any kind.
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lnPj = L j β1 + H j β2 + O j β3 + N j β4 + Si j β5 + ε j

(2.2)

where O, N and S are as before, the β s are parameters, and lnP represents a vector
of natural logarithms of house prices for houses j = 1...N. Both the traditional hedonic undeveloped and developed price models are most frequently estimated using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The majority of previous undeveloped and developed land hedonic studies do
not account for the possible spatial nature of housing and land data. The literature
on spatial econometrics focuses on two types of spatial effects that can arise when
sample data has a locational component: (1) spatial dependence and (2) unobserved
spatial heterogeneity (LeSage, 1999). Spatial dependence refers to the fact that one
observation associated with a location depends on other observations in adjacent
locations. For example, the price of a house in a particular location depends on the
prices and characteristics of neighboring houses. Unobserved spatial heterogeneity
refers to variation in relationships over space. Anselin (1988) suggests that spatial
effects lack uniformity, that is, the impact of spatial characteristics on the spatial
units vary from one region to another. For example, the impact of house characteristics on house prices located close to a forest is different from the impact of housing
characteristics on house prices located close to a lake. Traditional hedonic price
models that use Ordinary Least Squares fail to account for these effects which in
turn may result in biased, inefficient and inconsistent parameter estimates (Anselin,
1988; Brasington and Hite, 2005). In order to incorporate spatial effects into a regression model we consider a series of spatial model specifications, all derived from
a general spatial model.

2.2.1 General spatial hedonic price model
The general spatial model is considered a point of departure for a series of specific
spatial models that are obtained by constraining some of its parameters (Anselin,
1988). The general spatial model takes the form:
lnVi = ρW1 lnVi + Li α1 + Oi α2 + Ni α3 + Si α4 + εi
εi = λW2 εi + µi

(2.3)

where ρ is a spatial lag coefficient, W1 is a spatial autoregressive weight matrix,
λ is a spatial error coefficient, W2 is a spatial weight matrix of disturbances, µi is
assumed to be a vector of i.i.d. errors, and all other variables and parameters are
defined as before. In this paper we also consider the following model specifications:
the spatial lag model, which is found by imposing λ = 0 into the general spatial
model, the spatial error model, which is obtained by imposing ρ = 0, and the spatial
Durbin model, which is specified as:
lnVi = ρW1 lnVi + Li α11 + Oi α21 + Ni α31 + Si α41
+W2 Li α12 +W2 Oi α22 +W2 Ni α32 +W2 Si α42 + εi

(2.4)
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From all these model specifications, we perform a series likelihood ratio tests to
determine the best fitting models in each year for both developed and undeveloped
land transactions.

2.2.2 Spatial weight matrices
To capture spatial dependence in the house and land hedonic models, spatial weight
matrices must be constructed. Each land and house transaction coordinates can be
used to find the nearest neighbors to each property and construct spatial weight
matrices. The matrices are then normalized to have row-sums of unity. Following
Kim et al. (2003), we experimented with a series of different weights and report
results from the best fitting models.

2.2.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models
Previous empirical studies have assumed that the impact of transactions in the undeveloped land market is independent of transactions occurring in the developed
land market and vice versa. It was argued earlier in this study that the literature
fails to account for the link between these two markets. The main argument for
assuming linkage of the two markets comes from the fact that land is continuous.
For example, the price of land-only transactions may be affected by the price of
house transactions if they share common boundaries. Therefore the impact of different land uses on house prices is not independent of the impact of land uses on
land prices. Though the impact of land use variables is accounted for individually in
both single equations, it is reasonable to believe contemporaneous correlations exist
between the two markets through the unexplained portions of the equations. Given
that both the undeveloped land price equation and the developed land price equation
share similar characteristics that affect one another, as well as possible existence of
common omitted factors that are not accounted for in each equation, we can argue
that the errors between the two equations may be contemporaneously correlated. A
model of this structure calls for a seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE)
approach.

2.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper consists of undeveloped (land only) and developed
(house included) land transactions that took place in two time periods in Delaware
County, Ohio: first, a total of 705 undeveloped land transactions and 1,595 developed land transactions from July 1987 to June 1988, and second, a total of 1,236 undeveloped land transactions and 1,915 developed land transactions from July 1997
to June 1998. Delaware County is located north of the city of Columbus, and is a
fast-growing part of Ohio. It contains not only high quality agricultural land, but also
high value land for development (Sohngen et al., 2000). Table 2.1 presents variables
definitions and sources, while Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 presents summary statistics
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by time period and type of transaction on structural housing characteristics, parcel
characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics used in the hedonic regressions.
Table 2.1 Definitions and sources of hedonic regression variables
Name

Definition

PRICE
Price of undeveloped and developed land transactions in 1988 and 1998*
NOTINACITY 1 for properties not in a city, 0 otherwise
CORNYIELD Yield of corn on land (bushels per acre)
SLOPE
Average percentage slope of property*
AREA
Property area in acres
SQFT
Square footage of house (1000s)
AGE HOUSE Age of house in years, up to the transaction year*
STORYHGT
Number of stories in house*
BASEMENT Size of basement coverage*
ROOMS TOT Total number of rooms in house*
BATHS TOT Total number of bathrooms in house (half bath=0.5)*
GARAGE CAP Cars fitting in garage*
ATTIC
1 for houses with an attic, 0 otherwise*
POP DENS
Population density in census block**
INCPRCAP
Income per capita in block, in dollars**
SOUTHBND Distance to the southern boundary in miles***
% of agricultural land in 0.25 and 0.50 radii buffer, in 1988 and 1998****
PCT AG
PCT GOLF
% of golf courses land in 0.25 and 0.50 radii buffer, in 1988 and 1998****
PCT PARK
% of park land in 0.25 and 0.50 radii buffer, in 1988 and 1998****
PCT RES
% of residential land in 0.25 and 0.50 radii buffer, in 1988 and 1998****
Note: Prices is deflated by the average quarterly Ohio Housing Price Index (I QTR 1988=100)
from Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. Sources: * Delaware County Auditor, **US Census Bureau, *** Calculated using ArcGIS® .

It can be seen from Table 2.2 that the average price for undeveloped transactions
increased by 45.38% over the ten years under study, while Table 2.3 shows the average price for developed transactions increased by 19.46%. The average parcel size
for undeveloped transactions decreased by 78% while the average parcel size for
developed transactions slightly decreased. All this suggests that considerable parcel
fragmentation occurred over the ten years period, resulting in more transactions in a
given year but highly reduced area transacted. Further, the percentage increase in per
capita income at the census tract level over the ten years period of study (41.65% for
undeveloped transactions and a 45.02% for developed transactions) is much higher
than the average percentage increase at the state level.2
Several sources comprise the dataset. All house and land information comes from
the Delaware County Auditor.3 Housing characteristics include the total number of
rooms in a house, the total number of bathrooms (the sum of full baths and half
baths), the total garage capacity, and the age of a house in years, as well as dummy
variables for the presence of an attic, basement, and central air conditioning.
The land characteristics include parcel area in acres and the percentage slope
(measured by rise/run) and soil type of the parcel. Also included is a dummy variable for whether the parcel is located in a city area. Further, since most land price
studies are concerned with the impact of land characteristics, such as productivity,
2

Calculated at 20.21% for the 1989-99 period; data obtained from the US Census Bureau.
The Delaware County Office operates a project named Delaware Appraisal Land Information
System (DALIS) whose mission is to collect GIS data in Delaware County, OH. Special thanks go
to Shoreh Elhami, GIS Director of DALIS Project, for her assistance with the data.
3
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Table 2.2 Hedonic variable means for undeveloped land
1988
Variable
PRICE
NOTINACITY
CORNYIELD
SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
AGE-HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
POP DENS
INCPRCAP
SOUTHBND
PCT AG (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT GOLF (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT PARK (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT RES (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT AG (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT GOLF (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT PARK (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT RES (0.50 mi buffer)
Number of observations

Mean
$60,589.52
0.33
93.72
3.61
7.16
1,025.25
$14,377.72
4.96
41.27
1.42
3.39
34.53
41.26
1.39
5.27
36.90
705

Std. Dev.
$118,729.09
0.47
11.01
1.72
19.82
677.06
$3,577.34
4.66
34.13
6.63
8.94
24.93
29.91
4.06
8.47
21.82
705

1998
Mean
$88,086.39
0.77
94.58
3.38
1.78
289.44
$20,308.83
4.70
24.40
1.60
2.40
51.31
31.20
1.76
3.51
41.72
1,236

Std. Dev
$230,599.47
0.42
16.67
4.03
5.87
720.95
$8,873.36
4.45
26.39
7.67
6.91
23.45
25.57
6.54
7.64
18.71
1,236

Table 2.3 Hedonic variable means for developed land
1988
Variable
PRICE
NOTINACITY
CORNYIELD
SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
AGE-HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
POP DENS
INCPRCAP
SOUTHBND
PCT AG (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT GOLF (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT PARK (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT RES (0.25 mi buffer)
PCT AG (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT GOLF (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT PARK (0.50 mi buffer)
PCT RES (0.50 mi buffer)
Number of observations

Mean
$101,498.89
0.14
92.61
3.91
1.96
2.22
16.62
1.64
0.85
7.26
2.49
1.75
1,293.02
$13,825.80
4.65
26.84
1.91
3.95
43.20
42.26
1.81
4.96
36.64
1,595

Std. Dev
$81,020.66
0.35
6.89
1.62
8.77
0.87
29.34
0.45
0.36
1.87
1.02
1.01
494.59
$1,883.41
4.35
28.69
6.77
10.35
22.92
29.15
4.94
8.30
20.96
1,595

1998
Mean
$121,249.74
0.60
93.42
3.81
1.84
2.20
17.05
1.75
0.90
7.34
2.63
1.91
894.76
$20,050.19
4.63
18.65
1.72
2.84
55.11
26.93
1.78
4.55
43.18
1,915

Std. Dev.
$67,952.14
0.49
17.60
4.30
6.83
0.74
29.09
0.40
0.29
1.49
0.84
0.90
1,795.07
$9,133.43
4.15
21.38
7.09
7.03
19.34
21.90
6.25
8.36
16.46
1,915
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on land prices, we include the potential average corn yield of the transacted parcel.
Neighborhood demographic characteristics include income per capita and population density collected at the census block group level. These variables come from
the US Census Bureau. Following the urban economics literature, a set of distance
measures is included to capture proximity to urbanized areas. These variables, calculated using ArcGIS® , are the distances in miles from each transacted house and
parcel to the city of Columbus and the city of Delaware.

2.3.1 Neighborhood land characteristic variables
The primary variables of interest in this study are the percentages of land use types
in buffers around a transacted property. A review of the literature does not suggest
a specific number or size of buffers to be included in the hedonic regressions. Irwin
(2002) suggests that a visual inspection of the land use distribution could be a first
indicator to determine the specification of the neighborhood extent; she uses a 0.25mile radius buffer (400-meters); Patterson and Boyle (2002) use a 0.62-mile radius
buffers (1-kilometer); Espey and Owusu-Eudsei (2001) use various buffer sizes for
different park types. To avoid collinearity problems, the hedonic regressions in this
essay do not include all of the land uses calculated within the buffers. Since it is
of interest to determine the impact of open space lands and residential land on land
and house prices, the regressions only include the percentage of agricultural land,
residential land, parks, and golf courses within a buffer of 0.25 miles radii. A second
buffer of 0.5 miles radii is also created. The percentages of land uses in the buffers
are calculated using ArcGIS® .

2.4 Empirical Results
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 presents the estimates of the spatial undeveloped and developed land price equations in 1988 and 1998. Table 2.4 presents the 0.25 mile buffer
and Table 2.5 the 0.50 mile buffer. The undeveloped land equations in 1998 present
higher adjusted R2 than the undeveloped land equations in 1988; further, they comparatively have a greater number of explanatory variables that are statistically different from zero. The same result is observed in the developed land equations, yet the
1988 equations present several explanatory variables that are statistically different
from zero. With respect to the land use variables, their impact on the undeveloped
land prices is not statistically significant, yet significant on developed land prices
(except in 1988).
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 presents results for the undeveloped and developed land
price equations in 1988 and 1998 treated as seemingly unrelated regressions. Table
2.6 presents the results for the 0.25 mile buffer and Table 2.7 for the 0.50 barrier.
In order to estimate these coefficients, we proceed as follows: First, we obtain the
vector of disturbances from a first stage spatial regression with undeveloped and
developed land transactions pooled together for a given year. Second, we estimate
the variance-covariance matrix of disturbances using Judge et al.’s (1985) procedure
when each equation has different number of observations. This variance-covariance
matrix of disturbances is used to re-estimate the equations as seemingly unrelated
regressions without directly accounting for spatial effects.
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Table 2.4 Results for the spatial hedonic models, 0.25 mile buffer
Undeveloped
1988
1998
Variable
INTERCEPT
NOTINACITY
LN CORNYIELD
LN SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
LN AGE HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
LN POP DENS
LN INCPRCAP
LN SOUTHBND
PCT AG
PCT GOLF
PCT PARK
PCT RES
RHO
LAMBDA

Estimate
4.48***
-0.075
0.023
-0.160**
0.008***
-0.136**
0.756***
-0.165**
-0.003
0.002
-0.001
-0.005
-0.008
0.598***

t-stat
2.84
-0.43
0.90
-2.00
3.80
-2.35
3.21
-2.43
-1.07
0.31
-0.22
-1.25
-0.43
23.96

Estimate
5.88***
0.294**
0.008
0.044
0.000
-0.202***
0.662***
-0.090*
-0.011***
-0.011**
-0.011*
-0.019***
0.029***
0.474***

Developed
1988
t-stat
3.94
2.37
0.71
1.06
0.05
-5.28
4.58
-1.90
-4.36
-1.93
-1.87
-7.34
3.22
21.28

Estimate
11.11***
0.127
0.106***
0.002
0.184***
0.029***
0.128***
0.113*
-0.072***
0.156***
0.103***
-0.013
0.008
-0.216***
-0.003
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.022***
0.356***

t-stat
140.90
0.69
2.78
1.12
4.68
8.76
2.49
1.84
-4.37
4.43
3.93
-0.22
0.17
-7.12
-2.36
-0.92
-1.14
-1.55
-3.27
26.65

1998
Estimate
9.47***
0.008
0.031***
-0.005***
0.217***
0.012*
-0.053*
0.076*
0.019*
0.093***
0.088***
-0.018***
0.007
-0.070***
0.002***
0.006***
0.004***
0.003***
0.076***
0.076***

t-stat
512.92
0.30
2.57
-3.41
9.71
1.72
-1.76
2.02
1.90
4.44
5.78
-2.43
0.75
-7.06
2.44
3.75
2.44
4.08
15.89
5.67

N
705
1,236
1,595
1,915
Adjusted R2
0.40
0.46
0.31
0.45
Note: a series of likelihood ratio test comparing the general spatial model to the spatial error
model, the spatial lag model, and the spatial Durbin model suggest that the general specification best.

All estimated equations resulted in high adjusted R2 , yet the number of statistically significant variables varies from one equation to another. In particular, the
land use variables present differing results across years and type of transaction. The
price of undeveloped land transactions in 1988 is positively impacted only by the
percentage of golf area within 0.25 miles from the property, and negatively impacted
by the percentage of residential land within the same distance. None of the percentages of land use variables statistically impact the price of undeveloped land within
0.50 miles from the property. In 1998, only the percentage of residential land within
0.25 miles from the property has a negative impact on the price of undeveloped land
transactions, though the estimated coefficient is considerably higher than in 1988.
The percentages of golf course area and park area within a distance of 0.50 miles
from the undeveloped land property have a positive impact on its price, while the
percentage of residential land has a negative impact, yet smaller in size compared to
the impact within 0.25 miles from the property.
The percentages of agricultural land, park areas, and residential land have a negative impact on the price of developed land transactions in 1988 within 0.25 miles
from the property, yet no significant impact is found within 0.50 miles from the
property. These effects are reverted in 1998; all land uses have a positive impact on
developed land prices with the percentage of park areas having the greatest impact.
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Table 2.5 Results for the spatial hedonic models, 0.50 mile buffer
Undeveloped
1988
1998
Variable
INTERCEPT
NOTINACITY
LN CORNYIELD
LN SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
LN AGE HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
LN POP DENS
LN INCPRCAP
LN SOUTHBND
PCT AG
PCT GOLF
PCT PARK
PCT RES
RHO
LAMBDA

Estimate
4.65***
-0.111
0.019
-0.155**
0.008***
-0.150***
0.722**
-0.181***
0.001
-0.004
-0.001
-0.000
-0.015
0.597***

t-stat
1.65
-1.13
0.77
-1.94
3.55
-3.32
1.94
-2.92
0.41
-0.42
-0.18
-0.03
-1.15
14.26

Estimate
5.61***
0.182
0.008
0.045
-0.000
-0.213***
0.662***
-0.056
-0.011***
0.010
-0.005
-0.015***
0.036***
0.459***

Developed
1988
t-stat
2.95
1.47
0.68
1.03
-0.11
-4.67
3.10
-0.99
-3.35
1.45
-0.83
-3.73
2.84
15.00

Estimate
10.79***
0.105
0.105***
0.002
0.179***
0.028***
0.134***
0.116*
-0.068***
0.152***
0.098***
-0.002
0.019
-0.231***
-0.001
0.002
-0.001
-0.000
-0.024**
0.364***

t-stat
122.42
0.57
2.77
1.06
4.55
9.06
2.61
1.89
-4.18
4.33
3.75
-0.04
0.39
-8.75
-0.44
0.49
-0.56
-0.12
-2.40
27.82

1998
Estimate
9.56***
-0.005
0.027**
-0.005***
0.199***
0.016**
-0.045
0.081**
0.017*
0.093***
0.087***
-0.012***
-0.009
-0.083***
0.003***
0.010***
0.005***
0.006***
0.074***
0.070***

t-stat
514.08
-0.19
2.27
-3.52
8.87
2.22
-1.48
2.16
1.72
4.42
5.77
-2.70
-0.96
-7.78
4.17
5.24
3.46
6.58
15.63
5.26

N
705
1,236
1,595
1,915
Adjusted R2
0.40
0.45
0.31
0.49
Note: a series of likelihood ratio test comparing the general spatial model to the spatial error
model, the spatial lag model, and the spatial Durbin model suggest that the general specification best.

2.5 Discussion
Results from the seemingly unrelated regressions are used to compare marginal impacts from land use changes on undeveloped and developed land prices over time
where land changes are measured as percentage changes in land uses in buffers
around each property. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 present marginal values for the four
categories of land uses.4 The impact of changes in the percentage of agricultural
land is positive in both years on undeveloped and developed land values. In 1988, a
1% increase in agricultural land in the 0.25 mile radii buffer increases undeveloped
land values by $186.51, while it increases developed land prices by $368.10. These
effects are considerably larger in 1998. A 1% increase in agricultural land increases
undeveloped land values by $2,438.47, while it increases developed land prices by
$5,287.06. While the average value of land-only transactions increased in real terms
by nearly 18% per year, the value of agricultural open space around land-only transactions increased 18-25% per year (0.50-0.25 mi. radius respectively).
The value of developed parcels increased substantially more slowly over the 10
year time period, only 2.4% per year when considered on a $/acre basis, and 1.9%
per year when considered on a %/ f t 2 basis. In contrast, the value of agricultural
open-space increased by 14–27% per year 0.50-0.25 mi. radius respectively). Taken
4

We calculated the marginal implicit prices of each of the land uses assuming that the area of each
property remains constant at the sample average.
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Table 2.6 Results for the SUR hedonic price models using a spatially corrected covariance matrix,
0.25 mile buffer
Undeveloped
1988
1998
Variable
INTERCEPT
NOTINACITY
LN CORNYIELD
LN SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
LN AGE HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
LN POP DENS
LN INCPRCAP
LN SOUTHBND
PCT AG
PCT GOLF
PCT PARK
PCT RES

Estimate
0.000***
-0.297***
0.006***
-0.161*
0.011***
-0.072
1.201***
-0.251***
0.000
0.016***
-0.004
-0.009***

N
Adjusted R2

t-stat
0.01
-1.30
0.21
-1.85
4.43
-1.08
21.97
-5.62
0.11
2.47
-0.81
-3.88

Estimate
0.030
0.572***
0.046***
0.196***
0.003
0.125***
0.993***
-0.153***
0.000
0.005
0.004
-0.010***

705
0.97

Developed
1988
t-stat
1.35
6.98
4.15
5.32
0.65
5.22
53.44
-5.93
0.06
1.31
1.09
-5.62

Estimate
0.002
-0.091
0.084***
0.001
0.000***
0.026***
0.159***
0.147**
-0.079***
0.156***
0.141***
-0.029
1.164***
-0.158***
-0.004***
0.001
-0.004*
-0.003***

1,236
0.97

1998
t-stat
0.07
-0.49
2.21
0.55
4.18
8.73
3.17
2.43
-4.83
4.38
5.52
-0.50
23.98
-7.00
-3.82
0.55
-1.90
-3.12

Estimate
0.050***
0.195***
0.019
-0.004**
0.000**
0.062***
0.201***
0.371***
0.089***
0.129***
0.100***
0.084***
0.803***
0.040***
0.010***
0.010***
0.018***
0.009***

1,595
0.98

t-stat
2.51
4.84
1.02
-1.77
2.37
5.39
4.08
6.14
5.33
3.80
4.11
7.28
53.28
2.63
8.67
4.11
6.79
7.35
1,915
0.98

Table 2.7 Results for the SUR hedonic price models using a spatially corrected covariance matrix,
0.50 mile buffer
Undeveloped
1988
1998
Variable
INTERCEPT
NOTINACITY
LN CORNYIELD
LN SLOPE
AREA
SQFT
LN AGE HOUSE
STORYHGT
BASEMENT
ROOMS TOT
BATHS TOT
GARAGE CAP
LN POP DENS
LN INCPRCAP
LN SOUTHBND
PCT AG
PCT GOLF
PCT PARK
PCT RES
N
Adjusted R2

Estimate
0.000***
-0.357
0.006
-0.165*
0.010***
-0.158**
1.222***
-0.229***
0.003
-0.014
-0.000
-0.003

t-stat
0.01
-1.60
0.24
-1.91
4.01
-2.42
19.75
-5.93
1.10
-1.24
-0.02
-0.66
705
0.97

Estimate
0.030
0.474***
0.046***
0.191***
0.003
0.120***
0.978***
-0.158***
0.001
0.022***
0.009**
-0.008***

Developed
1988
t-stat
1.33
5.74
4.15
5.14
0.68
4.99
51.55
-5.44
0.70
4.74
2.34
-3.79
1,236
0.97

Estimate
0.002
-0.164
0.085**
0.001
0.000***
0.024***
0.161***
0.163***
-0.071***
0.150***
0.129***
-0.028
1.136***
-0.189***
-0.000
0.003
-0.000
0.000

1998
t-stat
0.07
-0.89
2.22
0.75
3.83
8.60
3.21
2.70
-4.43
4.23
5.10
-0.49
22.61
-9.68
-0.14
0.70
-0.02
0.26
1,595
0.98

Estimate
0.050***
0.169***
0.0167
-0.003
0.000***
0.066***
0.195***
0.396***
0.091***
0.130***
0.105***
0.085***
0.811***
0.014
0.011***
0.007***
0.016***
0.007***

t-stat
2.52
4.10
0.86
-1.57
2.59
5.78
3.95
6.55
5.47
3.82
4.32
7.38
53.16
0.88
8.73
2.46
6.87
4.64
1,915
0.98
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Table 2.8 Average marginal implicit prices for changes in the percentage land uses within 0.25 mi
buffer, in real dollars
1988 Undeveloped
Mean
$186.51
$1,141.11
-$53.00
-$432.61

Agricultural land
Golf courses
Parks
Residential Land

Upper 95%
$256.09
$1,566.80
-$33.23
-$271.23

Mean
$2,438.47
$2,662.75
$4,496.86
$3,174.19

1988 Developed
Lower 95% Upper 95% Mean

Mean
Agricultural Land
Golf Courses
Parks
Residential Land

Lower 95%
$116.93
$715.42
-$72.78
-$593.99

1998 Undeveloped

$368.10
$2,252.17
-$104.61
-$853.82

$252.34
$1,543.89
-$137.51
-$1,122.34

$483.87
$2,960.45
-$71.71
-$585.31

Lower 95%
$1,497.27
$1,634.98
$2,761.16
$1,949.01

Upper 95%
$3,379.68
$3,690.52
$6,232.56
$4,399.37

1998 Developed
Lower 95% Upper 95%

$5,287.06
$5,773.33
$9,750.02
$6,882.24

$4,947.34
$5,402.37
$9,123.54
$6,440.03

$5,626.77
$6,144.29
$10,376.50
$7,324.45

together, the results for both developed and undeveloped land indicates that a large
proportion of the growth in value over the time period is due to open space. For
instance, while the value of developed parcels has increased only slowly, the value
of the open-space around developed parcels appears to be an increasingly important
component of the value of developed parcels.
Further, these effects are considerably larger when considering a greater buffer
size. The process of land transformation from agricultural land into residential land
progressively impacts how undeveloped and developed land owners value the agricultural land left.
Table 2.9 Average marginal implicit prices for changes in the percentage land uses within 0.50 mi
buffer, in real dollars
Undeveloped
1988 Undeveloped
Mean
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Agricultural land $754.43 $580.90
$927.96
Golf courses
$152.36 $117.32
$187.41
Parks
$706.96 $544.35
$869.57
Residential Land $588.14 $452.86
$723.42
1988 Developed
Agricultural land
Golf courses
Parks
Residential Land

Mean
$1,752.03
$353.83
$1,641.78
$1,365.84

Lower 95%
$1,312.70
$265.11
$1,230.09
$1,023.35

Upper 95%
$2,191.36
$442.56
$2,053.46
$1,708.33

1998 Undeveloped
Mean
Lower 95% Upper 95%
$3,657.23 $1,822.42 $5,492.04
$5,872.10 $2,926.11 $8,818.10
$6,245.43 $3,112.14 $9,378.72
$5,328.24 $2,655.10 $8,001.38
1998 Developed
Mean
$6,843.43
$10,987.91
$11,686.49
$9,970.23

Lower 95%
$6,393.26
$10,265.12
$10,917.74
$9,314.38

Upper 95%
$7,293.59
$11,710.70
$12,455.23
$10,626.08

The same effect is observed for the percentage of golf courses surrounding a
property, yet in 1988 a 1% increase in this type of land has a considerably larger
impact than the percentage of agricultural land. Over time, the impact of additional
land dedicated to golf course follows the same pattern as agricultural land, as well
the marginal impact equalize. An increase in 1% in the percentage area dedicated to
parks within 0.25 miles from both undeveloped and undeveloped land properties in
1998 has a negative impact; yet extending the area to 0.50 miles from the property
results in a positive impact. This effect is inverted in 1998: both undeveloped and
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developed land prices are positively impacted by the percentage of land dedicated to
parks. Combining these two effects, it can be observed that the marginal impact of
open space lands increases as time passes and the relative abundance of these types
of land are reduced at the expense of residential land. Land owners and homeowners considerably value agricultural land, golf course and parks, and their valuation
increases over time.
The marginal impact of a 1% increase in the area dedicated to residential land
has a negative impact of $432.61 within a 0.25 miles distance from undeveloped
land properties in 1988, yet the marginal effect becomes positive considering a 0.50
mi distance. This effect is reversed in 1998; a 1% increase in the percentage area
dedicated to residential land increases undeveloped land values by $3,174.19 considering a 0.25 miles distance from the property, whereas it marginally increases
undeveloped land prices by $5,328.24 within 0.50 miles from the property.

2.6 Simulations
The undeveloped and developed land price equations estimated in this paper are
used to predict the impact of land use changes on property values as urbanization
into predominantly agricultural areas takes place. Concerns over the impact of increased urban and suburban growth on agricultural areas and open space lands have
led many cities and counties in the United States to pass laws to protect farmland
and the environment discouraging the expansion of suburban areas. It is arguable
that these policies have unpredictable effects on land and house prices. Further, as
this expansion continues, the relative abundance of land amenities decreases with
respect to other types of land areas. It is therefore useful to determine whether the
changing conditions in the area dedicated to a particular land use capitalizes into
property values. One way to asses this impact is to simulate price changes in the
hedonic price models imposing certain conditions on the land use variables. Specifically, we are interested in assessing how the actual predicted value of developed or
undeveloped parcels in 1998 (with 1998 amenities) compare to the predicted value
of these same parcels assuming they have 1988 amenities.
Table 2.10 Actual predicted prices in 1998 versus simulated predicted prices in 1998 within 0.25
and 0.50 miles buffer
Undeveloped 0.25 mi buffer
Mean

Actual Price Prediction
$46,321 $44,681
Simulated Price Prediction $54,984 $53,084
% Change
19.16 18.66

$47,961
$56,884
19.65

Undeveloped 0.50 mi buffer
Mean

Developed 0.25 mi buffer

Lower 95% Upper 95% Mean

$122,266 $118,462
$120,610 $117,082
0.27
-0.30

$48,322
$50,863
6.88

$126,070
$124,138
0.84

Developed 0.50 mi buffer

Lower 95% Upper 95% Mean

Actual Price Prediction
$46,605 $44,889
Simulated Price Prediction $49,153 $47,443
% Change
6.58
6.28

Lower 95% Upper 95%

Lower 95% Upper 95%

$121,899 $118,148
$137,232 $133,241
14.17
13.53

$125,650
$141,224
14.81

Table 2.10 present simulations of undeveloped and developed land prices in 1998
assuming that the average percentage area of the different land uses in 1998 approx-
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imate the averages in 1988. These results are compared to the actual undeveloped
and developed predictions from the estimated model in 1998. The average percentage of land dedicated to agriculture in this sample of transactions decreased considerably from 1988 to 1998, especially surrounding undeveloped land transactions.
The average percentage area dedicated to residential land also increased, while the
average percentage of area dedicated to golf course and parks were not considerably
affected.
Two effects are considered here. First, residential expansion may adversely capitalize into property prices due to increased housing congestion and other resulting
externalities. Second, because open space amenities are positive valued, and open
space amenities are larger in 1988, one would expect houses and land in 1998 to
be more valuable if they have 1988 amenities. For the 0.25 mi. buffer, undeveloped land transactions are estimated to be 19% more valuable if they have the 1988
amenities in 1998, whereas developed land transactions are estimated to be about
the same value. Thus, open-space within a relatively short distance of an agricultural property tends to enhance that properties value, however, it does not appear
to enhance the value of a developed property. Looking at the 0.50 mi. buffer, undeveloped land transactions would have only been about 7% more valuable with the
amenities of 1988 around them, whereas developed transactions would have been
14% more valuable. These results help explain observed tendencies in the Midwest,
where there is strong reliance on minimum lot size zoning. Minimum lot size zoning would appear to substantially benefit agricultural land owners because it would
help preserve open space near existing farms, while at the same time allowing for
development to occur. The results also imply that nearby open space does not substantially benefit developed land if that open space is close. Open space appears
to have its greatest effects on developed land if it is not located in the immediate
vicinity of the house.
Results from calculating the percentage difference between the simulated prices
and the predicted prices indicate that in close proximity to the property, residential
expansion has a greater negative impact on the price of undeveloped land transactions than developed land transactions. Assuming that the land use averages in 1998
remain at the same averages than in 1988, ceteris paribus, undeveloped land prices
would have been 19.16% higher than the actual predictions, whereas developed land
prices would have been only 0.27% greater considering the impact within 0.25 miles
from the property. This means that the negative impact of urbanization outweighed
the positive impact of increased relative area dedicated to open space lands, but the
impact is greater on undeveloped land properties than in developed ones.

2.7 Conclusion
This paper addresses concerns over the impact of urban and suburban expansion
into predominantly agricultural areas. We consider that the negative impact from
externalities generated by increased residential areas counteracted by the positive
externality generated from an increase in the relative abundance of open space lands
accumulate into property price over time. Results from the estimated undeveloped
and developed land prices in two different time periods are used to shed light into
whether the negative impact of urbanization outweigh the positive impacts of the
remaining open space land. These results are relevant policy making tools that al-
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low us to predict how land use changes affect the value of land and house price
transactions.
This paper represents a contribution to the literature because it estimates households’ valuations of different types of land uses on land and house transactions
considering the fact that both markets are linked by the continuity and fixity of land.
Empirical results determine that households’ valuation of open space lands differ
between land only transactions and transactions that include a house. Further, we
can predict changing preferences over time: residential movers in 1988 have different preferences compared to those in 1998.
The following concerns need to be addressed in future research. First, the land
uses in this paper do not provide information about whether the parcels are potentially developable or idle. Further, it was not possible to determine whether the
parcels classified as agricultural land are actually being used for agricultural production. The marginal impact of additional agricultural land most likely differs by types
of agricultural operations. It has been found in the literature that certain agricultural
activities have a negative impact on property values, such as swine production farms,
whereas others might have positive impacts. The last concern relates to the impact
of congestion externalities on property values. Most conversion of agricultural land
into residential land accompanies fragmentation of large plots into smaller plots.
The increase in housing congestion as measured by density of built structures per
unit of land, for example, is not captured within the percentage of residential land
surrounding a property. Over time the percentage increases, but at the same time
the number of houses built on the parcels also increases. It is possible that the impact of residential land use on property values may differ by the capital intensity
surrounding the property, an effect which is outside the scope of this study.
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Chapter 3

Neighborhood Sorting Dynamics in Real Estate:
Evidence from the Virginia Sex Offender
Registry
Xun Bian, Raymond Brastow, Michael Stoll, Bennie Waller and Scott Wentland

Abstract Given the potential risk of recidivism, recent research has found that registered sex offenders impose external costs that are capitalized into the value (lower
prices) and liquidity (longer time on market) of nearby residential real estate. Using
more than a decade of real estate listings data and a unique data set of registered
sex offenders (RSOs) in Virginia, we extend this literature by investigating how real
estate markets respond to clustering of this particular group and whether there is evidence of market prices facilitating clustering phenomena. Employing a differencein-difference approach within a hedonic empirical framework, the results show that
the housing market has a nonlinear response to clusters, as it considerably discounts
prices of homes located near a cluster (4+) of RSOs, providing a market incentive
for further sorting/clustering. Our empirical findings and supplemental geospatial
analysis are consistent with a sorting/tipping model in which individuals choose
residential locations according to preferences and price incentives. Insofar as clustering of negative externalities is efficient, we further discuss the market efficiency
implications in this context.

3.1 Introduction
Thomas Schelling (1971) showed that residents will tend to sort into segregated
neighborhoods, even when individuals within those neighborhoods are relatively
tolerant and do not have extreme preferences for such segregation as the group dyXun Bian
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namics suggest. In his model segregation is produced by individuals who chose to
locate in areas where they are not surrounded by large numbers of neighbors from
another group. In the presence of a critical mass of ‘others’ a neighborhood may
‘tip’ in one direction as residents move out.1 A number of studies have investigated
the dynamics of Schelling’s tipping model in different contexts. In this chapter, we
apply the insights of the Schelling tipping model to another group dynamic, clustering among sex offenders and non-sex offenders, a group of great concern to participants in the real estate market (which also happens to have transparent public data
on where they live and when they move). In particular, using a hedonic pricing approach, we examine whether there is evidence that the price mechanism incentivizes
these groups to cluster and the broader housing market implications of this result.
Following the passage of Megan’s Law and related statutes at both the state and
national level, convicted sex offenders must register their residences with local authorities each time they move (Virginia State Police, 2020).2 Each state operates its
own online registry, which is searchable by the general public. When a registered
sex offender moves in nearby, studies have consistently shown that the neighborhood takes note, which affects the local real estate market in turn. The purpose of
this chapter is to study the incremental effects that sex offenders (and sex offender
clusters) have on home prices and liquidity, determining whether there is evidence
of distinct price signals that facilitate tipping in the market for real estate. Using a
straightforward nearest-neighbor GIS analysis, we further explore the implications
of these pricing dynamics, examining the locational choices of sex offenders and
homeowners (i.e. non-sex offenders), looking at whether these groups tend to separate from one another and whether sex offenders exhibit a tendency to cluster among
other sex offenders over time.
Motivating our empirics analytically, we first explore household preferences that
may lead to clustering dynamics. Some households may have preferences to move
out in the event that one or more registered sex offenders move in nearby. On the
other side of the same coin, sex offenders may be more likely than the general population to move near other sex offenders for a variety of reasons (e.g. discounted
housing, less aversion to living near a fellow offender, etc.). Over time, neighborhood composition will tend to ‘tip’ toward segregation of these two groups, based on
their preferences, market conditions, and, as we explore empirically, pricing incentives. Moreover, there may be considerable variation of individual or family-level
preferences toward sex offenders within the general populace, which we test using a
proxy potentially correlated with intensity of these preferences. Specifically, we use
a proxy for children to explore whether pricing dynamics are different for ‘family’
vs. ‘non-family’ homes.
To summarize our results, we find evidence that the real estate market steeply
discounts the price of homes near clusters (4+) of registered sex offenders by as
much of 16%, on average, along with a substantial adverse effect on nearby home
liquidity. This result is consistent across multiple specifications, including a threestage-least-squares (3SLS) simultaneous equations analysis; and, when the preferences of the treated group are heightened (i.e., for more family-friendly 3+ bedroom
homes), we find a pronounced effect accordingly. This result helps explain further
1

One insight from Schelling’s model is that trends and patterns of residential mobility for the
group may be more extreme than the preferences of the individual within that group. We return
to a related point later when we investigate effects among individuals with stronger preferences
(proxied by the number of bedrooms within the home).
2 For more information on the sex offender registry in Virginia, which is a key source of our data,
see: https://sex-offender.vsp.virginia.gov/sor/.
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sorting/clustering of sex offenders over time found in the literature and in our own
geospatial analysis, as market prices provide an additional incentive for RSOs to
cluster and concentrate this negative externality in a particular area. We conclude by
discussing the market efficiency implications of these results in more detail.

3.2 Motivating Literature and Contribution
There are several streams of literature that have analyzed the primary elements of
this paper (neighborhood segregation, tipping, and real estate market response to sex
offenders), but one opportunity we take in this study is to combine the insights from
these strands of literature to investigate market response to RSO clusters specifically
and the further sorting that is incentivized by this home price response. Below, we
briefly discuss a number of geography and regional sciences studies that have established that registered sex offenders tend to cluster spatially. These papers generally
focus on the degree to which local or state restrictions limit locational choices and
essentially force sex offenders to live in clusters in the relatively few areas that are
open to them. Another strand of literature has focused on forces that lead to neighborhood segregation. These papers model the existence of stable equilibria and tipping points at which a neighborhood may change from high to low income or from
one ethnic or religious group to another. Finally, economics and real estate studies
have established that living near a sex offender creates negative consequences in
real estate markets — lower selling price and reduced liquidity. Given that these are
sizable (and growing) literatures, the review in this section is not comprehensive;
but, we attempt to integrate some of these insights as we summarize closely related
literature below.
When a registered sex offender (RSO) moves into a neighborhood, it presents
a potential ‘shock’ to the neighborhood that elevates perceptions of crime risk of
nearby residents, which has shown to have a measurable impact on very localized
real estate markets. Given the nature of this shock, which represents a ‘treatment’ to
nearby homes that is differentiated from the control group across both space (near
vs. far) and time (post-RSO move in), the real estate and urban economics academic literature has generally estimated this effect using a difference-in-differences
approach. The study closest to this paper is by Wentland et al. (2014), which also
utilizes multiple listing service (MLS) data estimates the effect of nearby RSOs on
real estate when there is endogenous determination of housing liquidity and price.
Controlling for home and property characteristics as well as property and time fixed
effects, three stage least squares results indicated that the presence of a registered
sex offender within 0.1 miles resulted in a 7% decrease in selling price and an 80%
increase in the time a home takes to sell. The authors also found significant but declining effects on price and liquidity of sex offenders located in larger radii up to one
mile around a listed property relative to the control group (i.e., homes not presently
within a mile of a sex offender). Results were robust across a number of specifications and identification strategies, including correction for sample selection and a
pre-trend, placebo analysis of housing outcomes before a nearby offender moves in
or after he/she moves out. Finally, they also show that the treatment varies heterogeneously based on the intensity of the preferences of potential homebuyers, where
homes with more bedrooms, a proxy for households with more children, suffered
larger price and liquidity effects. Perhaps most relevant for the present study, the
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authors also estimate (linear) effects of additional nearby sex offenders, but did not
investigate potential nonlinear effects of clusters.
Wentland et al. (2014) extended a growing literature that has also found that
sex offenders residing nearby had a significant impact on home prices. Linden and
Rockoff (2008) analyzed housing effects in Mecklenberg County, NC, a large area
which contains Charlotte. Data on the move-in date for the most recent address of
each offender was matched to a data set of home sales over a ten year period. They
found significant reductions in home prices across radii of less than 0.1 miles and 0.1
to 0.3 miles when an offender moves in. Results indicated that the presence of a sex
offender within 0.1 miles reduces home prices by roughly 4.0% after the offender’s
move-in date. Living beyond one-third of a mile from an offender had no significant effect on price in their study. Another influential study in this literature, Pope
(2008), analyzed the effect of proximity to a sex offender in Hillsborough County,
Florida which contains Tampa. His data set included move-in and move-out dates
for every house an offender has occupied since being placed on the registry. Controlling for housing characteristics, time, and neighborhood fixed effects, regression
results indicated that a location within 0.1 miles of a registered sex offender reduced
housing values by 2.3%. He also found that prices rebound when an offender moves
out. Like the Linden and Rockoff (2008) study, the effect dissipated quickly beyond
0.1 mile, as there was no significant effect on price for homes located between 0.1
and 0.2 miles from an offender.
A somewhat older study by Larsen et al. (2003) found similar results in Montgomery County (Dayton area), Ohio. They matched data on sex offender addresses
with home sales during one year, 2000. Controlling for a vector of house characteristics and neighborhood fixed effects, regression results indicate that living within
0.1 miles of a registered sex offender reduces property values by 17.4%. Significant
but diminishing price effects were estimated out to a distance of 0.3 miles.
A more recent paper by Brastow et al. (2018) analyzed the effect of nearby sex
offenders with a focus on housing liquidity. They use both survival analysis and a
difference-in-difference framework, and their empirical results show that registered
sex offenders have a large adverse impact on nearby home liquidity on average,
where this effect is largely driven by ‘surprises’ of sex offenders moving in or out
during the marketing period. However, for homes near offenders who reside nearby
through the entire marketing period, the results indicate that sellers steeply discount
the initial list price and may actually sell their homes more quickly.
Geography and regional science studies have employed a variety of spatial techniques to demonstrate the degree to which registered sex offenders cluster. The analysis generally focusses on local or state restrictions on the location of sex offender
residences. Grubesic (2010) calculates several measures of sex offender clustering in
Illinois and compares the results to residency restrictions and regional demographic
characteristics. The techniques produced general correspondence in the identification of clusters. The study identifies several characteristics of the identified clusters
including the existence of relatively low priced housing.
Rey et al. (2014) introduced a Markov chain framework to analyze residential
movement patterns of registered sex offenders in Hamilton County, Ohio, from
2005 to 2007. The authors analyze sex offender location choices relative to spatial
restrictions. Results indicate a 46 percent reduction in offenders violating spatial restriction zone policy as compared to a counterfactual case where offenders move in
patterns that correspond to existing housing distributions. Strong legacy effects are
also found as offenders previously in violation of restriction policies move into other
restricted zones at a higher rate than offenders who were previously in compliance
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with the policy. Generally, registered sex offenders continue to locate in restricted
zones at a higher rate than expected, despite the policy restrictions.
Finally, the economics literature of residential sorting, segregation, and tipping
has its roots largely in the work of Thomas Schelling (1971). In Schelling’s model,
a resident’s preference for neighborhood characteristics is expressed as the degree
of tolerance for existing or potential residents who differ on some important margin. A resident moves when the number of different neighbors exceeds the individual’s threshold. Schelling’s models demonstrated that tipping and segregation can
occur even if individuals have relatively high thresholds (are willing to live in integrated neighborhoods), segregation is a stable equilibrium and is likely to occur.
Economists continue to develop new models of spatial segregation. In a more recent article, O’Sullivan (2009) models neighborhood preferences as bid-rent offers
where vacant properties are sold to the highest bidder. Even though bid-rent curves
maximize in integrated neighborhoods, inefficient segregation is the stable outcome.
Card et al. (2008) use a regression discontinuity methodology with Census tract
data to test for the dynamics of neighborhood racial composition. They find evidence of white residential flows consistent with tipping behavior in most cities.
Tipping points range from 5% to 20% minority portion of city population. While
there is evidence of white population flows in urban areas, the authors do not find
Census tract rental or housing sale price effects around the tipping point.3 Thus,
while tipping and sorting dynamics have been investigating in these other contexts
(usually by race), these studies often use more aggregated data on the composition
of a particular geography, rather than microdata identifying the exact membership
of a household to a particular group that is sorting. The uniqueness of data from
sex offender registries is that it allows researchers to analyze this type of sorting
and clustering phenomenon at a very micro-level with data where we know the address, move-in, and move-out dates of each member of this particular group, which
contributes to the sorting/tipping literature more broadly. Further, we are able to extend the narrower literatures on the impact of sex offenders by helping explain how
price responses can facilitate clustering and further sorting, which is the primary
contribution of this paper.

3.3 Neighborhood Tipping Dynamics — A Simple Model
In this section, we sketch a simple theoretical model to motivate our empirical analysis. Imagine an open city in a featureless plain. A registered sex offender randomly
selects a point in the city to reside, and our model examines location choices around
this point. Additionally, our model will show that such location choices can impact
the value of nearby properties. We assume that each individual has a utility function:
Ui = U(Q(x, q), c)

3

(3.1)

Two additional studies have modeled neighborhood dynamics and real estate outcomes. Based
on a model developed in Bond and Coulson (1989), the neighborhood turnover process depends
on the hedonic bid functions for housing and neighborhood quality. Coulson and Bond (1990) use
FHA data from six cities from 1979 and 1980 to estimate inverse demand functions for housing
quality attributes. They find significant differences among income groups in the bid for floor space,
suggesting that segregation could occur as higher income groups bid for larger properties. The
authors did not find differences in bid functions for racial composition.
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where individual utility U is a strictly increasing function of the overall quality of
housing services Q and the consumption of a composite good c. For simplicity, the
price of the composite good c is assumed to be the same everywhere in the city,
and the price of c is normalized to unity. Quality of housing services is determined
by two things: 1) x, the intensity of the nearby sex offender(s) and 2) other housing attributes q, which include physical characteristics of the residence (e.g. square
footage, number of bedrooms, etc.) and other location characteristics (e.g. school
quality).4 A greater x could result from closer proximity to the sex offender (or each
additional sex offender). It may also be a consequence of the nearby sex offender
being one who committed a violent offense that is perceived as a higher or more
serious recidivism risk by his or her neighbors. Assuming a sex-offender-free environment is strictly preferred by everyone, we must have Qx < 0. Additionally,
assuming high-quality housing attributes are desirable, we have Qq > 0.
Following Rosen (1974), preferences for the overall quality of housing services
can be expressed by the bids for different levels of housing quality, θ , that yield the
same level of utility Ū. Assuming an individual exhausts his or her endowment y
on housing and the composite good c, we must have c = y − θ . Substitute this into
equation 3.1 and invert, we obtain the bidding function:
θ = θ (Q(x, q), y, Ū)

(3.2)

Equation 3.2 suggests that the willingness-to-pay for location depends on the
level of reservation utility, the endowment y, and overall housing quality Q, which
is determined by both x and q. To examine the impact of sex offenders on property
prices, we implicitly differentiate θ with respect to x holding utility level constant.
We obtain
θx =

UQ
Qx < 0
Uc

(3.3)

Because UQ and Uc are strictly positive, and Qx is strictly negative, we must have
θx < 0. Intuitively, θx is the marginal price an individual is willing to pay for one
unit increase of sex offender intensity x. Not surprisingly, Equation 3.3 indicates
that such a marginal price is negative. In other words, a nearby sex offender is a
‘bad’, or a neighborhood disamenity in this model. Individuals would be willing to
pay to get rid of it. This also implies people must be compensated for accepting
a greater x. In housing markets, such compensation takes the form of lower house
prices. Therefore, Equation 3.3 generates our first testable hypothesis:
Prediction 1: An increase in sex offender intensity x reduces the willingness-topay for a particular location. Property prices fall as x increases.
The first prediction is rather simple and intuitive. Any exogenous shock that increases sex offender intensity would reduce property prices. Such shocks could be a
sex offender moving into a sex-offender-free neighborhood. It could also be a new
sex offender entering a community where some sex offenders already reside. Our
model predicts that such shocks would hurt property value, which is straightforward
and expected, but to this point we have only assumed homogeneous preferences.
Yet, given a fall in value for these properties, the more interesting question is what
happens next with regard to locational choices, particularly if individuals perceive

4 By other location characteristics, we mean location characteristics other than the intensity of the
nearby sex offender, x. Because x is the focus of our analysis here, we single it out from other
location characteristics.
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Fig. 3.1 Difference in willingness to pay between different types of individuals
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θ i , represents the bidding function of type i individuals, who vigorously dislike or
have a strong aversion toward x. The dashed line, θ j , represents the bidding function of type j individuals, who also favor a sex-offender-free environment, but not
as strongly as type i individuals. As shown in Figure 3.1, type i individuals would
outbid type j for locations with lower sex offender intensity. On the other hand, type
j individuals would outbid type i for locations with greater sex offender intensity.
Because ownership goes to who offers the highest bid, sorting based on preference
for x occurs. Specifically, type i individuals will reside at places with lower sex of-
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fender intensity, and locations with greater sex offender intensity will be occupied
by type j individuals. Thus, we obtain the second testable hypothesis:
Prediction 2: individuals with a stronger preference for a sex-offender-free
neighborhood will reside at locations with lower sex offender intensity.
Although the model we presented here is not a dynamic one, it is not hard to
envision that an exogenous change of sex offender intensity would affect mobility.
Imagine a sex offender entering a community. This, as indicated by our first prediction, will hurt nearby house values. Then, the mechanism outlined in our second
prediction will lead people to rethink and modify their location choices made before
such an exogenous shock. Residences who dislike sex offenders the most will have
the strongest incentive to relocate and, most likely, be one of the first to do so. Furthermore, distaste for sex offenders will make a lot of potential buyers shun away
from buying in the neighborhood. Increased supply and low demand may further
cause house prices to drop. Other sex offenders, who perhaps have less of an aversion to their own group are attracted by the lowered prices, are more likely to move
into the community. As a result, the relocation of sex offenders, then, becomes a
non-random process, creating further shocks to the areas in which they move. Thus,
this market process implies that price signals from declining home values associated
with each additional sex offender precipitate a tipping dynamic, where a neighborhood may tip toward a critical mass of sex offenders, resulting in clustering.

3.4 Data
To explore clustering dynamics of registered sex offenders, we have obtained data
from several sources. Our sample of real estate data consist of transactions from
residential properties on the market between July 1999 and June 2009 and come
from a central Virginia multiple listing service (MLS). The initial housing data contained 21,453 observations of both sold and unsold properties. As noted by other
studies, MLS data are ‘organic data’ in the sense that it was initially collected and
maintained for commercial purposes, entered by real estate agents, which means it
can contain some incorrect or incomplete data. As a result, the data were carefully
culled for incomplete, missing, or illogical outliers.5 The final sample consists of
12,426 sold and 7,295 unsold properties.
The data collected from the MLS include typical property characteristics (square
footage, bedrooms, baths, etc.), location, and market and calendar information (list
date, sale date, length of listing contract). Specifically, our data includes numerous
property characteristics, which we use as controls in our hedonic analysis below
(e.g., square footage, age of the structure, acreage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms,
length of the listing contract, indicators for whether the home is a one-story, new,
vacant, whether it has a brick exterior, has hard wood floors, a pool, a fenced yard,
or a walk-in closet). In addition, we control for the year and what time of year
it was sold in (i.e. the season), macroeconomic controls (the unemployment rate
in Virginia, Leading Economic Indicators Index, Consumer Sentiment Index), and
5

Consistent with other studies using MLS data, we culled mobile homes and other outliers from
our data set, confining our data to more ‘typical’ range of homes from $25,000 to $750,000. However, the findings of this study are not sensitive to dropping these observations. As an additional
quality check, a sample of the MLS data was compared to county government records which contain data on price and housing characteristics and MLS data were 100% consistent with the tax
data for our sub-sample.
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area/neighborhood fixed effects (Census Block Groups). These control variables are
commonly used within the real estate literature. Hence, we limit our discussion in
this paper primarily to the variable of interest: the incremental effect of registered
sexual offenders. We do include the summary statistics of our control variables (with
the exception of the time and location fixed effects variables) in the summary statistics table, Table 3.4.
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for sold homes
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev. Min

Max

Sale Price ($)
Time on Market (days)
Sold
Number of Sex Offenders ≤ 0.25 mile
First Sex Offender ≤ 0.25 mile
Second Sex Offender ≤ 0.25 mile
Third Sex Offender ≤ 0.25 mile
Four or More Sex Offenders ≤ 0.25 mile
Square Feet
Age (years)
Vacant
Bedrooms
Baths
Length of Contract (days)
One Story
New
Finished basement
Hardwood
Brick
Pool
Fenced Yard
Walk-in Closet
Acreage
Avg. Fixed Rate Mortgage at Sale Date
Virginia Unemployment Rate
Consumer Sentiment Index
Leading Economic Indicators Index
Fall
Winter
Spring
Summer

165,874.10
110.55
0.61
0.08
0.04
0.01
0.003
0.002
1,924.02
26.42
0.33
3.20
2.04
186.83
0.39
0.16
0.27
0.55
0.54
0.17
0.17
0.21
2.04
6.13
3.57
86.17
99.04
0.19
0.26
0.30
0.25

89,949.70
88.79
0.48
0.38
0.20
0.11
0.05
0.04
782.09
28.15
0.47
0.78
0.69
102.98
0.49
0.37
0.44
0.50
0.50
0.37
0.37
0.41
7.67
0.49
0.59
10.45
6.04
0.39
0.44
0.46
0.43

749,000.00
963.00
1
9
1
1
1
1
8,418.00
267.00
1
8.00
6.00
990.00
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
248.66
8.64
7.10
112.00
104.90
1
1
1
1

25,500.00
0.00
0
0
0
0
0
0
417.00
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.81
2.20
55.30
84.20
0
0
0
0

The Virginia Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry contains detailed
information about registered sexual offenders and is available on a public website
maintained by the Commonwealth of Virginia. However, the publicly available data
on the website only relays a snapshot of sex offenders’ current addresses at the time
the website is accessed. While this is sufficient for homebuyers and real estate agents
to check the registry when purchasing a property, from a research standpoint, this
is problematic because a number of registered sex offenders move often and their
history of addresses is not maintained on the public site. To overcome this issue,
we have obtained a unique archived data set from the Virginia State Police which
contains each of the registered sex offender’s past addresses, including all movein and move-out dates. Each observation also contains a registered sex offender’s
current address, along with a number of other personal characteristics (e.g., age,
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sex, race, description of the perpetrated crime, and whether that crime was a violent
crime) that appear on the registry.
Over approximately ten years, there were 2,031 sex offenders who resided at
4,601 different addresses in the geographic area we focus on in Virginia.6 The
archived data we have obtained allows us to utilize historical real estate data effectively, essentially replicating the data that would have been accessible to homebuyers and sellers at any time during a property’s marketing period, including at
the time of the transaction. Analysis without such archived data is at best incomplete and is potentially biased. Unlike other studies, we did not cull the data set for
transient sex offenders based on length of stay at a residence alone, although we
did remove some whose obvious transient indicators did not seem useful for the
purposes of our study. For example, we removed offenders if they were listed as
homeless or as staying at a hotel or some other institution.
We obtain our variables of interest (i.e., whether a property listing was located
near sex offenders), we use the great-circle distance formula to calculate the straightline distance from a given house on the market to each sex offender.7 From that, we
tabulate the number of sex offenders that reside within a quarter-mile radius (i.e. ≤
0.25 mile).8 To explore the incremental impact of each offender, we then separated
out this tabulation into subgroups. Dummy variables were created to correspond
to each increment up to four offenders (with the fourth increment including each
number of sex offenders beyond 4). Table 3.4 shows the breakout of each increment.
The reference group, zero sex offenders, corresponds to the vast majority of homes
that were sold in our sample (approximately 93%). In our sample, there were 584
(sold) homes that were located within a quarter-mile of a registered sex offender,
167 located near two, 38 located near three, and 23 located within a quarter-mile of
four or more offenders.9

3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Hedonic Diff-in-Diff Approach
We first employ a traditional OLS hedonic pricing model that accounts for heterogeneous characteristics of each property listing, its location, and time of sale. We
use the following functional form:
6

Because our MLS covers a smaller subset of the Virginia real estate market (in central Virginia),
the number of sex offenders corresponding to our area is smaller.
7 This distance calculation (see below) approximates a straight line (“crow flies”) distance, rather
than a driving distance. To illustrate why this might be preferable for this study, consider an
example where a sex offender lives in an adjacent property behind a home. That sex offender
might actually be relatively far away in terms of driving time. Yet, the sex offender in that situation would likely be perceived just as risky as a sex offender next door (on the same street),
as they may pose equal risk to, for example, children playing in the yard. Distance = 69.1 *
180/π*arcos[sin(LAT1 )*sin(LAT2 )+ cos(LAT1 )*cos(LAT2 )*cos(LAT )*cos(LON2 –LON1 )].
8 In a previous study, we explored different radii, finding an impact of registered sex offenders up to
one mile. The impact, however, was a declining function in distance. For this study we confine our
analysis to registered sex offenders with a quarter-mile, which is the smallest radius the produces
reasonable variation in the number of sex offenders that reside within that range.
9 These figures are higher for all categories when the data set it expanded to incorporate unsold
homes in the Weibull hazard analysis below.
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(3.5)

where SPi is a vector for property selling price,10 Xi is a vector of property specific
characteristics11 and macroeconomic control variables,12 αi represents location and
year fixed effects, SOi , the variable of interest, indicates the presence of registered
sex offenders who live (contemporaneously) within a quarter-mile of a homei , and
ε is an error term. We estimate SOi in two forms. First, we estimate the effect the
number itself has on sale price; and, second we look at the effect of each increment
individually (i.e., first, second, third, and 4+ RSOs). The latter measures will help us
investigate the increment at which a neighborhood might tip or the pricing dynamics
that would lead to clustering.
Because location itself is a key source of differences in housing prices, hedonic
analysis of the housing market must control for spatial heterogeneity. Following
Pope (2008) and Wentland et al. (2014), we chose census block groups to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across these areas so that the explanatory
variables’ effects are identified from variation within a given area (or even in a given
year, as is the case for time fixed effects).13 This study uses block groups from the
2000 census, which on average contain between 600 to 3,000 people, usually around
1,500. Our sample of houses falls within a total of 163 census block groups in central
Virginia. Like Wentland et al. (2014), we follow Davis (2004) and Heintzelman
(2010) and cluster standard errors at the census block group level and use robust,
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
Note that like Wentland et al. (2014) and Brastow et al. (2018), this research design is a variation of a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) approach within a hedonic regression framework,14 leveraging two sources of variation or ‘differences’
for the variable(s) of interest in comparison to the control group. That is, the control
group is differentiated from the treatment by 1) presence of a sex offender in a time
dimension (i.e., a listing that appears on the market ‘post’ or after a sex offender
moves in nearby) and 2) the severity of the treatment along a distance dimension
(near vs. far — a quarter mile in this study). Hence, the interpretation of the treatment effects below relative to the control group can be interpreted similarly to these
other studies. Using a very similar data set to these studies (although with some
differences in design choices), we refer the reader to these papers for evidence of
10

Following Wentland et al. (2014), we use a linear form of sale price, but we also explored a
number of non-linear functional forms and our results remain robust. Kuminoff et al. (2010) survey
69 hedonic studies and find no single dominant functional form, as 80% rely on linear, semi-log,
or log-log functional form.
11 We use the following property specific variables: square footage, age, acreage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, length of the listing contract, whether the home is a one-story, new, vacant,
whether it has a brick exterior, hardwood floors, a pool, fenced yard, walk-in closet.
12 In addition to year fixed effects, we use the following macroeconomic controls: season the
home sold, Consumer Sentiment Index, fixed rate mortgage interest rate at the sale date, Virginia
unemployment rate, and the Leading Economic Indicator Index. The macro controls are monthly
aggregates, which correspond to the month the home was sold.
13 According to the U.S. Census, census tracts are “small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county ... designed to be homogenous with respect to population characteristics,
economic status, and living conditions.” Yet, census block groups are subsections of census tracts
and the smallest spatial area for which the U.S. Census tabulates sample data. For more detail, see:
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/tr metadata.htmlgad.
14 See both Pope (2008) and Linden and Rockoff (2008) for a similar approach. For more detail
about this approach, see their explanation for how this research design can exploit quasi-random
variation in sex offender movements.
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parallel trends and placebo tests that support our identification strategy, which we
omit here for brevity.

3.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Number of Bedrooms
One test proposed by Roberts and Whited (2013), among others, is to exploit systematic variation in the treatment or among treated groups as a check on the internal
validity of a difference-in-difference treatment design. If the design here is properly
identified, then we should observe whether effects of nearby sex offenders vary with
the intensity of household preferences (as predicted by our theoretical framework)
that would show an exacerbated response. To this end, we attempt to differentiate the
market response by introducing ‘family’ homes vs. ‘non-family’ treatment groups
(akin to introducing an additional ‘difference’ or diff-in-diff-in-diff approach). We
proxy for family-oriented preferences (i.e. whether the home has children or plans
to have children) based on the number of bedrooms the home has. Based on evidence from the 2009 American Housing Survey, we can reasonably assume that
homeowners with more children would be interested in homes with three or more
bedrooms, all else equal, and would exhibit greater risk aversion to residing near
sex offenders.15 If a potential homeowner has children or plans to have children,
then perceived risk associated with living more sex offenders, and thus heightened
negative disamenities, should be larger for this subsection of the market.
Therefore, we build on the baseline model (Equation 3.5) by extending it in the
following way:
SP = β0 + ∑ βi SOi ∗ 3Bedrooms+
i + ∑ βi SOi + ∑ βi Xi + ∝i +εP

(3.6)

where SOi ∗ 3Bedrooms+
i is an interaction term, multiplying the sex offender variables of interest by a dummy variable proxy for ‘family homes’ (which equals 1 if
a listed property has 3 or more bedrooms, 0 otherwise). This additional ‘difference’
incorporated into the model allows the incremental impact of sex offenders to differ
based on whether the home is a ‘family’ home or not (as proxied by bedrooms),
allowing two and one bedroom homes to be among the potentially ‘less treated’
control.

3.5.3 Simultaneous Equation (3SLS) Model
Following a strand of papers in the hedonic real estate literature, including Brastow
et al. (2018) and Wentland et al. (2014) discussed above, we also specify two equations in which sales price and liquidity are jointly determined (Krainer, 2001). An
empirical complication in this literature is the fact that a home’s price and liquidity,
as measured by time on market, are simultaneously determined largely by identi15

Our estimates hold attributes such as square footage constant. So, additional bedrooms, holding
square footage constant, essentially means that homebuyers are getting more, albeit smaller bedrooms. There are a number of reasons why they might want additional bedrooms holding square
feet constant, but the most straightforward explanation is additional children (or openness to having
children in the future).
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cal factors. We utilize an identification approach developed by Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), which identifies the system by two variables the characterize neighborhood market conditions. Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) define neighborhood
competition, C, as a distance and marketing time overlap measure of competition
from nearby houses for sale. An alternative measure, listing density, L, divides C
by the marketing period of property i to measure competition per day from nearby
listings.16 Simultaneous equations take the form:
SP = β0 + β1 T OM + β2 L + ∑ βi SOi + ∑ δi Xi + ∝i +εP

(3.7)

T OM = α0 + α1 SP + α2C + ∑ βi SOi + ∑ δi Xi + αi + εL

(3.8)

where T OMi is a home’s time on market (measured in days) and the other variables are defined above. We model simultaneity using a three-stage least-squares
(3SLS) approach. In a 3SLS setting, Equations 3.7 and 3.8 form the system of equations between property price and time on market. In addition, 3SLS incorporates
an additional step with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation to address
the issue of correlations across error terms.17 This functional form is similar to the
baseline reduced form OLS equation, but allows us to estimate the effect on time on
market and correcting for simultaneous equation bias.

3.5.4 Parametric (Weibull) Hazard Model – A Censoring Correction
While we model the incremental effect of sex offenders on time on market, the
estimates from the 3SLS models in the previous section must necessarily be limited
to homes that sold. According to Lancaster (1990, Chapter 8), a substantial amount
of information is effectively thrown away with OLS (and, in our case, 3SLS) models
that do not or cannot incorporate the full sample due to censoring or other issues
with the data. Accordingly, we incorporate information on homes that did not sell in
the estimation of a Weibull parametric hazard function using the full sample of sold
and unsold homes to account for such censoring issues.
A common approach in the real estate literature is to estimate a parametric hazard
model that assumes the baseline distribution follows a Weibull distribution (e.g., see
Rutherford and Yavas (2012), Bian et al. (2015), or Brastow et al. (2018)). For t,
(time on market) as measured in days, we estimate the following parametric Weibull
hazard:
λ (t; xi ) = exp (xi β ) αt α−1
16

(3.9)

C(i) = ∑ j (1 − D(i, j))2 {min[s(i), s( j)] − max[l(i), l( j)]} + 1, L(i) = ∑ j (1 −
D(i, j))2 {min[s(i), s( j)] − max[l(i), l( j)]}/s(i) − l(i) + 1, where ‘D(i, j)’ is the distance between a given home on the market, i, and a given nearby listing, j, provided that they live within a
one-mile radius, s(i) is the sell date for a given home on the market i, l(i) is the listing date for a
given home on the market i, s( j) is the sell date for a competing home j, l( j) is the list date for a
given competing listing j.
17 According to Belsley (1988), 3SLS is used instead of 2SLS in estimating systems of equations
because it is more efficient, particularly when there are strong interrelations among error terms.
Intuitively, in hedonic regressions, unobservable quality components (not already captured by its
measurable physical characteristics in the MLS listing) could drive this correlation among error
terms across equations (see also Bian et al. (2015)).
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where xi are the same covariates from the prior TOM equation and incorporates
list price (LPi ) instead of sale price (SPi ) so that the full sample could be used in the
hazard estimation. Further, all models cluster standard errors by census block group
and report heteroscedastic-consistent robust standard errors. We report the results
in both the accelerated failure time form and log-relative hazard form to interpret
the hazard results in regards to time on market and the probability of sale (failure),
respectively. The coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities with regard to
right-hand side variable by exponentiating the coefficients, analogous to a semi-log
interpretation in OLS.

3.5.5 Geospatial Analysis of Tipping and Clustering
If the presence of nearby sex offenders has an incremental impact on real estate,
then subsequent tipping of neighborhoods toward clusters of sex offenders should
be an observable geospatial phenomenon. In this section, we briefly outline how we
may exploit basic GIS techniques to explore implications of the pricing dynamics
that may flow from our theoretical and empirical models above.18
Following Clark and Evans (1954), we begin by conducting a simple Nearest
Neighbor Analysis (NNA) in order to determine the pattern and distribution of a
population in precise and meaningful terms. A Nearest Neighbor Analysis is often
utilized as a procedure to classify the geographic distribution of a set of points according to their spatial pattern and proximity (Griffith and Arnrhein, 1991). This
analysis has been applied to a diverse variety of fields including the study of spatial
dispersion patterns for individuals suffering from dengue fever in Malaysia (Aziz
et al., 2012). Second, we also incorporate a preliminary, broad spatial distribution
analysis of registered sex offenders in order to conduct an Average Nearest Neighbor
Analysis (ANNA).19 The average nearest neighbor classification is particularly effective at looking at a large data set and understanding the hypothetical random dispersion compared to the observed positioning. The average nearest neighbor analysis determines whether a set of spatial points can be classified as distributed in
a dispersed pattern, random pattern, or a clustered pattern. This is accomplished
on the basis of the Average Nearest Neighbor Ratio (ANNR) value. Two distances
make up the two key components of the Average Nearest Neighbor Ratio (ANNR).
The ANNA tool measures what the distance to the nearest neighbor centroid is, and
what it should be hypothetically if the dispersion is random. These are referred to
as the observed mean distance (OMD) and the estimated mean distance (EMD) respectively. If the average distance is less than hypothetical random distribution, the
ANNR is less than 1, and the distribution is considered clustered. If the average
distance is greater than the hypothetical distance for random clustering, then the
ANNR is greater than 1, and the distribution is considered dispersed. The point at
which these two values meet can be construed as a ‘tipping point’ or critical period
in which the points move from dispersed to clustered or clustered to dispersed.
18

The GIS analysis uses the full Virginia data set of sex offenders, including areas both inside and
outside our MLS geographical area.
19 Average Nearest Neighbor Ratio is given as follows: ANN = D /D where D is the observed
o
E
o
∑n di
mean distance between each feature and the nearest neighbor: Do = i=1
and
D
is the expected
E
n
p
mean distance given a random pattern: DE = 0.5/ n/A. In the previous equations di equals the
distance between feature i and its nearest feature, n corresponds to the total number of features,
and A is the total study area.
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The distance between points was measured as a Euclidean distance or ‘as the
crow flies’ in meters. The precise field area was set as the minimum enclosing rectangle around the features. The null hypothesis for the ANNA is that all the points
are randomly distributed. The null hypothesis is tested by Z statistic. The Z score
value is a measure of statistical significance which tells us whether or not to reject
the null hypothesis. Higher and lower numbers identify virtually no chance of random distribution. The ANNA also identifies a P value for the data set. This P value
is the probability that null hypothesis will be falsely rejected.
For the initial analysis, we divided the registered sex offender data into 6 month
increments. Each 6 month grouping identifies the registered sex offenders who lived
within Virginia at that time regardless of the duration they lived at that particular
address. The first grouping, designated (a), includes those registered sex offenders
who were living in Virginia during the time of January 1st to June 30th. The second
grouping, designated (b), includes those registered sex offenders who were living in
Virginia during the time of July 1st to December 31st. Each 6 month increment made
up a single layer feature class, and we utilized the average nearest neighbor analysis
to all points within that layer. We applied the ANNA to 24 total data layers. The
utilization of the ANNA in this fashion identified a general trend of clustering over
time with a specific tipping point apparent. This preliminary analysis also identified
a time in which a significant number of registered sex offenders were present within
the study area.

3.6 Results -– The Effects of Clustering and the Role of the Price
Mechanism
3.6.1 The Price of (Sex Offender) Clustering
The initial set of results reveals a significant relationship between the number of
sex offenders and real estate outcomes, namely price and liquidity (as measured
by days on market). While there are some differences in model specifications, the
initial results are qualitatively consistent with Wentland et al. (2014). The first two
columns of Table 3.6.1 show the general impact on sale price. Column 1 indicates
that an additional sex offender located nearby (i.e. within 0.25 mile) lowers the sale
price of a home by approximately $5,455. This provides preliminary evidence that
registered sex offenders present a negative externality and the negative externality
is an increasing function in sex offenders, which is generally consistent with the
literature discussed in section two. However, the incremental impact of each sex
offender may be more nuanced, which is the primary focus of this paper.
Column 2 breaks out the variable of interest into four increments (with the reference group being zero) that allow the effect to vary across increments in a nonlinear
fashion. Column 2 shows that the first nearby sex offender has a large, significant
effect on the sale price of a home, amounting to a discount of $8,338 or approximately 5% for the average home. The second and third nearby sex offenders do not
have a statistically significant impact on price, however, implying a discontinuous
or non-linear preference for living near additional sex offenders. While this does not
necessarily confirm an equilibrium (or equilibrium-like behavior) at some low number of sex offenders, this evidence would be consistent with the idea that the first
sex offender has a large initial effect on home prices, but an equilibrium may exist
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Table 3.2 The incremental effect of sex offenders on a home’s sale price and days on market –
OLS and 3SLS models

Variable

Number of Sex Offenders
≤ 0.25 mile

OLS Model
Dependent
Variable:
Sale Price

OLS Model
Dependent
Variable:
Sale Price

OLS Model
Dependent
Variable:
Sale Price

3SLS Model
Dependent
Variable:
Sale Price

OLS Model
Dependent
Variable:
Days on
Market

-5,454.72***
(-2.81)
-8,337.78*** -14,843.68*** -7,692.50*** 51.94***

First Sex Offender
≤ 0.25 mile
Second Sex Offender
≤ 0.25 mile
Third Sex Offender
≤ 0.25 mile

(-3.30)
-6,861.99

(-2.68)
-2,543.79

(-3.99)
-6,395.65*

(3.39)
46.81**

(-1.19)
-10,697.24

(-0.30)
-14,613.54

(-1.84)
-8,181.99

(2.01)
61.78

(-1.28)
(-0.89)
-25,099.07** 7,830.07

(-1.16)
(1.36)
-26,016.15*** 163.95**

(-2.07)

(-2.73)

(2.43)

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
12,362

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
12,362

Four or More Sex Offenders \leq 0.25 mile
(0.89)
8,908.58

Bedrooms (3+) * First Sex Offender
(1.08)
-5,481.68
Bedrooms (3+) * Second Sex Offender
(-0.60)
4,498.29
Bedrooms (3+) * Third Sex Offender
(0.24)
-43,765.75***
Bedrooms (3+) * Four or More Sex Offenders
(-4.21)
Property Characteristics
Macroeconomic Controls
Season Fixed Effects
Census Block Groups
Year Fixed Effects
Observations

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
12,426

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
12,426

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
12,426

Notes: This table presents results of OLS and 3SLS estimations of the incremental impact of registered sex offenders
on sale price and days on market (time on market) across different specifications (OLS and 3SLS); t-statistics (zstatistics) in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients
on controls are omitted for brevity.

in neighborhoods with a low number of sex offenders (three or less). A low number
of sex offenders may be consistent with a stable, initial discount of approximately
5% with a potential noisier discount associated with additional offenders.
If a neighborhood tips toward a critical mass of sex offenders, we would expect
this to be reflected by (or precipitated by) the pricing of these homes. Indeed, we see
that the equilibrium (or quasi-equilibrium) appears to break down once the fourth
sex offender moves in. Table 3.6.1 shows that a cluster of four or more sex offenders
coincides with a much larger, statistically significant discount on sale price. Specifically, a cluster of four or more offenders is associated with a sharp $25,099 (or 16%)
drop in price of nearby homes. Given the steep discount on home prices, the cluster
of sex offenders provides a stronger incentive to sort based on the theoretical framework outlined previously. All else equal, this strong price signal coupled with the
likelihood that sex offenders are likely to be less averse to living near one of their
own group members, we would expect additional sex offender clustering around
areas with multiple sex offenders as a result of the sharp discount associated with
this clustering. Thus, this provides initial evidence that pricing dynamics illustrate
a mechanism through which a clustering or tipping dynamic could occur in housing
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markets. Whether we find evidence of additional clustering over time in this data is
a hypothesis that will be explored with GIS spatial analysis.

3.6.2 The Different Price of RSO Clustering for Families
Household preferences for living near sex offenders are not likely to be uniform.
Households with children may be particularly averse to living near sex offenders,
which will be reflected in their bid functions for housing. After creating a simplified proxy for ‘family homes’ (i.e. a variable indicating whether a home has three
or more bedrooms), we attempt to disentangle some of the tipping dynamics of the
market by interacting this proxy with our variables of interest. The results are shown
in Column 3 of Table 3.6.1. The estimates of this model show that the discount for
the initial sex offender for ‘non-family’ homes is $14,844. Each additional sex offender does not have a statistically significant effect, implying an approximately
uniform discount for living near sex offenders (regardless of the number) for ‘nonfamily’ homes.20 The most striking result of this column is that ‘family’ homes have
a very large discount, approximately $43,765 or 26%, associated with living near a
cluster of four or more sex offenders. Given the potentially greater risk/externality
that sex offender recidivism imposes for families with children, this result is consistent with the prediction of both intuition and our theoretical framework. More generally, given that we find that an intensified (nonlinear) treatment effect on a more
sensitive treatment group, this also serves as additional evidence that our results are
properly identified.

3.6.3 The Liquidity (or Time on Market) Effect — 3SLS
The incremental effect of sex offenders may not be capitalized solely in price, particularly as price and liquidity are jointly determined in this market. The estimated
3SLS model, shown in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3.6.1, shows that the externality
associated with additional sex offenders is reflected by both price and liquidity. The
impact of the initial offender on price is slightly smaller (-$7,692), as the effect is
also capitalized into liquidity by extending the time it takes to sell the home by 52
days (or 47%) on average. There is a smaller (less statistically significant) effect
for the second sex offender, but no statistically significant impact for the third offender. Generally, this is consistent with the previous results like Wentland et al.
(2014) and Brastow et al. (2018), suggesting a significant, moderate external liquidity effect associated with living near a few sex offenders. Moreover, there is also a
large, significant effect associated with living near four or more offenders. While
the price discount is approximately the same as the OLS estimate, the striking result
is the massive effect on a home’s liquidity. A cluster of four or more nearby offenders increases a home’s time on market by 164 days, or 147% on average. While it
is not surprising that homes located near a cluster of sex offenders sell for a siz20

The coefficients that are not individually significant in this regression are also not jointly significant, at conventional levels of statistical significance. For all intents and purposes, the insignificant
coefficients are treated as zero in this analysis. Also note that the specification here is somewhat
different from Wentland et al. (2014), which has a linear interacted bedrooms specification. This
analysis suggests that there may also be a nonlinear effect.
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able discount and are much harder to sell in a reasonable amount of time, the sheer
magnitude of the effect remains striking, possibly reflecting a much smaller pool of
potential buyers willing to bid on one of these homes.

3.6.4 The Liquidity Effect and Probability of Sale – A Parametric
(Weibull) Hazard Model
Using the full sample of sold and unsold properties, a parametric hazard function
was estimated to account for related selection issues (which were explained in further detail in the methodology section above). The results in Table 3.6.4 are generally consistent with the three stage findings, with a couple notable exceptions. The
magnitude for the effect on time on market appear to be more modest across the
board as compared to the three stage results, but in this specification, the larger externality may be the reflected by the presence of the third offender, not the forth. The
third offender represents a substantially longer time on market, and correspondingly,
a much lower probability of sale in the hazard model specifications. The cluster of
four or more still represents a large, negative externality based on the Weibull hazard model results, which we interpret as qualitatively consistent with the three stage
results from the previous sub-section.

3.7 Results -– Tipping and Clustering Evidence from GIS Spatial
Analysis
We conduct a basic geospatial analysis of our sample, finding initial evidence of
additional clustering of registered sex offenders over time. The result of an average
nearest neighbor analysis gives several values, which include the Average Nearest Neighbor Ratio (ANNR), the observed mean distance (OMD), the estimated
mean distance (EMD), a z-score and a p-value. The initial Average Nearest Neighbor Analysis begins at a starting point of three registered sex offenders in the last
six months of 1997. This initial analysis produces an ANNR value of 3.847748. The
same analysis was completed on each six month grouping. We identified a potential tipping point within the first six months of 2003. Around the tipping point at
which the observed mean distance reached the estimated mean distance, the ANNR
reached 1.007778. The ANNR generally continued to decrease as seen in Figure 3.2,
with the smallest ANNR is found in the 2009a data set. The Z score values identify
that the RSO distribution pattern within the study area has a less than 1% chance of
being the result of chance. Figure 3.3 shows the dramatic dip, as increasing clustering of registered sex offenders occurs on a state-wide level.21
To summarize, the GIS analysis shows a clear trend of clustering, as some neighborhoods tip toward being more densely populated by sex offenders. This offers
21

In untabulated analysis, we created census blocks as a way to normalize the ANN analysis for
populated areas within Virginia. We are able to statistically identify traits of those census blocks
which contain RSOs with our sample. We compare the location of the RSOs to the census blocks
in order to develop a general temporal trend and identify if any other ‘tipping point’ exists. Our
analysis showed that despite the potential for the RSOs to live in any of the 285,762 census blocks,
there is a spatial clustering within certain small census blocks over time. We leave more in-depth
spatial analysis to future research.
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Table 3.3 The incremental effect of a registered sex offender on a home’s time on market and
probability of sale – Weibull accelerated failure-time form and log relative-hazard form
Weibull Distribution
Coefficients
Dependent Variable:
Time on Market

Weibull Distribution
Coefficients
Dependent Variable:
Sold

0.098**

-0.146**

Second Sex Offender

(1.98)
0.012

(-1.99)
-0.018

≤ 0.25 mile
Third Sex Offender

(0.17)
0.794***

(-0.17)
-1.179***

≤ 0.25 mile

(3.30)
0.538**

(-3.29)
-0.798**

(2.50)
0.394***

(-2.50)
0.394***

Variable

First Sex Offender
≤ 0.25 mile

Four or More Sex Offenders
≤ 0.25 mile
/ln p

(28.35)
(28.35)
p
1.48
1.48
Property Characteristics
✓
✓
Macroeconomic Controls ✓
✓
Season Fixed Effects
✓
✓
Census Block Groups
✓
✓
Year Fixed Effects
✓
✓
Observations
19,701
values
identify that the RSO distribution19,701
pattern within the study area
has a less than 1% chance
Sold Homes
12,406
12,406
of being the result of chance. Figure II shows the dramatic dip, as increasing clustering of
Notes:sexThis
tableoccurs
estimates
the external
registered
offenders
on a state-wide
level.21 effects an RSO on home liquidity using a parametric hazard that follows a Weibull distribution.
Results in Column 1 report accelerated failure-time coefficients, while
the results in Column 2 report log relative hazard form coefficients.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses (Errors Clustered by Census Block
Group) *** p¡0.01,
p¡0.05,
* p¡0.10.
Figure II.**
ANNA
statistic
results by 6 month increment
4.5
4

ANNA (R) Value

3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5

19
97
19 b
98
19 a
98
19 b
99
19 a
99
20 b
00
20 a
00
20 b
01
20 a
01
20 b
02
20 a
02
20 b
03
20 a
03
20 b
04
20 a
04
20 b
05
20 a
05
20 b
06
20 a
06
20 b
07
20 a
07
20 b
08
20 a
08
20 b
09
a

0

Fig. 3.2 ANNA statistic results by 6 month increment
Figure III. ANNA Z score statistical results by 6 month increment

additional, complementary evidence that the pricing dynamics are consistent with
sex offender sorting.

21

In untabulated analysis, we created census blocks as a way to normalize the ANN analysis for populated areas within
Virginia. We are able to statistically identify traits of those census blocks which contain RSOs with our sample. We
compare the location of the RSOs to the census blocks in order to develop a general temporal trend and identify if any
other “tipping point” exists. Our analysis showed that despite the potential for the RSOs to live in any of the 285,762
census blocks, there is a spatial clustering within certain small census blocks over time. We leave more in-depth spatial
analysis to future research.
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Fig. 3.3 ANNA Z score statistical results by 6 month increment
To summarize, the GIS analysis shows a clear trend of clustering, as some neighborhoods
tip toward being more densely populated by sex offenders. This offers additional, complementary
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a dynamics
Discussion
evidence thatand
the pricing
are consistent of
with Efficiency
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VIII. Conclusion and a Discussion of Efficiency Implications
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real estate. Several
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sex have
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In thishome
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find thatsignificantly.
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a this study,
tered sex offenders
lowerhome
nearby
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prices
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to
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in
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areas.
To
explain
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we
investigated
whether
there
is
we find that sex offenders have a tendency to cluster in certain areas. To explain this
that market prices facilitate this process, given that RSOs could be attracted by lower
phenomenon,evidence
we investigated
whether there is evidence that market prices facilitate
prices and being less concerned with living near other sex offenders (as compared to nonthis process,offenders’
given concerns
that RSOs
could
be attracted by lower prices and being less conabout living near offenders). Using a decade of multiple listing service (MLS)
cerned with living
nearalong
other
offenders
(as data
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data in Virginia,
with sex
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obtained withto
thenon-offenders’
help of the Virginia
about living State
nearPolice,
offenders).
Using
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decade
multiple
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service
we found that the
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thatof
moves
in nearby has
a significant
negative (MLS) data
effect on with
a home’scorresponding
price and liquidity. We
findoffender
evidence of nonlinear
effects, where
each the help of
in Virginia, along
sex
data obtained
with
the Virginia State Police, we found that the initial sex offender that moves in nearby
has a significant negative effect on a home’s price and liquidity. We find evidence of
nonlinear effects, where each successive sex offenders that move in nearby have little significant impact until the neighborhood reaches a critical ‘tipping point,’ where
a cluster of four or more sex offenders has much larger negative effects on the price
and liquidity of nearby homes. A within-neighborhood analysis shows that living
near a cluster of four or more sex offenders may reduce a home’s sale price by approximately $26,000 (or 16%) and increase the time a home spends on the market
by 164 days (or 147%), on average.
Overall, the results provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that market
prices facilitate the sorting/tipping process we observe, where individuals operating within the market sort according to their preferences and incentives, resulting
in segmentation of these two groups (i.e. sex offenders vs. general populace). The
geospatial evidence is consistent with increasing clustering of registered sex offenders and segregation of these two groups. This research may help real estate academics and practitioners understand the locational choices/tendencies of registered
sex offenders and the implications for real estate and residential mobility.
While these results are striking, it raises a broader question about whether this
process is efficient. We can offer a brief discussion based on the findings here. The
steep negative externality associated with living near a cluster of sex offenders at
first gives one pause that a negative externality is leading to a serious issue for real
estate markets. However, note that in Table I.B., the number of homes that are located nearby clusters is very small. So, while the externality effect is large for an
individual listing on the market, it is not necessarily the case that the overall ef-
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fect on the market is larger. The opposite could be true, depending on how many
homes are affected by this externality. Intuitively, if the external impact of an RSO
is spatial in nature (i.e., a decreasing function in distance), then a cluster contains
overlapping externalities that are concentrated in a particular area. Conceptually,
this runs parallel to the idea that it might be more efficient to concentrate pig farms,
or some other spatially-specific negative externality like a paper mill, in a particular
area or cluster rather than scattering them randomly next to housing developments,
for example. While this may not be applicable for all externalities (nor is efficiency
the only value policymakers need to take into account), this reasoning is a key motivating idea behind local zoning restrictions. However, while states and localities
do have restrictions on where RSOs can live and work to induce a similar sort of
clustering, the evidence from Virginia from our study suggests that the market provides an additional incentive to cluster, which is unplanned and decentralized. Thus,
the extent to which real estate markets provide a price incentive to cluster negative
externalities could be an extension of classic ideas in economics, whether it is Adam
Smith’s ([1776] 1937) invisible hand metaphor more generally, or Coase’s (1960)
idea more specifically, that market exchange can lead to efficient outcomes through
a decentralized price mechanism (even when externalities are present, depending
on the circumstances). We leave further exploration of this in real estate and other
applications to future research.
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Chapter 4

The Rental Next Door: The Impact Of Rental
Proximity On Home Values
Wendy Usrey

Abstract The literature on the spillover effects of rental properties mainly focuses
on the impacts of multi-unit complexes and low income housing. Little has been
done specifically looking at the relationship between single-family rental homes
and sales price. This paper extends the literature by modeling the impact of singlefamily rental proximity on home sales price using a spatial approach. Through the
use of GIS software, I was able to specifically measure the density of single-family
rental properties for each sold home, rather than following the “blanket approach”
of measuring density as the ‘percent of rentals in the census tract’ typical in the literature. With data collected for 2,766 homes sold between January 1, 2011 and July
1, 2012 in Fort Collins, Colorado, a hedonic price model was used to empirically
test for the impacts of rental proximity on home values. I find strong evidence that
proximity to single-family rental homes plays an important role in determining a
home’s selling price. Rentals within 1/4 mile of a sold home had a negative impact
on price, while rentals between 1/4 and 1/2 mile had a positive impact on price. If
rentals are considered an alternative to foreclosure or short sale, these results suggest
the negative impacts of distressed sales are greater than those of rental properties on
surrounding home values.

4.1 Introduction and Background Information
People generally tend to believe that rental properties will impact their neighborhood negatively as more and more homes in the subdivision turn into rental properties. Many homeowners’ associations attempt to reduce the number of rental properties by regulating the placement of signs, restricting the number of rental properties
in the subdivision, and in some cases, outright banning rental properties. In some
cities, policy makers try to reduce the number of rental properties by passing ordinances (such as the three unrelated ordinance in Fort Collins, CO), requiring rental
inspections, regulating sign placement, and charging registration and/or licensing
fees. Even the mortgage industry is “anti- rental,” with larger down payments required for non-owner occupied homes and “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refus[ing]
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to underwrite mortgages in condo projects where a majority of units are rentals”
(Reagan, 2009).
The general public is quick to assume a rental property will “ruin” their neighborhood, and this is traditionally the assumption in most literature. This opposition
has been well documented and takes many forms. Some of the most common arguments against rental housing include: rentals attract low-income residents and less
desirable neighbors, lead to an increase in crime and traffic and place an additional
financial burden on local governments and schools. Opposition also stems from the
belief that rental properties are not as well-maintained as owner-occupied homes
and will overall lead to a decline in property values (Ellen et al., 2007; Obrinsky
and Stein, 2007; Sirmans, 1996). These arguments have been supported in some of
the empirical literature. Wang et al. (1991) concluded that “an inverse relationship
exists between the value of a house and the presence of rental properties in the area.”
Specifically, they found that the presence of rental properties within close proximity
(defined as the group of 5-8 surrounding homes) reduced a home’s selling price by
approximately 2% (Wang et al., 1991). Similar results were found in several studies
looking at the impact of subsidized and multi-family rental housing developments,
though the results were mixed and varied widely between the studies (Goetz et al.,
1996).
While at first glance it would appear that rental homes are “bad” for a neighborhood and property values, the evidence is mixed overall. A study analyzing
the impact of federally subsidized rental housing on property values found that in
most cases, property values were not reduced by federally-subsidized developments
and in many instances the developments actually led to increases in property values (Ellen et al., 2007). Grether and Mieszkowski (1980)Grether and Mieszkowski
found that proximity to “low-density apartment developments [were] relatively
harmless” in terms of their impact on residential property values, and a document
produced for the National Policy Summit on Rental Housing summarized numerous studies in which the authors determined property values were higher in areas
near multi-family housing or “proximity to subsidized housing made no difference
in housing values...” (Obrinsky and Stein, 2007).
A recent addition to the debate is how economic conditions are playing a role in
the desirability of rental homes. With the housing crisis plaguing the United States,
home prices are down in many areas which means many homeowners can no longer
sell their properties without taking a loss, or bringing money to the table. As of
March 1, 2012, an estimated 11.1 million homeowners were underwater on their
mortgage.1 That’s approximately 22.8% of mortgages and is at the highest level
since the third quarter of 2009, when the data was first tracked (Reuters, 2012).
Stricter lending requirements, along with higher rates of unemployment, means
fewer people are willing or able to buy. As a result, many homeowners are faced
with tough choices: sell at a loss, attempt a short sale, let the home go to foreclosure, leave the home vacant, or rent it out until conditions improve. For homeowners
in these situations, rental restrictions limits their options. If they can’t afford to make
payments on two homes or don’t have money to bring to the closing table while unable to rent out the home due to rental restrictions, their only option left is to attempt
a short sale or let the home go to foreclosure.
It is commonly assumed that foreclosures and vacant homes decrease property
values, and many studies have shown that this is assumption is accurate. Immergluck
1

A borrower is considered to be underwater when their loan balance is higher than the current
market value of the property.

of two evils.’ Allow rentals, keeping homes occupied with fewer foreclosures, and
accept the “problems” that come from non-owner occupied homes or ban rentals,
and instead deal with the empty properties and increased foreclosures.
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Fig. 4.1 Larimer County foreclosure filings and sales
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Kresin, 2012). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the relationship between foreclosures and
2
rental demand in Fort Collins.
In 2009, foreclosure filings in Larimer County peaked, creating higher demand
for rental housing. Between 2009 and 2012, as fewer rentals were available (indicated by the decreasing vacancy rates), the average rent increased by 17.9%. Rental
housing policy typically focuses on balancing the need for affordable housing with
the needs of homeowners’ concerned with preserving the quality of their neighborhood and protecting the value of their homes. Policy discussion tends to largely
focus on low-income affordable housing (i.e. subsidized housing, Section 8 housing,
etc) despite the fact that such types of rental properties make up a small percentage
of overall rental housing in most communities.3 Single-family rental homes play an
important role in providing quality housing to people who are unable or unwilling
to purchase their own homes, and are “essential for households at middle-income
and lower-income levels” (Colorado Division of Housing, 2011).
2

Values for 2012 are estimates based on the monthly data available at the time of the analysis.
For example, in Larimer County, affordable rental units (including income restricted, senior and
disabled housing) make up just 10.8% of renter-occupied units (Community Strategies Institute,
2009).
3

Average Rent and Vacancy Rates in Fort
Collins

52

Wendy Usrey

Fig. 4.2 Fort Collins rent and vacancy rates
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Figure 2: Fort Collins Rent and Vacancy Rates
Data Source: Colorado Division of Housing
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evidence, and so much at stake, further investigation is required to make sound decisions about the impact of non-owner occupied homes in a subdivision.
While this issue receives a lot of public attention and policy interest, the majority
of research in this area has focused on multi-family rental properties, government
subsidized housing and concentration of poverty in large cities. Little has been done
to look at how the presence of single family rental homes in a neighborhood for a
community like Fort Collins, Colorado will impact property values. Literature in this
area typically uses the percent of rental properties in the census tract as a measure
of rental density. In doing so, the authors are implicitly assuming that the impact
of rental composition will be identical across the tract. This paper expands upon
the current literature by using a unique spatial approach where the location and
concentration of rental properties is identified and explicitly considered, allowing
the impact to be unique for each home. It is also different in that it looks at single
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family rental properties rather than focusing specifically on multi-unit complexes or
subsidized housing developments. Using a hedonic pricing model, the analysis will
estimate the way rental properties affect home values by looking at how property
values change depending upon their proximity to rental homes.

4.2 Analytical Framework
Rosen (1974) provided the framework for the hedonic price regressions that is typically used to measure housing market impacts and externalities. These models use
the characteristics of a property as independent variables to explain or predict the
sales price of a house. The basic intuition in hedonic valuation is that the price of
a good (in this case, a house) is a function of a bundle of attributes unique to that
specific good (property). However, the prices of the individual characteristics are
not directly observed; they are implicit in the sales price of the house (which is
observable).
Thus the hedonic price of a house is defined as the “set of implicit prices” related to the home’s specific characteristics and its observed price (Rosen, 1974).
In equation form, the hedonic price of house Pi is a function of its characteristics,
represented by the vector Xi .
Pi = f (Xi )

(4.1)

For simplicity, assume a linear function of the form:
Pi = β0 + β1 X1i + β2 X2i + ... + βk Xki

(4.2)

Taking the partial derivative of price with respect to each characteristic yields the
characteristic’s marginal cost:
δP/δx1 = β1

(4.3)

In this case, the marginal price of an additional unit of characteristic X1 is equal to
β1 . For example, if X1 represented the number of bedrooms, this equation is telling
us that for each additional bedroom, the price of the house increases by β1 , holding
other things constant.
In addition to structural characteristics, (square footage, number of bedrooms,
lot size, etc.), the location of a house is considered to play an important role in
determining its value, so the characteristics of the neighborhood (location) must also
be considered. Depending on the analysis, other factors expected to affect the price
of a home are also added to the model (for example: environmental characteristics,
proximity to amenities, etc.).
For this analysis, the hedonic model, Pi j = f (Xi j , Ni j , Ri ), measures the value of a
home as a function of its structural characteristics, its neighborhood characteristics,
and the rental density characteristics of its location. In semi-log functional form, the
regression model can be written as follows:
ln(Pricei j ) = β0 + β1 Xi j + B2 N j + β3 Ri + εi

(4.4)

Where Pricei j = price of house i in neighborhood j, Xi j =a vector of structural characteristics of house i in neighborhood j, N j =a vector of characteristics for neighborhood j, and Ri =rental density characteristics of the location of house i. The variables
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that make up each of these characteristics, their definitions, and their expected relationship with the dependent variable are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Variable descriptions
Variable

Description

Expected
Sign

ln (Sales Price)

Natural log of home sale price, in real dollars

n/a

Age
Stories
Square Footage
Basement SF
Rooms
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Fireplace
Lot
Central Air
Loveland Schools
In City Limits
Owner Occupied

Age of house at time of sale in years*
Number of stories (does not include basement)*
square feet of total above grade living space*
Number of square feet in basement (finished or unfinished)*
Number of rooms above grade (does not include bathrooms)*
Number of bedrooms*
Number of bathrooms*
Number of fireplaces*
Lot size in acres*
Dummy=1 if central air conditioning*
Dummy=1 if located inside Loveland School District**
Dummy=1 if located inside Fort Collins city limits**
Dummy=1 if owner occupied*

-

+
+
+
+
+
+/+/+/-

Attached Garage
carport
Detached Garage
Multiple Garages
Garage SF

Home has an attached garage*
Home has a carport*
Home has a detached garage*
Home has multiple garages and/or types*
Square feet of garage space*

+
+
+
+
+

Bank Owned
Short Sale

Property was bank owned/foreclosure***
Property was a short sale***

-

Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4
Sold 2012
Distance to CSU
Distance to Shopping

Quarter home was sold*
Home was sold in 2012*
Distance to CSU’s Lory Student Center****
Distance to popular shopping area****

+
-

Rentals 500
Rentals 14
Rentals 12

Number of rentals within 500 ft ****
Number of rentals within 500 ft and 1/4 mile radius ****
Number of rentals within 1/4 and 1/2 mile radius ****

+/+/+/-

Population
% College
Median Age
Families
Dad
Mom
% White
Income
Vacant
% Rentals
% Students

Total population in census tract****
% Census tract pop. with college degree or higher****
Median age in census tract in years****
Husband and wife with own child****
Male with own child less than 18, no wife****
Female with own child less than 18, no husband****
% of tract population that is white****
Average annual income in census tract in real$****
Vacant housing units in census tract****
% of rental homes in census tract****
% of tract population enrolled in 4-yr public college****

+/+
+/+
+
+
+/-

+
+

Sources: * Larimer County Assessor’s Office; ** Author’s calculations using GIS; *** RealList search
option through Fort Collins multi-list service; **** All neighborhood characteristics come from the US
Census Bureau.

The semi-logarithmic functional form used here was selected because it is the
most commonly used functional form in hedonic studies of housing markets due to
the inseparable nature of the characteristics of housing. As Coulson noted, “physical
housing characteristics are for the most part, tied together in an inseparable bundle.
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One cannot detach a bathroom from a house and sell it on ebay. Because of this,
linearity should not be assumed in a housing hedonic function ... .” (Coulson, 2010).

4.3 Hypothesis and variable selection
The purpose of this study is to determine how proximity to rental homes affects the
value of nearby homes by estimating the magnitude and direction of the rentals’
impacts on nearby homes. Thus, the hypothesis being tested is that the proximity to
rental homes does not affect the price of homes in the neighborhood, all else equal.
This study focuses specifically on properties with a postal delivery address of
Fort Collins, Colorado. The sample was chosen so that general city characteristics
such as, public service provisions, tax rates, etc. are the same for all properties in the
sample, and can therefore be excluded from the model. In addition to the variables in
Table 4.1, squared variables such as Age2 and Lot 2 are included, a common practice
in hedonic studies, to account for the notion of diminishing returns. These variables
capture the fact that as size of the home, size of the lot or age of the home increase,
the price of the house will increase, but at a decreasing rate. Numerous indicator
or dummy variables are also included to indicate whether prices change as a result
of the presence of different attributes. For example, the dummy variable CentralAir
allows us to test whether the presence of air conditioning in a home has an impact
on the home’s price.
The structural characteristics included in this model that are standard in most
housing price regression models include: square footage, age, number of bedrooms
and bathrooms, lot size, garage and/or carport spaces, presence of a fireplace, central
air conditioning, number of stories, and presence of a basement. Many of these models are limited in the number of structural characteristics they can include because
they lack sufficient data. My sample includes data on additional characteristics that
could affect the price of a home including: basement square footage, number of total
rooms above grade, age of the home at the time of sale, garage type, school district,
location inside city limits, and type of occupancy at the time of sale (non-owner vs.
owner occupied). Based on the literature, I have also included an indicator variable
to indicate whether a sold property was a fair market sale, foreclosure or short sale
(which theoretically would result in a lower sales price).
It is largely considered common knowledge among real estate professionals that
the time of year a home sells has an impact on its price. The seasonality of the
real estate market is supported in the literature as well (Goodman, 1993). For this
reason, dummy variables were included for both the year and quarter during which
the home sold.
Neighborhood characteristics that theoretically could affect a neighborhood’s
home values include both demographic and location variables. As already discussed,
the presence of rentals in a neighborhood is a main interest of this study. In addition
to the rental proximity variables discussed below, the subdivision’s overall occupancy composition may also have an impact on home values. Therefore, a variable
for the percent of homes occupied by renters has been included. Previous studies
have found that lower home prices were associated with higher percentages of minorities, presence of single parent households and higher numbers of vacant homes
(Chiodo et al., 2010). For this reason, variables for the percent of population that is
white only in a neighborhood, single parent households (with both male and female
heads of household) and number of vacant homes were included. Other included
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variables that are traditionally associated with higher property values include education levels, age of residents, and income.
A study on Fort Collins, conducted by Corona Research (2005) found that 71% of
renter households with more than three unrelated persons living in a single dwelling
unit were college students. While the study specifically analyzed the impact of
single-family rentals on neighborhood property values, it used the percent of singlefamily homes in a census block group, rather than the total number of rental homes
within a certain distance of the subject property, which is the focus of this paper. The
authors found four characteristics with a significant impact on neighborhood home
values: percent of rentals, average number of rooms in each house in the subdivision, distance from the CSU campus to the approximate center of the neighborhood,
and the average age of the homes (Corona Research, 2005). Based on this information, variables for the number of college students in the census tract and distance to
CSU (measured from the sold home to Lory Student Center) were included.
Typical to these types of analysis, the distance to Central Business District is
included; however, the Central Business District in Fort Collins, known as “Old
Town” is very close to the Colorado State University Campus (already being measured with the Distance to CSU variable). Furthermore, while Old Town is a popular
area of town, it provides more of a “destination” type shopping and nightlife experience. The majority of everyday retail shopping occurs along the Harmony Road
corridor which is also home to a large number of technology-oriented employers.
With location to Old Town already being largely accounted for in the Distance to
CSU variable, a variable for the home’s distance to a major shopping center was
added to the model.4
Figure 4: Close up of rental properties located near CSU Campus

Fig. 4.3 Example of proximity rings around each sold home

Figure 5: Proximity “rings” for each sold home

In order to test the hypothesis that proximity to rental homes will affect a home’s
value rental density characteristics were constructed. These variables were created
using a list of non-owner occupied homes obtained from the Larimer County Assessor’s office. While it would be ideal to have information on whether a home
17
4

The shopping center selected for this analysis was the Front Range Village, a lifestyle-shopping
center anchored by several big box stores (including Lowe’s, Super Target, and Sport Authority).
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is specifically being used as a rental property, this information was not available.
Therefore, the assumption was made that a home listed as non-owner occupied in
the county tax records is being used as a rental property.
The homes identified as non-owner occupied were plotted, along with singlefamily homes sold between January 1, 2011 and July 1, 2012, using ArcGIS software. The number of rental homes within 1/2 mile of each sold home were identified, then grouped and totalled according to distance from the subject property.
Rentals that were located within 500 feet of the subject make up Rentals500 category. Rentals that were located within a radius of 500 feet to 1/4 mile, were included
in Rentals14. Similarly, rentals located between a 1/4 and 1/2 mile radius from the
subject make up Rentals12. A visual representation of the construction is provided
in Figure 4.3.

4.4 Data sources and summary statistics
The data for this paper came from multiple sources. Property characteristics were
obtained from the Larimer County Assessor’s office and the local multi-list service
(MLS). Both sources provided detailed structural information on each property, as
well as transaction data for single-family homes sold between January 1, 2011 and
July 1, 2012. In order to ensure a consistent, quality data set, I compared the assessor’s property information with the multi-list information for every property. If an
inconsistency was found, I examined that specific property in both systems to check
for typographical and/or data errors. In most cases, the inconsistency was due to an
error in the input of data in one of the two systems and was easily corrected in the
final data set. If there were inconsistencies that could not be resolved, or significant
amounts of data were missing for the property, it was eliminated from the data set.
Sales that were not arms-length transactions were identified by examining both
the sale price and the type of deed used in the transaction. 5 Property transfers that
involved deed types that are not used for arms-length real estate sales were removed
from the data set.6 Sales for unusually low dollar amounts were also examined as
they typically involved the “sale” of a home to a relative (for example, a home was
sold to a family member for $100).
Data for neighborhood characteristics and demographic information was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and matched to the individual properties based
on Census blocks and tracts (the geographic unit used to represent a “neighborhood”, a common practice in the literature). GIS shapefiles for Colorado school district boundaries and Fort Collins’ city limits were used to identify whether properties
were located within the city limits as well as within the boundaries of Fort Collins’
school district (Poudre R-1) or the city of Loveland’s school district (Thompson R2J). Table 4.2 present summary statistics for non-categorical/binary variables. Table
4.3 contains summary statistics for categorical/binary variables.

5

An arms-length transaction is defined as, “a transaction in which the parties are dealing from
equal bargaining positions” (Reilly, 2000).
6 For example, it is common to use Quit Claim Deeds to transfer or “gift” property to another
individual (for example to a spouse or child) as they do not contain any language of warranty.
There are a variety of other deeds that generally indicate a transaction was not an arms-length sale,
examples include: Beneficiary Deeds, Trustee Deeds, Bargain and Sale Deeds, and Administrative
Deeds
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics for non-categorical/binary variables
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Sales Price
Age
Square Footage
Basement SF
Rooms
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Fireplaces
Garage SF
Lot Size
Distance to CSU
Distance to Shopping
Population
Median Age
% White
% College
Income
% Students
Families
Dad
Mom
Vacant
% Rentals
Rentals 500
Rentals 14
Rentals 12

272553
30.32
1783.56
812.96
6.90
3.33
2.40
0.67
498.90
0.74
3.53
4.04
4526.46
34.29
90
9
77419
17
405.59
36.34
85.74
81.95
32
139.55
58.89
8.51

117376
24.22
648.85
620.53
1.85
0.87
0.89
0.49
268.85
4.32
1.95
2.07
2095.72
6.22
3
0
23528
13
2.81
17.48
41.133
44.03
17
134
52
8

25500
1
464
0
2
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.22
0.33
1214
19.50
69
37
19699
3
30
2
14
24
6
0
0
0

825000
126
7559
7279
15
7
8
2
3316
98.73
11.36
15.26
11580
53.10
96
132402
90
1218
102
160
313
90
802
548
59

The price of homes sold during this time period ranged from $25,500 to $825,000,
with a mean sales price of $272,553. Average square footage (above grade) was
1,783 and average basement square footage was 812. Most homes had 3 bedrooms
and 2 bathrooms and garage square footage of 498 (which roughly translates into
a 2 car garage). The majority of sold properties were located within city limits and
within the boundaries of the Poudre R-1 School District. Five percent of the homes
were foreclosures, 2.0% were short sales, and 75% were owner occupied.
The average census tract had a population of 4,526 people, 90% of which were
white, and consisted of 405 families, 36 single-dad households and 85 single-mom
households. On average, 15% of the census-tract population held a bachelor’s degree. Annual income ranged between $19,699 and $132,402 with the average being
$77,419. The percent of students in each census tract ranged between 3% and 90%,
with a mean of 17%. Sold homes had an average of 8 rentals within 500 feet, 59
rentals between 500 feet and 1/4 mile, and 139 rentals between 1/4 and 1/2 mile.
The average percent of rentals overall in each census tract was 32%.

4.5 Empirical Results
Initially a semi-log specification was considered, however based on the relationship
between sales price and rental density, the specification that best fit the data and underlying intuition was a model examining the non-linear effects of proximate rental
properties on sales price. The model specification is presented below and examines
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics for categorical/binary variables
Variable

Frequency Percent

Owner Occupied
Bank Owned
Short Sale
Sold in 2012
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Central Air
No Garage
Attached Garage
Carport
Detached Garage
Multiple Garages
Outside City Limits
In City Limits
Loveland School District

2059
142
63
1028
655
1149
594
361
1325
167
2290
13
218
71
478
2281
196

75%
5%
2%
37%
24%
42%
22%
13%
48%
6%
83%
0%
8%
3%
17%
83%
7%

the non-linear effects of rental proximity on home sales price by log-transforming
the rental proximity variables.
This model considers the possibility that as the number of proximate rentals rises,
the marginal impact on a home’s price will increase, but at a decreasing rate, and
allows for interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. The rest of the model was
kept in the semi-log functional form, with sales price being the only other variable
that was log-transformed. The regression was corrected for heteroskedasticity using
robust standard errors. Results are presented in Table 4.4.
Overall, the model was highly significant, with a p-value of less than 0.0001. The
model’s adjusted r-squared was 0.692, indicating that the model explains 69.2% of
the variation in sales price after adjusting for degrees of freedom. The majority of
the structural characteristics variables were statistically significant with the expected
sign. Square Footage, Basement SF, Rooms, Bathrooms and Fireplaces were positive, representing a percentage increase in home price per unit increase in the characteristic. While Multiple Garages was the only variable for specific garage type
that was significant, Garage SF was significant and positive. This indicates that in
the real estate market for Fort Collins, CO the size of the garage is more important
to buyers than the type of garage, all other things being equal.
As expected, the size of the home had a positive impact on price. Sales price
increased 0.027% for every additional square foot above grade, and by 0.018% for
every additional basement square foot. While at first glance this appears to be a very
small number, when one puts this into the context of an example the amount appears
more appropriate. Because the variables are interpreted as the change in price due
to a one square foot increase, we would expect the price difference between two
houses that differ only by one square foot to be very small. In other words, a house
that has 1,000 square feet above grade and a house that is 1,001 square feet above
grade would not be expected to differ substantially in price.
Rooms and Bathrooms also positively impacted home sales price by 1.9% and
5.6%, respectively, for each additional room or bathroom. Additionally, the presence of Central Air increased the home’s price by 3.8%, all else equal. Significant
variables that were predicted to have a negative impact on sales price were Age and
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Table 4.4 Regression results with dependent variable being ln(sales price)
Variable

Coefficient

Variable

Coefficient

Age
Stories
Square Footage
Basement SF
Rooms
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Fireplaces
Lot Size
Central Air
Attached Garage
Carport
Detached Garage
Multiple Garages
Garage SF
In City Limits
Loveland Schools
Dad
Mom
Vacant
Rentals
Income
% Students
Age2

-0.003***
-0.048**
0.0003***
0.0001***
0.018***
-0.027***
0.055***
0.045***
-0.007
0.036***
-0.056
0.073
-0.018
-0.178**
0.000***
-0.025
0.090***
0.002**
0.000
0.000***
0.038
8.20E-07
0.331***
4.48E-05***

Owner Occupied
Bank Owned
Short Sale
Q2
Q3
Q4
Sold 2012
Distance to CSU
Distance to Shopping
ln (Rentals 12)
ln (Rentals 14)
ln (Rentals 500)
Population
Median Age
% White
% College
Families
Square Footage2
Basement SF2
Lot2
Distance to CSU2
Distance to Shopping2
Constant

0.035***
-0.144***
-0.111***
0.038***
0.047***
0.028*
0.003
-0.065***
-0.050***
0.056***
-0.053***
-0.044***
-6.14E-05***
0.001
0.698***
-0.008
0.000***
-1.93E-08
-2.04E-08
6.87E-05
0.003
0.005***
11.170***

Observations
Adjusted R2

2266
0.692

Notes: Table shows the estimated coefficients from one OLS regression of listed covariates on ln (Sales Price). Standard errors are not shown for space considerations.
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors used. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level, respectively.

if the sale was a foreclosusre (Bank Owned) or a Short Sale. As expected, homes
that were bank owned sold for 15% less than those that were a fair market sale, and
homes that were a short sale sold for 11% less than fair market sales, all else equal.
There was also evidence of seasonality in the market, with homes sold during the
second and third quarters of the year selling for approximately 4% more than homes
sold during the first quarter of the year.
Two of the house characteristic variables that had unexpected outcomes were
number of Stories and Bedrooms, however further consideration provides some insight into the results. If one considers the fact that adding a bedroom takes away
from the size of other rooms in the house, it seems appropriate that increasing the
number of bedrooms would negatively impact the sales price overall (Boxall et al.,
2005; Coulson, 2010). Lot Size and In City Limits were not statistically significant.
Distance to CSU, as well as distance to the shopping district, were both significant.
In both cases, home price decreased for each additional mile from CSU or the shopping district, falling by 6.5% as distance from CSU increased and by 5% as distance
from the shopping district increased.
Neighborhood characteristics also played a role in determining the sales price
of a home. As predicted in the literature, % White, College, Families and Income
all positively impacted a home’s sales price. The rental proximity variables were all
significant at the 0.0001 level. A 1% increase in the number of rentals located within
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500 feet decreased the home’s price by 0.0439%. Price decreased by 0.0532% for
each additional percent of rentals within a radius of 500 feet to 1/4 mile, while a
1% increase in rentals located between 1/4 mile and 1/2 mile of the home increased
price by .0559%, all else equal. Putting this in the context of an example provides a
clearer picture of what these results are saying. If a home has 100 rental properties
within a 1/4 to 1/2 mile radius, and 10 more homes become rentals (equivalent to
a 10% increase), the sales price of the property is predicted to increase by 5.59%,
holding other things constant. For a home that would have sold for $250,000, this
translates into an increase in sales price of nearly $14,000.
Overall, these results indicate that while rental homes that are closely located to
a property detract from its selling price, as distance from the home increases, the
presence of rental homes increase its price. This relationship can be explained by
considering how many home buyers shop for properties. If there is a rental directly
across the street that perhaps is not well maintained, it is considered an eyesore,
but a rental a block away, which the buyer doesn’t see from the driveway, may not
matter as much to the buyer. At the same time, if rental properties are considered an
alternative to a short sale or foreclosure, an increase in the number of rentals would
mean a decrease in the number of distressed sales, effectively increasing prices for
surrounding homes overall if the negative impacts of foreclosure are greater than
the negative impacts of rentals. An interesting extension of this study would be to
analyze proximity of foreclosures to the same sold homes to test for this type of
scenario.

4.6 Policy Implications
In general, these findings can be used to assist policy makers, homeowner’s associations and mortgage lenders in making sound decisions on rental regulation. The policy implications of these findings may be of particular interest to Fort Collins’ policy
makers given the three-unrelated ordinance. Passed in 2007, the three-unrelated ordinance (often referred to as U+2), limits the number of unrelated occupants in residential properties to no more than three. The ordinance was intended to reduce the
number of people living in a single property, with the goal of reducing neighborhood
problems and complaints, and preserving property values. A 2005 impact study conducted by Corona Research (2005) for the city predicted that “2/3 of households
that would be considered in violation of the ordinance were living in single-family
homes.”
While the ordinance may have limited the number of people living in any one
rental property, (theoretically reducing complaints and problems), it likely lead to
an increase in the number of rental homes overall, as households that were made up
of more than three unrelated people were forced to split up. This appears to be the
case based on interviews conducted in a 2009 follow up study during which several
people commented that they had “seen a marked increase in the number of rental
properties where they live”(Corona Research, 2009). Another consequence of the
ordinance is that it likely contributed to the decrease in vacancy rates. Basic supply
and demand theory tells us that as the number of available properties falls, rents will
increase. This means that in Fort Collins, the U+2 ordinance very likely exacerbated
affordable housing problems.
Furthermore, if the ordinance resulted in additional rental households forming
(which appears to be the case), the results of this analysis suggest that the U+2 or-
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dinance may not have had the intended impact of preserving property values. Given
these results, further research examining the full impact of the U+2 ordinance on
both property values and housing affordability would be beneficial to local policy
makers.

4.7 Conclusion
Single-family rental homes play a crucial role in providing quality, affordable housing to households that are unwilling or unable to purchase their own home. Literature in this area often overlooks the majority of the rental housing market as it
typically focuses on low-income affordable housing or multi-unit apartment complexes. Sound housing policy requires a balance between the need for quality, affordable housing with the needs of homeowners seeking to preserve the quality of
their neighborhood and protect the value of their homes.
This analysis extends the current literature by specifically measuring the impact
of proximity to single-family rental homes on home sales price. In developing this
model, GIS software was used to measure precise distances between rental properties and sold homes. This method resulted in rental density variables that were
unique to each individual home, rather than taking the “blanket approach” of using
census tract data typically found in the literature. By measuring both the number of
rentals and their distance from each sold single family home, I was able to explicitly
identify both the location and concentration of rental homes for each sold property,
rather than implicitly assuming a uniform impact as seen in most literature. Overall,
these findings suggest that rental properties do have an impact on the selling price
of nearby homes.
I find strong evidence that rental density plays an important role in determining
a home’s overall selling price; with rentals located within 1/4 mile of a property
negatively affecting price and rentals located between 1/4 and 1/2 mile positively
affecting selling price. If rental homes are considered an alternative to a foreclosure
or short sale for sellers that are underwater on their homes, these results suggest
that while an increase in the number of rental properties may negatively affect the
price of homes within close proximity, by lowering the number of properties sold in
short sale or foreclosure, they have a positive effect on the price of homes in the area
overall. These findings suggest areas for additional research, including an analysis
of the proximity of distressed sales on sold home prices. To the extent policymakers
seek to preserve property values through rental restrictions, the results of this paper
suggest that these restrictions may not necessarily be having the intended effect.
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Chapter 5

Airport Noise and House Prices: Evidence from
Columbus, Ohio
Kerianne Lawson

Abstract The John Glenn International Airport in Columbus, Ohio opened a new
runway in 2013. This expansion made it possible for Columbus to nearly double
its air traffic. The added noise from this expansion was a concern for the city, and
specifically residents in the surrounding neighborhoods. I use a difference in differences approach to examine the effect of the added noise pollution. I find that after
the runway expansion, house prices in noisier areas decreased compared to those in
areas not as affected by aircraft noise. Depending on the area specification, decrease
in home sale price ranges from approximately 2-10%.

5.1 Introduction
Living near an airport, or at least under the flight paths, can be very loud. Aircraft
noise is a negative externality caused by airports that, in theory, should affect house
prices. Moreover, an expansion of an airport that increases noise should be a concern
as it could impact home values in noise-affected areas.
The John Glenn International Airport is located about seven miles east of downtown Columbus, Ohio. On August 22, 2013 the airport opened a new runway that
was 702 feet further south than the previous runway. This move allowed for enough
space between the north and south runways so that for the first time, planes could
take off and/or land on both runways at once. Representatives from the airport stated
in numerous news articles that the goal of the airport was to meet increasing demand
and allow for more planes to get in and out of Columbus faster than ever before
(Weese, 2013). The increase in air travel demand could be attributed to Columbus’
population growth in recent years. It was reported in 2018 that Columbus is one of
the fastest growing cities in the country, and appears to be booming compared to
other northern and midwestern cities (Millsap, 2018). As Columbus Mayor Michael
Coleman put it, “as the city grows, the airport needs to grow with it” (Weese, 2013).
As the demand for air travel continues to increase, many cities must decide if
it is beneficial to expand their airports to accommodate more traffic. For example,
the Heathrow Airport in London discussed adding a third runway in 2013 as well.
The new runway would bring an additional 250,000 planes to Heathrow a year.
Kerianne Lawson
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 26506, USA e-mail: knl0013@mix.wvu.edu
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Opponents to the expansion argued that the noise levels would be simply unbearable
with the new runway. The airport is already a source of strife in south-east London.
The concern that the affected areas would be under a “louder sky of sound” led
to a debate about moving the entire airport to the outskirts of the city where the
additional noise would affect fewer people (The Guardian, 2013). There are many
stories like this, and as cities struggle with the decision to expand or move airports to
deal with the increasing number of flights per year, economists should be concerned
with the consequences of these decisions. In particular, the potentially increasing
noise pollution may affect the housing market.
This paper examines the effects of an airport expansion on house sale prices
in Columbus, Ohio. After the new south runway opened at John Glenn International Airport in Columbus, home values in areas under the flight paths decreased.
Although, it is not clear that the decrease in home sales prices is due to the actual increase in noise from the airport, or just the expectation of new noise. Mense
and Kholodilin (2014) looked at the anticipation of noise based on the release of
flight path plans released two years before the scheduled opening of the BerlinBrandenberg airport and the house prices in that area. They found a decrease in
home values from the expected increase in noise.1
The majority of the literature uses a hedonic price model to study the relationship
between airport noise and house prices. Several papers have noted that it is more
important to consider flight paths rather than distance from the airport (Boes and
Nüesch, 2011; Mense and Kholodilin, 2014; Tomkins et al., 1998). This is why
I use a difference in differences approach to compare the homes under the flight
paths to homes not under the flight paths before and after the new runway opened.
I use two different methods to identify which homes are affected by airport noise.
The first is using homes located in certain ZIP codes and the second using latitude
and longitude coordinates.

5.2 Literature Review
City and regional airports have been regarded as amenities that benefit the surrounding area. For example, in terms of economic growth (Bilotkach, 2015; Blonigen
and Cristea, 2015; Brueckner, 2003; Button and Yuan, 2013; Green, 2007; Tittle
et al., 2013), and increased employment (Appold and Kasarda, 2013; Button and
Lall, 1999; Sheard, 2014). However, there has been mixed evidence the nature of
spillovers from nearby airports. Despite evidence that airports are associated with
increased employment and economic activity, others are concerned about possible
negative externalities generated from airports. In this paper, I will focus on noise
pollution. Excessive noise from air traffic must be considered when we evaluate the
costs and benefits of an airport’s location and activities. One of the ways one can
measure the social costs of airport noise is looking at prices of homes around the
airport.
Studying the effects of airport noise, and other negative externalities associated
with airports, on house prices is not new to the economics literature (Nelson, 1980;
Suksmith and Nitivattananon, 2015). Most of the literature uses hedonic price models and studies decibel levels across cities to evaluate the effects of noise on house
1

The airport has still not opened despite the plans being released in 2011, further showing that
expectations of noise matter.
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prices (Cohen and Coughlin, 2003; Dekkers and van der Straaten, 2009; Espey and
Lopez, 2000; Nelson, 1979). Nearly all have found a negative relationship between
home prices and noise levels. The estimates on these effects vary, because some are
looking at airport openings and others at expansions.
Cohen and Coughlin (2008, 2009) look at houses around Hartsfield-Jackson Atalanta International Airport. They found that while proximity to the airport is positively related to house prices, after controlling for proximity and house characteristics, the homes in noisy areas sold for less than homes in less noisy areas. In Cohen
and Coughlin (2008), they consider spatial effects and use a model that includes
spatial autocorrelation and autoregressive parameters and find a strong negative relationship between noise and house prices. Cohen and Coughlin (2009) build on
O’Byrne et al. (1985) that also looked at Atlanta’s airport and house prices, but in
the 1970s. They find similar results, but look at how the impact of noise has changed
over time at the specific airport.
Nelson (1980) conducts a survey of the literature using thirteen empirical studies
and finds that the noise discount in urban areas is commonly about 0.5% to 0.6%
per decibel. The increase in sound from being near an airport is approximately 20
decibels, resulting in a 10-12% decrease in home values in noisy areas. These studies
do not necessarily look at the opening or expansion of the airport, but just compare
seemingly identical homes that are close to and far away from the airport, or lie in
different noise contour zones. Despite the large number of papers that have found
a negative relationship between noise and house price, it still up for debate about
whether airports are an urban amenity or disamenity.
One study suggested that as aircraft technology improves, planes make far less
noise than they ever have before and additional air traffic does not significantly
affect noise levels or home sale prices (McMillen, 2004). McMillen (2004) looks
at the expansion of the Chicago O’Hare airport and finds that homes in the areas
with severe noise experience about a 10% decrease in their home values. However,
the size of the area of noise concern is shrinking as planes get quieter. He estimates
that in order for airport expansions to have an impact on home values, the expected
increase in air traffic must exceed 60%. One could argue that John Glen International
Airport’s new runway meets this requirement, as the new south runway has the
potential to double Columbus’ air traffic and the increase in flights possible was
often discussed in the local news.
This is connected to some of the more recent literature that argues that it is more
about the anticipation of noise than the noise itself. Jud and Winkler (2006) study
the effects on house prices after the announcement of the airport expansion in North
Carolina, the Piedmont Triad International Airport, a hub for cargo and passenger
air travel. They find that within a 2.5 mile band of the airport, house prices declined
about 9.2%. They effect is still significantly negative, 5.7%, when the band is extended another mile and a half. This suggests that the anticipation of air noise could
affect house prices, before the increased noise levels caused by the airport expansion
even occur. Conversely, if residents near the airport do not perceive the expansion to
be a major one, then this will not affect home prices as much. McMillen (2004) argues that the shrinking affected area because of quieter planes, and lack of reaction
to relatively small expansions should be a good sign to airports who wish to grow
in the coming years.
Others have argued that airports are an amenity to the nearby neighborhoods.
Tomkins et al. (1998) found in a study conducted about the Manchester airport that
home owners may actually experience house price premiums if they locate close to
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airports. They found a 4 to 12% increase in home price depending on the level of
noise observed.
Some papers have suggested that using identifying homes under flight paths is a
better method than distance from the airport (Boes and Nüesch, 2011; Mense and
Kholodilin, 2014; Tomkins et al., 1998). The reasoning behind this is because two
homes that are equivalent in distance from the airport may experience vastly different noise levels depending on the flight patterns above them. Mense and Kholodilin
(2014) uses the release of the new flight patterns from the Berlin-Brandenburg airport. They find that home values decrease between a 8.3 to 12.8% because of the
release of the plans for the new flight paths, not the actual increased noise itself, as
the airport is yet to open. They propose that perhaps it is the anticipation of added
noise that affects home values more than the actual noise after the airport’s opening.
Because Columbus’ airport did not double its traffic overnight with the opening of
the new runway but expanded for the increasing demand, then expectations of the
added noise may be a driving factor of the results of this paper.
In a similar study, Almer et al. (2017) used a change in regulation in Germany
that affected the Zurich airport’s flight patterns for a quasi-experimental analysis of
the aircraft noise on housing prices. They use online advertisements for apartments
and use a difference-in-differences approach with time varying treatment effects and
find the rental market experienced about a 13% decrease in the average apartment’s
rent for about two years after the policy change and then reached a new lower equilibrium for the rest of the observed period. Almer et al. (2017); Boes and Nüesch
(2011) both use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the
increase or change in airport noise on the areas under flight paths, which should be
the most affected by sound, after the policy went into effect or expansion was announced. In this paper, I will use a similar approach and use the opening date of the
new runway as the beginning of the treatment period.
Unlike previous work, this paper is the first to use the difference-in-differences
method to estimate the effect of opening of a new runway at an airport on house
prices. While not very many cities are considering opening up new airports, new
runways are an option for lots of airports that are trying to accommodate increasing
demand for air travel. Airport expansions that include adding runways are happening
in smaller cities like Columbus, but also major cities all over the world (Cowin,
2018). The homes potentially affected by these new runways are already near the
airport, so this effect should be interpreted differently than the results in Boes and
Nüesch (2011) which is considering placing an airport in an entirely new area. The
effect of an opening at a new site, or a major change in flight paths like in the case of
Almer et al. (2017), should be viewed differently than increasing the intensity and
frequency of sound in an already noisy area. The results in this paper could be more
useful in cases where airports are considering an expansion via new runway(s).

5.3 Data
The data on house sale price and characteristics comes from the Franklin County
Auditor. The home sale information covers the years 2009-2017 and excludes condominiums, mobile homes and duplex dwellings. Included in the data are several
variables about the location, condition, and house characteristics (Mingo, 2018).
Homes that are affected by sound are identified using two methods: ZIP codes, and
areas created using latitude and longitude coordinates.
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The John Glenn International Airport only has runways that run east-west. So I
look at homes to the east and west that are in the flight path zone, and compare them
to homes to the north and south of the airport, as well as the rest of Franklin County.
Just measuring distance from the airport would not be an accurate way to determine
which homes are impacted by the sound.
On the Columbus airport’s website, it says that they have started programs to
monitor and track noise levels (Columbus Regional Airport Authority, 2018). They
have devices to measure sound in the areas they believe will be most impacted by the
ever increasing volume of air traffic in Columbus. They provide an interactive map
that has circles where the monitors are located, and the current sound levels at any
given time (Fly Columbus, 2018). As the planes move you can see the increasing
sound levels denoted by the change in color and size of the circles, as shown in
Figure 5.2.

Fig. 5.1 Circles indicate sound tracking monitors around the airport

Fig. 5.2 Example of a plane approaching the airport
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5.4 Empirical Methodology
This paper’s difference in differences approach rests on the plausibly exogenous
variation in sound due to the flight paths over the city. I identified the noisiest areas
using maps from the sound tracking website provided by the Columbus airport.
Then, I used the opening of the airport runway as the date to determine the posttreatment period and the ZIP code and latitude/longitude areas to determine the
treated homes.
The model is as follows:
log(SalePrice) = α + γ(Treatediarea ∗ Posti ) + β Xi + εi

(5.1)

where Xi is a vector of home characteristics including the year the home was built,
the number of bedrooms, full baths and stories, the condition2 , the style of the
home3 , and the school district in which the home is located. γ is the coefficient
that can be interpreted as the percent change in home sale prices for homes in a
given treatment area.
I used several different specifications to determine which homes are included in
the “treated” group. That is, the homes that are under the path of the planes coming
and going from the airport. The first three specifications are based on ZIP code
location and the second three are based on latitude and longitude location.
The airport is located in the south central part of the 43219 ZIP code. First, I only
included homes in 43219, as they would be closest to the airport. Next, I added the
ZIP codes directly east and west of where the airport was located, 43211 and 43230.
Next, I added two more ZIP codes that were west of 43219, but not directly west
of the airport. However, as you can see in Figure 5.3, many homes that are north
of the airport, and presumably not as affected by airport noise, are included in this
specification.
To ensure I was truly capturing the homes most affected by airport sound, I used
the latitude and longitude coordinates of each home sold. Area 1 is drawn to include
all of the sound monitoring devices that the Columbus airport has placed in its immediate vicinity to measure sound. Area 1 extends about 4 miles on either side of
the airport. It seems reasonable to assume that this is the area that the airport is most
concerned about and is therefore tracking the noise. The next two areas are drawn to
capture homes slightly further out of this area but who are almost certainly affected
by the sound. Area 2 adds approximately 2 miles on either side of Area 1, and Area
3 is an additional 3 miles out. These areas are based on anecdotal evidence from the
city’s residents as well as the previous literature. The true shape of the area affected
is more like two cones fanning out to the east and west of the airport. However, for
this paper, I will just use the same height for all three areas, because I do not know
how far the cone shape fans out to the north and south. It is possible that there are
more homes being affected by sound that are not included in the three areas.

2

The condition of the home is determined by the county auditor’s office. Homes can be coded as
one of the following: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, Average, Poor or Very Poor
3 Some examples of the style of the home are bungalow, Cape Cod, and colonial
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Fig. 5.3 The three ZIP code specifications: 1 ZIP is blue, 3 ZIP is blue and purple, 5 ZIP is blue,
purple, and green.

Fig. 5.4 The three area specifications, the shade of blue indicating each area. Area 1 is the darkest
and Area 3 is the lightest.

5.5 Empirical results
First, a concern is that the proximity to the airport in the treated group homes is
correlated with some unobservable factors that will affect house prices. One way to
see if this is a valid concern is to compare home characteristics between the treated
and untreated groups. Table 5.5 has the summary statistics for the three ZIP code
area specifications compared to the rest of Franklin County.
There are slight differences in the characteristics and quality of the homes between the ZIP code areas and the rest of the sample. However, it does not look
like the differences are not large enough to explain the difference between aver-
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Table 5.1 Home characteristics comparison for the ZIP code areas
ZIP 1
ZIP 3
ZIP 5
vs rest of sample vs rest of sample vs rest of sample
Year Built
Stories
Sale Price
Full Baths
Bedrooms
Acres
Very Good
Good
Fair
Average
Poor
Very Poor

1983
1.586
126,662
1.640
3.157
0.178
0.005
0.076
0.083
0.831
0.003
0.001

Observations 1,873

1974
1977
1974
1966
1975
1.565
1.526 1.568
1.484 1.578
214,373 159,803 217,317 155,435 220,360
1.808
1.656 1.818
1.577 1.576
3.292
3.220 3.296
3.152 3.308
0.255
0.239 0.256
0.209 0.260
0.039
0.006 0.041
0.021 0.040
0.176
0.153 0.176
0.179 0.174
0.030
0.052 0.028
0.059 0.027
0.7513 0.783 0.750
0.736 0.755
0.003
0.004 0.003
0.005 0.003
0
0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001
104,731

8,313

98,291

12,360 94,244

age sale price in the two groups. I believe a lot of this difference can be explained
by the school district in which the schools are located. In the rest of the sample,
there are 5 school districts that rank in the top 15 in the state of Ohio (Niche.com,
2018). The treated ZIP codes are all located in the Columbus or Gahanna-Jefferson
school districts (Ohio Development Services Agency, 2018). Given the poor quality
of Columbus city schools and the relatively small number of private schools in the
area, many central Ohio residents are willing to pay a premium for homes in certain
school districts even though they are not much nicer or bigger. Because of this, I
include controls for school district in the model.
Table 5.2 Diff-in-Diff results for the ZIP code areas
(1)
1ZIP*Post
3ZIP*Post

(2)

Log Sale Price
(3)
(4)

-0.043**
(0.016)

(5)

(6)

-0.0002
(0.011)
-0.049***
(0.007)

5ZIP*Post

-0.035***
(0.005)
-0.081***
(0.007)

Year Built
Bedrooms
Full Baths
Stories
Acres
Condition
No
No
Style
No
No
School District
No
No
Observations 106,604 106,604
R2
0.015
0.013

No
No
No
106,604
0.027

0.001***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.138***
(0.001)
0.107***
(0.002)
0.032***
(0.001)

0.001***
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.136***
(0.001)
0.101***
(0.002)
0.031***
(0.001)

-0.041***
(0.005)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.137***
(0.001)
0.101***
(0.002)
0.032***
(0.001)

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,642
0.498

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,642
0.502

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,642
0.500

Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05, ‘ˆ’ 0.1
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Table 5.5 is the difference in differences results for the three ZIP code specifications. Even when controlling for style, condition, school district, and house characteristics, the house prices in the 3 ZIP and 5 ZIP areas are still negatively and
significantly affected after the runway opens. However, because of the shape of the
ZIP code areas, many homes north of the airport are included in these areas. And as
previously discussed, planes can only take off and land over the homes to the east
and west of the airport. These ZIP code areas may be considering homes largely unaffected by aircraft noise as a part of the treated group, which would be problematic
for this study’s analysis.
Table 5.3 Home characteristic comparison for the three areas
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
vs rest of sample vs rest of sample vs rest of sample
Year Built
Stories
Sale Price
Full Baths
Bedrooms
Acres
Very Good
Good
Fair
Average
Poor
Very Poor

1974
1.563
156,920
1.758
3.279
0.236
0.023
0.156
0.056
0.760
0.003
0.001

1974
1982
1974
1972
1974
1.565
1.650 1.558
1.706 1.547
213,090 185,943 214,851 201,877 213,999
1.806
1.809 1.804
1.792 1.806
3.290
3.255 3.292
3.257 3.295
0.255
0.213 0.257
0.190 0.262
0.038
0.011 0.040
0.035 0.039
0.175
0.099 0.180
0.154 0.177
0.030
0.064 0.028
0.053 0.028
0.753
0.819 0.748
0.754 0.753
0.003
0.005 0.003
0.004 0.003
0.001
0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001

Observations 3,889 102,651

8,088

98,452

11,803 94,737

Table 5.5 is a comparison of the homes in the three areas to the rest of the sample. Like the three ZIP code areas, these homes sell for less than the rest of the
sample despite being very similar in size and age of the home. Again, I control for
school district and style of the homes in hopes of controlling for differences in the
neighborhoods that can affect house prices. Table 5.5 is the difference in differences
results for the three areas. Even as far out from the airport as Area 3, house prices
are still affected negatively and significantly after the opening of the airport runway.
In column 4, the result is negative, but loses significance once the controls are added
to the regression. There are mostly industrial buildings to the east of the airport in
Area 1, and those properties are not included in the data. This could contribute to the
not significant result. Next, I check to see if my results are only due to the size of the
areas I have created. I change three areas to different longitude ranges, but the same
latitude ranges. I expand and shrink the three areas by a quarter of a mile (or 0.005
longitudinal degrees). These results are presented in Table 5.5 and are consistent
with Table 5.5.
My estimates include all homes in Franklin County outside of the specified
treated area as the control group. Some of these homes are nearly 25 miles away
from the airport and in newer suburban areas that are very different, in many unobserved ways, from the older neighborhoods downtown that are affected by the
airport sound. To attempt to include homes that are most comparable geographically and in neighborhood composition, I restrict the sample of home sales and run
the same analysis with the three latitude/longitude areas. The observations included
in this analysis include homes located the ZIP codes where the three areas are, and
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Table 5.4 Diff-in-Diff Results for the three areas
(1)
Area1*Post

Log Sale Price
(3)
(4)

(2)

-0.053***
(0.010)

(5)

-0.007
(0.008)
-0.054***
(0.008)

Area2*Post

(6)

-0.022***
(0.006)
-0.037***
(0.006)

Area3*Post
Year Built
Bedrooms
Full Baths
Stories
Acres
Condition
No
Style
No
School District
No
Observations
106,540
R2
0.007

No
No
No
106,540
0.010

No
No
No
106,540
0.005

0.001***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.139***
(0.001)
0.139***
(0.002)
0.032***
(0.001)

0.001***
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.139***
(0.001)
0.103***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.001)

-0.027***
(0.005)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.139***
(0.001)
0.103***
(0.002)
0.032***
(0.001)

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,580
0.497

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,580
0.498

Yes
Yes
Yes
93,580
0.495

Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05, ‘ˆ’ 0.1

other ZIP codes close to the treated areas and the airport.4 Table 5.5 shows the results when using a smaller area as a control group. These are homes that still should
be unaffected by the airport noise, but may be a more suitable control group than
using the entire county. When controlling for school district and housing characteristics, I find slightly larger negative results.
Table 5.5 Diff-in-Diff Results for the three areas with adjusted sizes
(1)

(2)

Log Sale Price
(3)
(4)

-0.017*
Area1*Post
(0.008)
Area2*Post

-0.025***
(0.005)

(6)

-0.019***
(0.006)
-0.026***
(0.005)

Area3*Post
Size Change +0.005
Controls
Yes
Observations 93,580
R2
0.497

(5)

-0.012
(0.008)

+0.005
Yes
93,580
0.497

+0.005
Yes
93,580
0.495

-0.028***
(0.005)
-0.005
Yes
93,580
0.496

-0.005
Yes
93,580
0.499

-0.005
Yes
93,580
0.495

Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05, ‘ˆ’ 0.1

4

43201, 43202, 43205, 43206, 43209, 43210, 43211, 43212, 43213, 43214, 43219, 43221, 43224,
43227, and 43230
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Table 5.6 Diff-in-Diff Results for the three areas with restricted control group
(1)

(2)

Log Sale Price
(3)
(4)

-0.044**
Area1*Post
(0.014)
Area2*Post

-0.108***
(0.012)

(6)

-0.069***
(0.009)
-0.063***
(0.010)

Area3*Post
Controls
No
Observations 32,715
R2
0.005

(5)

-0.010
(0.009)

No
32,715
0.026

No
32,715
0.004

-0.041***
(0.007)
Yes
32,654
0.503

Yes
32,654
0.511

Yes
32,654
0.501

Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05, ‘ˆ’ 0.1

5.6 Conclusion
John Glenn International Airport opened a new runway to accommodate increased
demand. August 22, 2013 was the first time that planes could simultaneously take
of and/or land on the two runways. This addition allows for Columbus’ airport to
possibly double its number of flights a day in the coming years. The increased sound,
or at least the anticipation of the increased sound, may affect house prices to the
homes under the flight paths. I used a difference in differences approach to examine
the effect of the increased sound after the new runway’s opening on the homes to
the east and west of the airport. The results indicate that there is a negative and
significant effect on home sale prices to the affected areas after the runway opens.
My results are smaller (about a third to fourth of the size) than the effects found
by Mense and Kholodilin (2014), but that study was looking at the introduction of
a brand new airport. Since I am only concerned with the opening of a new runway
in a much smaller airport and city, it makes sense that the impact of additional
sound is not as large. The Berlin-Brandenburg airport has a projected number of
annual passengers that is five times the size of Columbus. In comparison to the other
hedonic price models in the literature, my preliminary results are slightly smaller as
well. These results could be contributed to the findings of McMillen (2004) that
suggests that newer planes are quieter than ever before.
My results suggest that the Columbus airport’s increasing air traffic has a negative
impact on the housing market in areas that are most affected by the sound. With the
different area specifications, my estimates range from about a 2% to 10% decline
in house sale price after the opening of the south runway in Columbus. The project
cost about $140 million dollars, and is a part of a larger effort by the airport to
increase the number of planes visiting John Glenn International Airport each year.
As Columbus’ Mayor Coleman said in 2013, the city continues to grow in size, the
airport plans to expand with it (Weese, 2013). In addition to the construction costs,
increasing airport noise is a another cost of this growth, which has the potential to
reduce housing prices in the loudest areas.
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Chapter 6

Homeowner evaluation of crime across space
Eliot Alexander

Abstract I analyze how a homeowner’s evaluation of crime is affected by the type
of crime committed and the spatial distribution of crime around a home. Nearby
crime is capitalized into house prices, but it is not well understood how the degree
of that capitalization varies with the crime incident’s distance from the house. I
employ a simple hedonic model of house prices in Baltimore City using a microlevel dataset of location-specific crimes and houses to shed light on this relationship.
Because crime is potentially correlated with a myriad of spatial unobservables, as
crime could be attracted to areas of greater property value, I estimate a HausmanTaylor model with nearby tree-canopy density and distance to the nearest park as
instruments for neighborhood crime. I find that, though the historical average of
neighborhood-wide crime does not significantly impact house prices, nearby crimes
that occur during the homeowner’s search period do decrease house prices, and this
effect varies with the distance of the crime to the house. There is also significant
heterogeneity of the impact of different types of crime on housing prices.

6.1 Introduction
Safety from crime is an important aspect of the bundle of amenities that local governments provide in an effort to attract new citizens and retain existing ones. This
goal of minimizing the impact of crime on its citizens is, however, only one goal
amongst many that must be supported by a limited budget. Because crime not only
varies by type but has a non-uniform spatial distribution, understanding the impact
of crime on citizens by type and space will enable policymakers to better allocate
scarce funds to best serve its citizens. In this way, local police departments could
place a greater emphasis on preventing crimes in areas that have the greatest impact
on the overall well-being of residents.
To be sure, all crime is a dis-amenity. However, until a local government can
eliminate crime altogether, it can maximize the utility of its citizens by targeting
crime in a way that best reduces the crimes that residents want most strongly to
avoid. In order to maximize law enforcement policy in this way, we must investigate
resident preference heterogeneity across crime types and over the spatial distribution
Eliot Alexander
Ohio State University Newark, Newark, OH, 43005, USA e-mail: Alexander.632@osu.edu
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of crime that affects them. Numerous studies have utilized hedonic analysis to study
the cost of crime.
Before Rosen’s (1974), Kain and Quigley (1970) estimated implicit prices of specific aspects of the bundles of residential services in St. Louis. They found strong
effects for building and neighborhood characteristics but insignificant effects for
crime. They explained that including a neighborhood crime index is more a statement of good intentions than any serious effort to come to grips with the conceptual
and measurement problems of defining a neighborhood’s perceived safety, and argued that insignificance of crime was likely due to its high correlation with the residential quality data and the relatively low variance of crime within the city. Harrison
and Rubinfeld (1978) control for neighborhood crime in their estimate of marginal
willingness to pay for clean air in Boston. They found that marginal pollution damages are indeed increasing with total pollution level and with consumer income.
They also found that the hedonic price of clean air exhibits large variance with different specifications of the hedonic housing price model: with plausible specifications of the relationship among air pollution, housing attributes, and housing values,
aggregate benefit estimates may be reduced as much as 60% below the figure based
on a constant marginal valuation. The study, which included FBI data on crime rate
by town, incidentally found it had a higher effect than that of pollution (in annual
average pphm of nitrogen oxide). Dubin and Goodman (1982) estimated the value
of education and crime in the Baltimore area using 12 neighborhood crime variables and 21 neighborhood schools variables in addition to variables for housing
characteristics. Using a Box-Cox transformation, they found that a semi-log model
of price provided the best fit. They compared the results between Baltimore County
and Baltimore City subsets of their data. In the city, a one unit change in non-violent
property loss implied a $795 fall in house price, the violent crime component implied a decrease of $3,143, and “shopping center crime” implied a price decrease
of $3,721. In the county subset, crime had a much smaller impact. Of the coefficients on the three crime variables, only the one for murder was significant, and an
increase by one unit lead to a $1,184 decline in house price. They suggested that
crime could indeed have a smaller cost in the county but also proposed that lower
variation of crime in the county was more likely the reason. In concluding, they
stressed that their findings only show marginal effects and warned that dynamic effects across the city could lead to different results if education or crime policy were
implemented.
In an analysis of migration, Berger and Blomquist (1992) used a hedonic model
as one of many steps towards determining which factors, such as wages and quality
of life, most strongly affect an individual’s choice to move. Their results showed that
although rate of violent crime did not affect an individual’s probability of moving,
it did affect the individual’s decision of to which location he or she will move, given
a decision to move. They found that individuals on average were willing to accept
$1.07 in combined compensation via wages and housing prices in response to a oneunit increase from the mean in the violent crime rate. Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001)
used hedonic analysis to study various effects of proximity in Atlanta to a MARTA
rail transit station. They proposed that transit stations could increase crime due to
increased access to new areas for criminals. They found strong, significant effects
of crime density on property value as well as a strong correlation between crime
density and proximity to transit stations, supporting the theory that stations lead to
higher crime. For higher-income areas, they found evidence that the potential for
increased “booty” slightly outweighed the supposed increased probability of arrest.
The increase in crime due to greater access was stronger for transit stations nearer
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downtown, the area of highest criminal activity, suggesting that criminals do not
travel far outside high-crime areas.
In a similar context, Troy and Grove (2008) performed a hedonic analysis to investigate the relationship between violent crime and city parks in Baltimore. They
found that public parks maintain a positive market value until the crime of the surrounding neighborhoods reaches a certain threshold, at which point they maintain
a negative value. They compared the results of a linear model, a semi-log model, a
Box- Cox transformation, and a spatially adjusted model to test for potential spatial
auto- correlation, and obtained similar results for all four models.
Bishop and Murphy (2011) expanded the hedonic model to incorporate dynamic
decision-making and applied the model to a dataset of violent crime, consumer race
and income, and housing characteristics across multiple counties in the Bay Area of
California. Their results held that, on average, households were willing to pay $472
a year to avoid a 10% percent increase in violent crime, and by comparison, static
models underestimate willingness to pay to avoid crime by 21%. They also found
heterogeneity of WTP for avoiding crime across incomes and races.
Bishop and Murphy (2011) develop a new econometric method for finding the
underlying marginal willingness-to-pay function that avoids the problems of endogeneity described by Brown and Rosen (1982). By specifying a parametric form of
this function, they derive an estimator and apply it to violent crime data from Los
Angeles and San Francisco. They found that MWTP is indeed increasing in total
level of crime; with each additional increase in violent crime per 100,000 residents,
MWTP increased by between 20 to 30 cents. They hold that by assuming constant
WTP across all levels of crime, the researcher will find severely biased estimates,
which in this case would underestimate the total value of a non-marginal shift in
crime levels.
Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010) also argue that researchers should be concerned
about the endogeneity of crime in these models. A few studies attempt to correct for
this issue by using instrumental variables (Rizzo, 1979; Naroff et al., 1980; Burnell,
1988; Tita et al., 2006), but only two test the validation of their instruments. The
instrument of the first, the lags of explanatory variables in Buck et al. (1993) fails
the overidentification test. Only Gibbons (2004) and Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010)
give support for their instruments as appropriate ones. As I am also concerned about
the endogeneity of crime on house prices, I estimate a Hausman-Taylor model with
two instrumental variables in addition to a hedonic model.
Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010) address two additional issues in estimating the effect of various types of crime: multicollinearity and the specification of the crime
variable. First, multicollinearity is likely an issue for our study. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010) address this by transforming crime type variables from levels to annual
changes, which are much less correlated. Because I use house-specific measures of
crime in addition to the annual, neighborhood-level crime measures that Ihlanfeldt
and Mayock employ, this method will not apply to all of our crime variables, and so
instead we difference each individual crime variable with the corresponding censustract-wide average, which decreases the collinearity of the variables. Using different
measures of local crime -– specifically crime density, crime rate, and crime counts
— can yield different results. The results of Ihlanfeldt and Mayock suggest that
crime density — crime per area — best explains local price variation, and this study
will examine both crime counts and crime density.
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6.2 Model
As a basis, a simple hedonic model of housing prices for household i in neighborhood n is estimated in which houses vary by such as square footage and age as well
as by their provision of local amenities such as tree cover, proximity to open space,
and amount of nearby crime incidents:
lnPin = β0 + βC XCi + βH XHi + µn + εi

(6.1)

where XC and XH are vectors of local crime and housing characteristics, respectively. Neighborhood fixed-effects control for time-invariant factors that influence
house prices by neighborhood. Additionally, we estimate a Hausman-Taylor model
to correct for endogeneity of crime variables and to compare the effects of recent and
house-specific measures of crime to neighborhood-wide measures of crime across
the entire dataset. The Hausman-Taylor model uses both within neighborhood and
between neighborhood variation to explain observed housing prices and is given by:
ln¶in = β0 + X1in β1 + X2in β2 + Z1n δ1 + Z2n δ2 + µn + εin

(6.2)

for variables X1in and Z1n that are assumed to be exogenous and variables X2in and
Z2n that are possibly correlated with unobserved neighborhood effects µn . In the current context, Z1n is the average distance to downtown of houses by neighborhood,
Z2n is the total number of crimes committed in the neighborhood over the four year
span, X2in is a vector of house characteristics that includes individual measures of
local crime, and X1in consists of two variables that will act as instruments for neighborhood crime: distance in feet to the nearest park, and average tree canopy cover
of the house. We obtain robust standard errors that are clustered by neighborhood,
as it is likely that house prices are spatially correlated. The BPD delineated these
neighborhood boundaries, which presumably constitute some level of contiguous
areas that are separate from one another.
A consistent estimate of neighborhood crime can be identified if the number of
variables in X1in is at least as large as the number of variables in Z2i and if there is
sufficient correlation between the instruments — distance to the nearest park and
tree canopy cover -– and neighborhood crime i.e., the instruments are not weak.
Further, the neighborhood averages of tree canopy, the distance to the nearest park,
and the distance to downtown must be uncorrelated with the random effect µn .
It is reasonable to think that unobserved neighborhood-level factors that affect
house prices do not significantly vary with neighborhood-level distance to parks,
tree cover, or distance to downtown. The provision of parks across space in Baltimore City has been set for many years; public efforts concerning the provision of
parks in Baltimore City focus on renovating existing parks rather than establishing
new ones. Baltimore is a relatively old city, and most of its parks were founded in
the 19th century. These historical connections are likely too old to have any remaining correlation to current neighborhood unobservables. Similarly, tree canopy cover
in Baltimore City has gone largely unchanged in recent years except for small-scale
efforts by private citizens that likely have a negligible effect on overall canopy cover.
Figure 6.1 shows that tree cover in Baltimore is sparse and appears to be correlated with park location. Public support of additional tree cover in Baltimore City
focuses on subsidizing plantings by individuals rather than a larger-scale provision
of trees in new areas of the city. Thus, it is likely that the spatial distribution of tree
canopy cover in the city is based on older policies that are exogenous to current
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Fig. 6.1 Baltimore City tree canopy density

neighborhood unobservables. Tree cover and distance to open space, however, are
correlated with neighborhood-level crime; the correlation coefficients with crime
are -0.40 and -0.2 for average neighborhood tree cover and distance to the nearest
park, respectively. Though these relationships are perhaps the opposite of expected,
they nevertheless entail a significant correlation. Rather than constituting a haven for
criminals, perhaps parks attract residents to an extent that deters crime, as there are
more potential witnesses in the surrounding area. It is possible that the same effect
holds for tree cover. Tests for weak instruments and for overidentification confirm
that these instruments are valid.

6.3 Data
93

The dataset employed is a panel of mortgage transactions in Baltimore City, Maryland between 2007 and 2010 that was matched with house-level measures of local
crime, parks, and tree canopy cover. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the roughly
3,500 house and park locations across the city. The housing data includes detailed
characteristics obtained from the Maryland Department of Planning’s MDProperty
View electronic GIS parcel data. The data includes US state plane coordinates for
transacted houses, which were converted to latitude and longitude. We observe accurate spatial locations for both homes and local amenities and so can estimate the
effect on house prices of crime as it varies spatially around the household. Table 6.1
shows summary statistics for the dataset.
The crime data was compiled by the Baltimore Police Department and contains
longitude and latitude coordinates, the incident date, and the neighborhood where
the crime took place. It is possible that there is a correlation between property val-
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3.7 Figures
Fig. 6.2 Baltimore City housing transactions

Table 6.1 Summary statistics

SaleAmt
Crime1
Crime2
Crime3
CrimeSqMi1
CrimeSqMi2
CrimeSqMi3
MeanNeighCrime
CanopyCover
FeetToOS
BldgSqFt
GarageSqFt
Baths
Fireplace
Acreage
HouseAge
MiToDowntown
OwnOcc

N

Mean

Std. Dev. Min.

Max.

3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459
3,459

214,931
18.0
52.1
195.9
143.4
138.3
129.9
851
18.8
1,288
1,672
93.4
1.691
0.3
0.16
71.4
4.9
0.86

135,675
13.8
31.3
104.6
109.5
82.9
694
913.5
18.1
849
631
154
0.75
0.46
0.10
16.7
1.1
0.34

1,000,000
167
401
1,216
1,329
1,063
806
3,689
94.9
4,191
5,926
1,152
5.5
1
1.58
100
7.6
1

20,000
0
0
3
0
0
2
27
1
0
528
0
1
0
0.0045
0
0.54
0

ues and crimes due to biases in reporting crimes if areas of higher crime and lower
value experience underreporting of crimes; survey data shows that higher-income
residents and homeowners are more likely to report crimes (Skogan, 1999). Violent
crime is defined as aggravated assault, homicide, rape, arson, robbery, and shootings, while nonviolent crime is defined as auto theft, burglary, and larceny.
First, for each housing transaction, we limit certain measures of crime to crimes
that occurred at a time that is likely to affect the house sale price. We define a
window of time over which observed crimes will affect a house price valuation; this
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window spans from 180 days prior to the sale date through 30 days prior to the sale
date. It is reasonable to expect that a homeowner would spend a period of roughly
six months in the search of a house over which he/she observes characteristics of the
prospective purchases. The last month prior to the sale date is excluded, as the final
housing decision has likely been made already before this time while the relevant
paperwork is carried out before the actual transaction date. Results are robust to
changes in the specification of this time window.

Fig. 6.3 Baltimore City neighborhoods

A measure of crime is then calculated for each house as the total number of
crime incidents by type that occurs within this time window prior to the sale date
and within various exclusive radii of the house. For example, each house is assigned
measures of the total number of violent and nonviolent crimes that occur within the
relevant time window and occur within 0.2, 0.2 to 0.4, and 0.4 to 0.8 miles of the
house. Each house is also assigned to a neighborhood, determined by that of the
nearest crime to the house over the entire four-year dataset. Figure 6.3 plots each
crime incident over the four-year span, color-coded by neighborhood to show the
rough location of the nearly 150 neighborhoods as defined by the Baltimore Police
Department. For a more long-term measure of crime across space, I also included
in estimations the average number of crime incidents per neighborhood over the
four-year span. In addition to a count of crime, I also calculate a measure of crime
density for each house, defined as the count of crimes by type divided by the area in
92
square miles of each concentric, exclusive
band.
I must also address the potential for multicollinearity across different measures
of crime, either by crime type or by distance from the house. It is not uncommon
in the hedonic literature to exclude property crime and use only one measure of violent crime (Berger and Blomquist, 1992; Troy and Grove, 2008; Bishop and Murphy, 2011; Bishop and Timmins, 2011). However, when possible I include multiple
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types of both violent and non-violent crimes in order to reduce omitted variable bias
and to compare the effects of different crime types. Table 6.2 shows the correlation
coefficient between different measures of crime in the sample. Using a measure of
crime counts above the census-tract mean decreases the collinearity of variables.
Table 6.2 Crime correlation
Total crime count within

Crime count above mean within

0.2mi 0.4mi 0.8mi

0.2mi 0.4mi 0.8mi

0.2mi 1
0.4mi 0.72 1
0.8mi 0.52 0.72 1

0.2mi 1
0.4mi 0.35 1
0.8mi 0.12 0.37 1

A measure of local tree cover is also estimated using a dataset on tree canopy
density from the National Land Cover Database. This includes an index of tree
canopy cover as it is spatially distributed across the US. This index ranges from
0 (representing no canopy cover) to 100 (maximal canopy cover). Figure 6.1 shows
the spatial distribution of tree cover for the city as a color gradient with green representing maximal cover and red representing minimal cover. The dataset is quite
granulated, as it consists of multiple index values per city block. Each house is assigned the average index value of the nearest ten data points, representing roughly
a city-block-wide measure of tree cover. The nearest canopy data point is also used
as a robustness check. Data on parks from the United States Geological Survey was
used to assign the distance to the nearest public park for each house.

6.4 Empirical results
Table 6.3 shows the results of the hedonic model of house prices in Baltimore
City using three measures of crime within concentric, exclusive bands around each
house. A quick check of the variance inflation factors for the various models suggests that multicollinearity is not likely an issue. The largest VIF value for the crime
count and density variables is 7.94, and the largest VIF value for the crime count
above the mean is 1.73. Measuring crime by count suggests that the homeowner discount of house prices for increased crime fades with the crime’s distance from the
house. However, these three bands cover increasingly large areas, so these measures
do not account for crime density surrounding each house.
By adjusting each count for the area over which it consists, we obtain measures of
crime counts per square mile. A model of these measures suggests that homeowners
do not monotonically decrease their valuation of crime as it increases in distance
from their house. Using crime counts and crime densities results in an equal fit of
the variation in house prices. Estimation of these models while excluding counts
of burglary and robbery, shown in table 3.6, generates more significant effects of
crime. In this case, all three counts of crime are significant, and the effect of crime
decreases as the crimes extend farther in distance from the house. Adjusting for
density however, suggests that the density of crimes within 0.2, between 0.2 and
0.4, and between 0.4 and 0.8 miles around the house have similar effects on house
prices. We cannot reject that these effects are equal.
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Table 6.3 Hedonic crime model
Variable

Crime Count Crime Density Count Above Mean

Crime1
Crime2
Crime3
AverageCanopy
FtToOS
OwnOcc
BldgSqFt
GarageSqFt
MiToDowntown
Fireplace
Acreage
Baths
Age
Constant
SaleMonth FE
SaleYear FE
Neighborhood FE

-0.0016*
-0.00052
-0.00027*
0.0024***
0.000027*
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00012***
0.033
0.068***
0.44***
0.072***
-0.00089*
11.25***
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.00021*
-0.00023
-0.00040*
0.0024***
0.000027*
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00012***
0.033
0.068***
0.44***
0.072***
-0.00089*
11.25***
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.0015*
-0.00055
-0.00013
0.0025***
0.000024*
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00012***
0.067***
0.067***
0.44***
0.07***
-0.00094*
10.99***
Yes
Yes
Yes

N
3,459
3,459
3,459
R2
0.6451
0.6451
0.6445
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the .10%, .05%,
and .01%, respectively.
Table 6.4 Hedonic model without robberies or burglaries
Variable

Crime Count Crime Density Count Above Mean

Crime1
Crime2
Crime3
AverageCanopy
FtToOS
OwnOcc
BldgSqFt
GarageSqFt
MiToDowntown
Fireplace
Acreage
Baths
Age
Constant
SaleMonth FE
SaleYear FE
Neighborhood FE

-0.0032***
-0.0011*
-0.00043**
0.0023***
0.000027**
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00011**
0.030
0.068***
0.44***
0.071***
-0.00089*
11.30***
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.00040**
-0.00040*
-0.00065**
0.0023***
0.000027**
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00011*
0.030
0.068***
0.44***
0.071***
-0.00089*
11.30***
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.0029**
-0.00098
-0.00021
0.0024***
0.000024*
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00012***
0.067***
0.067***
0.44***
0.07***
-0.00094*
10.99***
Yes
Yes
Yes

N
3,459
3,459
3,459
R2
0.6460
0.6460
0.6452
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the .10%, .05%,
and .01%, respectively.

Table 6.5 shows a comparison of estimates between OLS, fixed-effects, randomeffects, and Hausman-Taylor models. The results are fairly consistent between the
models, except for estimates of the coefficient on neighborhood historical crime.
Most models result in an insignificant effect except for the random-effects model,
which, surprisingly, shows a positive effect of neighborhood crime on house prices.
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Table 6.5 Comparison of OLS, fixed effects, random effects, and Hausman-Taylor models
OLS

FE

RE

H-T

CrimeDensity1 -0.00043*** -0.00043*** -0.00035*** -0.00043***
CrimeDensity2 -0.00044** -0.00040* -0.00037* -0.00040*
CrimeDensity3 -0.00064*** -0.0010*** -0.00055** -0.0010***
NeighCrimes -5.12E-6
No
0.000068* -0.00041
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the .10%, .05%,
and .01%, respectively. For brevity, stimates of AverageCanopy,
FtToOS, MiToDowntown, BldgSqFt, GarageSqFt, Acreage, Baths,
Age, Fireplace, and year effects are omitted.

Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the results of the Hausman-Taylor model. The effects of
crime count and density are very similar to those found in the hedonic model. We
do not find a significant effect for total neighborhood crime, however. It is possible
that the instruments used to estimate this endogenous variable are weak. Table 6.7
shows estimations that include each crime by time within certain radii. This not only
provides further evidence that households value different types of crime differently,
but that they treat various types of crime in different ways as they vary across space.
Table 6.6 Hausman-Taylor crime model
Spatially-Varying Exogenous

FeetToOS

AverageCanopy
Crime1
Crime2
Crime3
OwnerOcc
Spatially-Varying Endogenous BldgSqFt
GarageSqFt
Acreage
Baths
Fireplace
Age
Spatially-Invariant Exogenous MeanDistToDowntown
Spatially-Invariant Endogenous MeanNeighCrime
Constant

0.000028*** 0.000028***
0.0023***
-0.0033***
-0.0011**
-0.00051**
0.19***
0.00016***
0.00011**
0.44***
0.071***
0.068***
-0.00096**
-0.024
-0.00053
12.18***

0.0023***
-0.00041***
-0.00043**
-0.00078**
0.19***
0.00016888
0.00011**
0.44***
0.071***
0.068***
-0.00096**
0.024
-0.00053
12.18***

SaleMonth FE
Yes
Yes
SaleYear FE
Yes
Yes
N
3,459
3,459
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the .10%, .05%, and .01%,
respectively.

Auto theft and rape are the only crime types that consistently decrease house
values across multiple radii. Arson and burglary never appear to have a significant
effect within any radius. Some variables such as larceny do not have a consistent
pattern in the way they are valued at increasing radii.
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Table 6.7 Hausman-Taylor crime by type model
Variable

Density within Density within Density within
0.2 miles
0.4 miles
0.8 miles

FeetToOS
AverageCanopy
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
AggrAsslt
Burglary
Larceny
AutoTheft
Arson
Shooting
MeanDistToDowntown
MeanNeighCrime
Constant

0.000027**
0.0025***
-0.0056**
-0.0091***
0.0014***
-0.00082*
-0.00022
-0.00054***
-0.00082**
0.0021
0.0024
0.036
-0.00060
11.83***

0.000026**
0.0024***
8.06E-6
-0.013***
0.0011*
-0.0012*
-0.00004
-0.00041
-0.0015***
0.00074
-0.0042*
0.012
-0.00057
12.0***

0.000022**
0.0024***
0.0052
-0.022**
0.0017
-0.00077
-0.00024
-0.0011**
-0.0018**
-0.0021
-0.0069
-0.0091
-0.0055
12.12***

SaleMonth FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
SaleYear FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3,459
3,459
3,459
Hansen’s J stat
0.255
0.275
0.474
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the .10%, .05%,
and .01%, respectively.

6.5 Conclusion
This study provides evidence that there is significant heterogeneity not only in the
way homeowners value different types of crime but also in the way they value the
spatial distribution of crime surrounding their house. This study represents an initial
look into the way homeowners value safety spatially. Spatial proximity is indeed a
significant component of how homeowners evaluate local crime; homeowners have a
greater willingness-to-pay for avoiding crimes that are located closer to their homes.
In an attempt to address the potential endogeneity of crime on housing prices,
we find that tree canopy cover and distance to the nearest park constitute valid candidates. Multiple model estimations strongly fail to reject the hypothesis that these
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and also are correctly excluded
from the price equation. However, it is possible that these are weak instruments -–
that they are not jointly significant in explaining endogenous crime.
This study is a first step towards understanding how residents view the spatial
component of crime. Because residents do not treat crimes of all types and in all locations equally, policy-makers and law enforcement agencies should similarly consider type and spatial heterogeneity of crimes when planning and enacting policy to
reduce crime. This is not to say that certain crime types or certain areas should be
ignored but that a greater focus should be placed on crime types and areas that have
a greater negative impact on residents.
Residents do not appear to evaluate crimes categorized within perhaps arbitrary
spatial boundaries like neighborhoods. Instead, homeowners do take into account
physical distance from their home when evaluating safety from crime. For some
crimes such as homicides, residents appear to only be affected by incidents that are
within a small distance from their house, while for other crimes like automobile
theft, larceny, and rape, homeowners are averse to incidents farther away.
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Policymakers can use these results and those of further studies to implement
law enforcement that accounts for the spatial distribution of houses and crime into
account to not just maximize the safety of residents but the well-being of residents,
measured by the willingness-to-pay to avoid crime by type and space. For crime
types that appear to harm residents over large distances, such as auto theft and rape,
law enforcement could focus on city-wide efforts to reduce incidents. However, for
some crimes, such as homicide, law enforcement could focus on areas that have
a large density of residents. In this way, in a time of tight state and city budgets,
law enforcement could enact measures that are both more cost-effective and better
impact residents.
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Chapter 7

The Effects of Zebra Mussel Infestations on
Property Values: Evidence from Wisconsin
Martin E. Meder and Marianne Johnson

Abstract Containment strategies for invasive species often require significant changes
in behavior. Success in fostering these changes requires that individuals correctly
perceive the costs and benefits. Yet, while both the ecological and aesthetic impacts
of some invasive species are universally negative it less clear how lakefront property owners might view zebra mussel infestations. Zebra mussels negatively affect
the local ecology, crowd out native species, and deposit sharp shells on beaches.
However, they are also associated with increased water clarity, a reduction in suspended pollutants, and increased numbers of popular game fish. We use a spatial lag
and spatial error hedonic model to estimate the impact of zebra mussel infestations
on lakefront property prices in Waupaca County, Wisconsin. We find no evidence
that homes on infested lakes incur a penalty at sale; consequently, it may be difficult
to generate compliance with containment strategies to effectively halt the spread of
zebra mussels.

7.1 Introduction
Climate change and increased ease of transportation have accelerated the spread
of invasive species with deleterious ecological consequences (Thomas and Hanson,
2007; Rahel and Olden, 2008; Zipp et al., 2019). As species such as the emerald
ash borer, the spruce bark beetle, the lionfish, and Asian carp expand their range,
national, state and local environmental groups have aggressively moved to implement a range of containment and mitigation strategies. Yet despite uniformly negative publicity, recent studies suggest that people form complex and multifaceted
views of infestations. For example, Hansen and Naughton (2013) find that spruce
bark beetle infestations are associated with an increase in property values in Alaska.
Kovacs et al. (2011) document that Sudden Oak Death sometimes negatively and
sometimes positively effects property values. Zhang and Boyle (2010) are unable
to conclusively demonstrate that lakefront homeowners penalize properties on lakes
infested with Eurasian watermilfoil, though these owners do care about the total
amount of plant growth in the lake. In other cases, infestations have had an overMartin E. Meder
Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA 70301, USA e-mail: martin.meder@nicholls.edu
Marianne Johnson
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Oshkosh, WI 54901, USA e-mail: johnsonm@uwosh.edu
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whelmingly negative impact on property values, such as that identified for the insect, the hemlock woolly adelgid (Holmes et al., 2006). These studies suggest that
perceptions of the economic impact of invasions may be an empirical question. This
may be especially true for zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha), where the ecological and scientific evidence does not convincingly tell us whether the invasive
species should be perceived as “a good” or “a bad” by lakefront homeowners and
recreational boaters.
Native to Eastern and Central Europe, zebra mussels were first detected in the
United States in 1988 in Lake St. Clair near Detroit, Michigan. It took barely twenty
years for them to spread to more than thirty states, endangering ecologies as diverse
as Lake Okeechobee in Florida (Adams and Lee, 2012) and the Great Lakes in the
north central United States (Timar, 2008). Primarily spread by transient recreational
boating, zebra mussels are associated with significant environmental disturbances.
They alter ecosystems by crowding out native species, particularly fish such as carp
and sturgeon, and by increasing water clarity (Klerks et al., 2001; Strayer et al.,
2004; McCabe et al., 2006). In addition to the ecological harm, zebra mussels generate millions of dollars in direct annual costs by inhibiting the functioning of intake
pipes and cooling systems and by affecting the operation of other permanent submersed structures (Timar and Phaneuf, 2009).
Previous research on zebra mussels has focused modeling human-induced spread
(Timar and Phaneuf, 2009), predicting contaminations (Timar, 2008), and optimal
mitigation strategies (Adams and Lee, 2012). However, containment and mitigation
strategies for invasive species such as zebra mussels are costly and often require
significant changes in behaviors and practices (Cobourn et al., 2019; Eiswerth et al.,
2011; Roberts et al., 2018). Practices such as hot washes and boat dry-outs can
be effective, though all require financial and time investments from boaters and
homeowners. Their incentive to conform with containment policies is complicated
by the nature of the ecological changes engendered by zebra mussels. In addition
to the negative implications discussed, Zebra mussels are also associated with increased water clarity, which is highly valued by lakefront property owners. For fishermen they disadvantage some unpopular species, such as carp, while encouraging
more popular species such as smallmouth bass (Strayer et al., 2004).1 For swimmers, they decrease the concentration of suspended pollutants in the water column
through biosequestration, yielding cleaner water. However, the sharp shells of zebra
mussels can mar beaches and encrust partially submerged structures such as piers
in an unattractive layer of shells. Hence, despite consistently negative publicity, it
is not clear that lakefront homeowners would necessarily place an implicitly negative value on zebra mussel infestation. Where ecological disturbances are associated
with both positive and negative amenities, this makes the combined effect an empirical question. To convince individuals to modify their lake-use habits, it is therefore
important to develop accurate estimates of the costs as perceived by lakefront property owners as a first step to designing response strategies.

1

Negatively, zebra mussels impede the feeding habits of lake sturgeon, around which an entire
seasonal tourism industry has developed in some areas of Wisconsin (McCabe et al., 2006).
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7.2 Methodology
7.2.1 Model
We employ a hedonic model to estimate the empirical impact that zebra mussels
have on lakefront property prices. Such estimates are highly useful to policy makers
and for constructing cost-benefit analyses of containment and mitigation strategies.
In hedonic pricing models, the implicit values consumers place on the individual
features of a property can be identified by regressions of sales price on the various
characteristics of the product (Rosen, 1974). These characteristics generally include
the features of the structure and of the land, as well as additional location and environmental characteristics. In an estimated model, the slope coefficient on a particular characteristic represents the marginal willingness to pay. Hedonic models are
commonly used to assess legislated or other land-use policy changes, as the model
allows researchers to isolate the effect of the policy variable on housing prices, and
hence estimate the additional value or penalty as perceived by consumers. Only a
handful of studies have attempted to use hedonic price models to estimate the impact
of invasive species (Halstead et al., 2003; Hansen and Naughton, 2013; Horsch and
Lewis, 2009; Zhang and Boyle, 2010). While there are clearly a number of limits
to hedonic pricing models in generating welfare estimates for environmental policy
changes, these models can provide useful empirical evidence of the value that consumers place on an environmental amenity or dis-amenity (Hansen and Naughton,
2013; Holmes et al., 2006; Leggett and Bockstael, 2000).
One complicating factor of hedonic models is there is little theoretical basis to
drive the functional form of the estimation equation. This has been extensively discussed with in the literature; the general consensus is that simpler forms perform as
well or better as more complex variations, with the additional advantage of providing more intuitive relationships and explanations (Cropper et al., 1988; Leggett and
Bockstael, 2000). Following the common strategy in literature, we adopt a specification where the dependent variable is the sales price of a property as determined by
the market (Pi ); see Equation 7.1. While hedonic models often focus on isolating the
effect of a policy change or an environmental amenity or disamenity, a number of
additional explanatory variables are generally included to capture the main factors
that influence property values. Like Rosen (1974), we speculate that the sales price
of a property is a function of the property’s structural (H), land (L), geographic (G)
and time (T ) characteristics. Price is also influenced by presence/absence of zebra
mussels (Z), as indicated in Equation 1.
P = f (H, L, G, T, Z)

(7.1)

Hedonic pricing models frequently suffer from the econometric problem of endogeneity. For example, zebra mussels are spread by contaminated boats or other
recreational vehicles moving between bodies of water. Higher demand lakes—lakes
with features that make it attractive for recreational use or lakes which are closer to
population centers—are more likely to become infested. Simultaneously, these same
lakes tend to evidence higher property values. Previous studies of aquatic invasive
species have grappled with endogeneity in different ways. Horsch and Lewis (2009))
employ a difference-in-difference methodology to assess the impact of Eurasian watermilfoil, whereas Zhang and Boyle (2010) utilize lake fixed effects to address the
same problem. However, neither of these approaches addresses the underlying spa-
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tial interdependence that is inherent in this type of hedonic model. Spatial interdependence implies that the sales prices of neighboring properties are more related
than the sales prices of properties further away. Failing to account for the fact that
properties near each other are more related than properties more distant generates
biased results, as the error terms from the Ordinary Least Squares regression (Equation 7.2) will not be normally distributed and likely will be correlated with each
other.
Pit = β0 + β1 Hit + β2 Lit + β3 Git + β4 Zit + β5 Tt + uit

(7.2)

We can address the problem of endogeneity engendered by spatial interdependence through the use of a spatial lag and spatial error term. This strategy has been
used effectively to examine the impact of spruce bark beetle infestations (Hansen
and Naughton, 2013) and air pollution (Carriazo et al., 2013) on property values.
Our spatial maximum likelihood model therefore estimates the sales price of property i in time period t, Pit (Equation 7.3) as a function of the same structural, land,
and geographic characteristics as used in Equation 7.2
Pit = ρΣ j̸=i w jt lnPjt + γ0 + γ1 Hit + γ2 Lit + γ3 Git + γ4 Zit + γ5 Tt + uit

(7.3)

but where
uit = λ Σ j̸=i w jt u jt + eit

(7.4)

The spatial lag represented by Σ j̸=i w jt lnPjt is the weighted average of other properties’ sales prices. Weights (w) are assigned based on the inverse distance between
the properties included in our sample, as identified using GIS determined latitude
and longitude measured at the center of each property. The estimated coefficient
on the spatial lag term, ρ, illustrates how the sales price of one property is influenced by the sales prices of neighboring properties. Additionally, the spatial error,
Σ j̸=i w jt u jt , is the weighted average of the other observations’ error terms, using the
same weights (w) as the spatial lag, with eit representing the error term. The estimated coefficient, λ , does not have a useful interpretation in this case (LeSage and
Pace, 2009). By directly incorporating spatial location into the model, we can thus
disentangle the impact of zebra mussel infestations from consumer preferences for
lakes with particular location attributes.

7.2.2 Study Area and Data
Hedonic pricing models rely on the assumption that all property sales occur in the
same housing market and hence prices represent the market equilibrium price, conditional on house and land characteristics. This is problematic when studying invasive species. Properties located on a single lake would constitute a single housing market but would not evidence variation in infestation status. Infestation status varies across lakes, but these lakes may not exist in the same property market.
Hence, researchers face a difficult task appropriately identifying a market to study,
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as no agreed upon theoretical tests of market boundaries exists.2 This leaves researchers to empirically identify reasonable markets for study.
We focus our study on the north central Wisconsin region of the United States.
The region’s reputation as a vacation destination as well as its proximity to the regional metropolitan areas of Madison, Milwaukee, Chicago and Minneapolis help
identify it as a well-defined market (see Figure 7.2.2). Chi and Marcouiller (2012)
argue that this area represents a “contiguous remote rural region” with most counties
nonadjacent to a significant urban center. These counties are classified as “recreational” and are likely to include substantial numbers of second homes (Chi and
Marcouiller, 2012). For our purposes, by choosing to purchase lakefront property
in this area, owners have self-selected for an interest in aquatic recreational activities. Further, by indicating a premium on lake use, these buyers are likely sensitive
to invasive species infestation. Unlike dis-amenities such as water pollution, which
can be difficult for property owners to discern, the infestation status of lakes are
well known to owners and potential buyers and is required by state of Wisconsin
disclosure laws.

Fig. 7.1 Map of Waupaca County

While the expansion of zebra mussels may seem like a dynamic problem, several
issues mean that it is difficult to statistically treat it as such. First, expansion is
limited by the availability and suitability of ecosystems that can support them; e.g.,
not all lakes provide the appropriate environment for zebra mussels to thrive. The
corollary is that infestations spread much faster to popular lakes that provide suitable
habitats. This demonstrates itself in the data, where infestations are observed to
occur in waves. A second issue is that Wisconsin Department of Natural Resource
sampling practices are highly inconsistent and rely on a mix of random checks and
homeowner reporting. Thus, while the true number of infestations every year is
likely not zero, and therefore not entirely static, the level of dynamism—or even the
extent or direction of invasion—cannot be practically observed.
This makes Waupaca County in north central Wisconsin of particular interest. Its
zebra mussel invasion, which has gradually made headway in a large chain of lakes
2

Additional issues with hedonic pricing models have been extensively discussed (Leggett and
Bockstael, 2000; Horsch and Lewis, 2009). These include the absence of a theoretical basis for the
functional form of the model and difficulties with omitted variable bias (Palmquist, 1991).
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in the county in the years since the establishment of the Wisconsin Integrated Property Assessment System in 2009 provides us with a natural case study. While the first
zebra mussel infestation in the county was identified in Partridge Lake in 2005, all
further infestations occurred between 2010 and 2014. Consequently, a large number
of houses sold on infested lakes, while others with similar attributes sold in close
proximity on non-infested lakes, often within the same township. While this kind
of invasion has occurred in other regions of Wisconsin, such as the Spread Eagle
Chain of Lakes in Florence County, Waupaca County’s relative population density
and affluence allows for a greater number of observations owing to a thicker market.
According to the U.S. Census, Waupaca County is home to roughly 52,000 people, its population remaining highly stable across recent decades. With 126 lakes and
a land area of 747 square miles, Waupaca County is decidedly rural, averaging 70.1
persons per square mile. The population is overwhelmingly white with a median
household income of $49,777, slightly below the national median. The homeownership rate is nearly 77%. The county is home to twelve incorporated cities and a
variety of smaller villages and townships. Waupaca County records roughly 25,364
housing units, 14.8% of which are in multi-unit structures. However, because of the
nature of our question, we focus solely on single-family lakefront properties that
sold between 2009 and 2014. We exclude unimproved properties as well as properties with temporary structures. Property transactions whose real estate transfer
returns indicate a transfer fee exemption were excluded from the data set to ensure
that all observed transactions occurred at arm’s-length. Our sample thus includes
102 properties from 16 cities, towns and villages on 43 different lakes. In our data
set, 30.4% of the lakefront properties sold in Waupaca County were on lakes infested with zebra mussels, which is notably higher than the state-wide average.
Data were collected from the state’s Wisconsin Integrated Property Assessment
System which makes available the sales of all properties, sales price, date of sale,
as well as some additional in formation. The system is designed to publicly provide information as required by state open records laws. Additional data is from the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources lake database, county-level property
assessments and the Geographic Information System (GIS). Summary statistics are
reported in Table 7.1. Sales prices were adjusted to pre-recession values using the
Wisconsin House Price Index of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank as a way to account for the recent instability in home prices in the United States. The mean sales
price in 2007 dollars is nearly $385,000, with a median price of $270,457.
Structural characteristics (H) include the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms and half baths, square footage and year in which the house was built. We
also have dummy variables indicating whether the home has central heating and/or
a basement. As is common in the literature, we include a measure of the distance
from the center of the property to the closest highway, measured in miles, determined by GIS mapping. Land characteristics (L) include measures of acreage and
lake-frontage.
The geographic characteristics (G) merit some additional discussion. We include
several measures designed to capture buyer preferences for recreational lake features such as lake area, lake depth and whether the lake has been endorsed for sport
fishing. Empirically, lakefront homeowners have also exhibited strong preferences
for clearer lakes (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000; Zhang and Boyle, 2010), so we include Secchi depth as a measure of water clarity. However, zebra mussels are known
to improve water clarity over time. Thus, we establish a baseline for water clarity
by adopting the 1999 Secchi depth measure for each lake, dating Secchi depth to a
period prior to the arrival of zebra mussels in this county. In this way, subsequent im-
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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics
Variables

Mean (Frequency) Standard Deviation

Sales Price (December 2007 Dollars) $384,734.60

$331,809.20

House Characteristics
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Half Baths
Existing Basement
Central Heating System
Square Footage
Year Built

2.74
1.85
0.31
70.59%
95.10%
2958.53
1967

0.99
1.01
0.47
2050.99
28.31

1.22
142.45

3.21
185.23

16.88
36.12
8.87
62.75%
0.604

30.74
26.42
4.18
0.607

30.39%

-

Land Characteristics
Acreage
Frontage
Geographic Characteristics
Lake Acreage (in 10s)
Lake Depth (feet)
Secchi Depth (feet)
Endorsed for Fishing
Distance to Highway (miles)
Invasive Species
Zebra Mussels

provements in water clarity can be attributed to the infestation and the value placed
on this change by lakefront homeowners subsumed in the estimated coefficient for
zebra mussels. Anecdotally, we can see the interaction between zebra mussel infestations and lake clarity in our sample: Rainbow Lake had a baseline Secchi depth of
eight feet in 1999. Infested with zebra mussels in 2011, its water clarity improved
to 10.03 feet in 2013 and 10.25 feet in 2014.
While some previous hedonic studies of environmental dis-amenities have attempted to measure the extent of the “bad” (Carriazo et al., 2013; Leggett and
Bockstael, 2000; Zhang and Boyle, 2010), measuring the extent of a zebra mussel
infestation is highly problematic for several reasons. Although tests exist to detect
the concentration of veligers, the larval form of zebra mussels, results may not provide an accurate representation of the number or concentration of adult mussels as
veligers are vulnerable to cannibalism by adult mussels, lack of suitable habitat, or
other environmental factors (Maclsaac et al., 1991; Strayer et al., 1996). Further,
visual monitoring techniques are ineffective for a species which primarily inhabits
the lake bed. These problems lead to inconsistencies in reporting and measurement
by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. We suggest that buyers are less
sensitive to the extent of an infestation than to the existence of an infestation.3 Considering that the visibility of zebra mussels can vary significantly between lakes and
across time periods, being almost entirely unobservable over the winter months, the
use of an indicator variable is most appropriate.

3

Similar problems to those associated with zebra mussels confound Wisconsin DNR data on
Eurasian watermilfoil. The visibility of milfoil is significantly affected by weather conditions and is
unobservable between October and March in Wisconsin, meaning buyers during this period cannot
assess an infestation. They only know if a lake is infested or not.
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7.3 Analysis
To provide a benchmark for analysis, we first estimate the standard Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) model as specified in Equation 7.2, exclusive of the spatial lag and
spatial error term. This is equivalent to assuming that λ and ρ are simultaneously
zero.4 These results are compared to a specification that includes only the spatial
lag or the spatial error and then finally a specification that includes both the spatial
lag and the spatial error. Our estimation results are presented in Table 7.2. As is
common in hedonic studies, we transform the dependent variable to be the natural
log of real sales price, which we measure in December 2007 dollars (lnPit ). We also
incorporate a month time trend to ensure that differences in sales prices across time
that are common in all properties will not bias estimates.
As expected, across all four regressions, square footage, the number of full bathrooms, and the year in which a house was built are of central importance to home
buyers, their estimated coefficients evidencing positive and statistically significant
associations with sales price. Additionally, home buyers place a premium on convenient access to the property. For each additional mile that a property is located
from a main highway, home price decreases by about 12 to 15% (p ≈ 0.05). Our
estimated coefficients for these factors are highly consistent with the ranges found
by other hedonic studies and are robust to specification and estimation procedure.
The number of bedrooms and acreage also contribute positively to sales price in all
cases, though they are not statistically significant in any of the four specifications.
We retain these variables to maintain consistency with other studies in the hedonic
pricing literature.5 We find that buyers are also sensitive to the amount of lakefrontage available on the property, though the relationship is nonlinear. While the
estimated coefficients on frontage are consistently negative and the estimated coefficients are quite small for the frontage-squared term, across Regressions 1 through
4, they are in fact logical. The estimates indicate that for most standard frontages,
an extra foot or so has very little impact (negative, but essentially zero). However,
particularly large expanses of frontage command notably higher prices.6
Home buyers exhibit a strong preference for deeper lakes (p < 0.01); lakes endorsed for fishing command an additional premium of 23% to 31% of sales price
(p < 0.05). Neither result is surprising given the strong revealed preferences by
property owners in this region for sport fishing. Our measure of baseline water clarity, 1999 Sechi depth, is positively associated with sales price, though not statistically significant in either of the regressions that use a spatial lag.
As previously discussed, zebra mussels generate both positive and negative effects on their environment, when viewed from the perspective of lakefront property
owners.7 Thus we have no intuitive guide to evaluate the estimated effect generated
by a hedonic model, nor any presumption as to whether the sign should be positive
4

The heteroskedastic robust OLS estimates, clustered by township/village yields, nearly identical
results to the basic OLS model, hence we only report the most basic model.
5 We do not find a statistically significant relationship between property sales price and number of
half bathrooms, the existence of a basement or whether the property has improved central heating.
We do not retain these variables in the final regressions for parsimony.
6 The estimates indicate that after roughly 393 feet of frontage, each additional foot of frontage
contributes positively to sales price. Note that one meter is equivalent to 3.28 feet.
7 Johnson and Meder (2013) use a non-standard hedonic model and basic OLS to estimate the
impact of zebra mussels in 17 counties in north central Wisconsin (n = 1072). They find that lakes
infested with zebra mussels evidence 10% higher sales prices than comparable properties on uninfested lakes. We know of no other hedonic model estimates for zebra mussels.
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Table 7.2 Hedonic regression results

Variables

OLS

Spatial
Lag

Spatial
Error

Mixed
Spatial Lag
&
Spatial Error

0.081
(0.058)
0.183***
(0.061)
0.176*
(0.092)
0.006***
(0.002)

0.036
(0.051)
0.142***
(0.053)
0.183**
(0.079)
0.007***
(0.001)

0.062
(0.055)
0.171***
(0.058)
0.175**
(0.096)
0.006***
(0.002)

0.024
(0.051)
0.125**
(0.052)
0.182**
(0.075)
0.007***
(0.001)

0.015
(0.020)
-0.001
(0.000)
106e-6
(7.03e-7)

0.020
(0.017)
-0.001**
(0.000)
1.18e-6*
(6.00e-7)

0.013
(0.018)
-0.001*
(0.000)
1.26e-6*
(6.77e-7)

0.022
(0.017)
-0.001*
(0.000)
1.06e-6*
(5.90e-7)

0.011***
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
0.026*
(0.014)
0.307**
(0.134)
-0.139*
(0.075)
0.238*
(0.131)
0.006**
(0.003)
-

0.009***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.017
(0.012)
0.250**
(0.115)
-0.136*
(0.064)
0.089
(0.118)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.506***
(0.129)
-

0.011***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.025*
(0.014)
0.301**
(0.131)
-0.151**
(0.074)
0.162
(0.150)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.357
(0.328)

0.009
(0.002)
0.003*
(0.001)
0.012
(0.011)
0.229**
(0.107)
-0.127**
(0.060)
0.066
(0.155)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.707***
(0.144)
-0.330
(0.267)

House
Bedrooms
Full Bathrooms
ln(Square Footage)
Year Built
Land
Acreage
Frontage
Frontage Squared
Geographic
Lake Depth
Lake Acres
Secchi Depth
Endorsed for Fishing
Distance to Highway
Zebra Mussels
Month Time Trend
Spatial Lag (ρ)
Spatial Error (λ )

Observations
102
102
102
102
R2 /Squared Correlation 0.79
0.82
0.79
0.82
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Adjusted Sales Price). Constant
included but omitted for space. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level.

or negative. Our standard OLS model, as reported in Regression 1 in Table 7.2, suggests that zebra mussel infestations are associated with a 26.9% increase in property
values (p = 0.07).8 However, this model fails to incorporate spatial effects, which
8 This comes from using the standard transformation 100 ∗ [ex − 1] transformation for interpreting
the coefficients of dummy variables in models with the dependent variable being transformed by
the natural log (Wooldridge, 2010).
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likely causes our estimate to be upward biased. Diagnostic tests for spatial dependence suggest the use of a mixed spatial lag and spatial error model. The need for a
spatial lag is highly recommended by diagnostic tests (Lagrange Multiplier = 12.03,
p = 0.001). Moran’s I for the spatial error (= 1.54, p = 0.124) is suggestive but not
definitive.
The spatial lag coefficient (ρ) is both positive and statistically significant in regressions 2 and 4, providing evidence of spatial spillovers between the sales price of
a property and that of its neighbors. For example, a 1% increase in neighboring sales
prices is associated with an increase in sales price of 0.51% (Spatial Lag regression)
to 0.71% (Mixed Spatial Lag & Spatial Error regression). This demonstrates that the
factors that influence the sales price of one property such as neighborhood amenities
and/or infrastructure development will spillover to affect the value of neighboring
properties as well. The use of the spatial lag thus captures these underlying omitted variables that contribute to the endogeneity problem inherent in hedonic studies.
The spatial error performs less well in our estimated equations. In neither of the two
rightmost columns is the estimated coefficient statistically significant (p = 0.28 and
p = 0.22), suggesting that the Spatial Lag in column 2 is the preferred specification.
Across all specifications, zebra mussel infestations are associated with higher
sales prices for lakefront homes, suggesting that the visible effects of an infestation,
in including clearer water and more high-value fishing, outweigh the negative perceptions of an infestation. The spatial lag model reported in column 2 posits that
homes on infested lakes will command a 9.3% premium over otherwise comparable houses on un-infested lakes (the mixed spatial lag and spatial error specification
suggests 6.8%). This corresponds to a welfare gain of approximately $25,000 on a
median lakefront property. Note that both estimated values are substantially smaller
and less statistically significant than that generated by standard OLS, which fails
to account for spatial interconnections. In neither case is the estimated coefficient
statistically significant, suggesting that the true impact of an infestation cannot be
differentiated from zero. This implies that even in areas where zebra mussels command significant attention in the local news, consumers do not prioritize infestation
status when selecting recreational lakefront properties.

7.4 Conclusion
The absence of hedonic studies of zebra mussels is surprising given the attention devoted to invasive and potentially invasive species in the United States and Canada.
One of the reasons for this absence may be the confounding effects that zebra mussels have on their environment. An infestation engenders both visible positive and
negative effects on a lake. Zebra mussels improve water clarity and sports fishing
while reducing suspended pollutants in the water. Zebra mussels also crowd out
some fish species important to the Wisconsin fishing industry, notably sturgeon,
and deposit sharp shells along beaches. It therefore becomes an empirical question,
whether lakefront homeowners suffer from an infestation.
In this study, we evaluate how the spread of zebra mussels through a chain of
lakes in Waupaca County, Wisconsin has influenced the sales prices of lakefront
properties. In spite of their uniformly negative reputation, we find no evidence that
zebra mussels are associated with decreased prices for lakefront properties. Rather,
using a Maximum Likelihood estimation strategy with a spatial lag, we find that
an infestation is associated with positive but not statistically significant increases in
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lakefront property values. Our finding of a zero or slightly positive association between zebra mussel infestations and property values has an important policy implication. Since most mitigation and control mechanisms require substantial changes in
user behavior, the lack of a negative effect on property values suggests that it might
be difficult to generate substantial levels of compliance. If lakefront home owners
do not perceive a negative effect from zebra mussels, they are much less likely to
regularly practice hot boat washes or regularly clean their boats, both of which are
inconvenient and engender significant opportunity costs. These results may also indicate that mechanical or chemical control methods employed by lake associations
for invasive species such as zebra mussels are unnecessary from a homeowner perspective. We caution readers that this paper is an initial attempt to assess the impact
of zebra mussel infestations on lakefront property values; as such, it unavoidably
has a number of limitations. The most important is the small sample size, while
carefully selected and suggestive, demands further replication, both in Wisconsin
and in other states.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Chad Cotti, Russ Kashian and Kevin McGee for
helpful comments and suggestions.
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Chapter 8

A Case for Amenity-Driven Growth? The Value
of Lake Amenities and Industrial Disamenities
in the Great Lakes Region
Heather M. Stephens

Abstract In advanced economies, such as the United States, people increasingly
value quality of life and are willing to pay for access to natural amenities. In the
Ohio Great Lakes region, residents enjoy access to an abundance of fresh water and
natural and recreational amenities. At the same time, however, they are confronted
with the artifacts of the region’s industrial legacy in disamenities, including factories
and other industrial sites. Given the economic restructuring of many of the region’s
industries, there is interest in understanding how the competing effects from natural
amenities and industrial disamenities affect housing demand and regional growth.
To assess this, we utilize a unique dataset that includes over 300,000 housing transactions in the Greater Cleveland (Ohio) region and detailed geographically-located
data on industrial disamenities, urban amenities, and natural and related built amenities. Using the hedonic pricing method, we estimate the value that residents place
on these amenities and disamenities. We find a positive capitalization effect from
being directly on Lake Erie. However, away from houses in close proximity to the
lake, the effects are more heterogeneous. Additionally, there is evidence that proximity to manufacturing is associated with lower house values, especially near the
lake. This suggests that, as the region’s economy transitions, residents may positively value less industrialization near the lake and a focus on Lake Erie as a natural
and recreational amenity.

8.1 Introduction
Lake Erie has long been the driving force behind economic development in the
Greater Cleveland, Ohio, region; from the early settlements on the shore of the lake,
to the growth of ports to transport goods from the markets of the East Coast to the
Mississippi River and the West, to the growth of the automobile and other manufacturing businesses. The presence of high quality housing along the shoreline, along
with the presence of beaches and marinas, also suggests that people in the region
value the lake beyond its role in creating employment. In recent years, as global
competition and economic restructuring have put pressure on the industrial sectors
that led to the growth of this region, there is a renewed interest in exploring the role
Heather M. Stephens
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of the lake in attracting households who are value the lake amenities. Policymakers
seek to understand how and if people value Lake Erie in order to determine whether
economic development policies focused on the lake amenities make sense.
In advanced economies, such as the United States, there is evidence that people increasingly value quality of life (QOL) and are willing to pay for access to
natural amenities (Rappaport, 2004; McGranahan, 2008; Partridge and Ali, 2008).
However, due to the fact that proximity to Lake Erie was one of the drivers behind
the industrialization of the Cleveland area, a complicating factor in this region is
that there is pollution and environmental degradation near Lake Erie. In other contexts, there is evidence that housing values are negatively affected by proximity to
environmental disamenities such as power plants, superfund sites, and air pollution
(Smith and Huang, 1995; Hite et al., 2001; Davis, 2011).
This research thus considers the potential for QOL-oriented Lake Erie development in Greater Cleveland. We hypothesize that, if households value access to
Lake Erie, they will be willing to pay a higher housing price, all else equal. We
also will test whether industrialization has made it less desirable to live close to
Lake Erie, offsetting any positive aesthetic or recreational benefits, and reducing
housing prices. Using residential sales transactions data from the Greater Cleveland
region, we use a hedonic price model to measure the capitalization effect on houses
in proximity to Lake Erie and its recreational amenities as well as the proximity
to industrialized sites or pollution. Our unique dataset includes over 300,000 housing transactions from 1992 to 2006 as well as detailed geographically-located data
on industrial disamenities and industrial emissions, and natural and related built
amenities, including parks, and Lake Erie and its beaches and marinas. To control
for unobserved characteristics, we also include both time and spatial fixed effects.
This research contributes to the literature by providing insight into the value of
lake amenities in a highly-industrialized, developed, and transitioning region. Much
of the previous literature on lake amenities has focused on resort communities along
the coasts and in the South. Thus, a priori, it was unclear whether and how much
households in this region value these lake amenities. However, there is some limited
evidence that at least high-income people in the Great Lakes region may value lake
proximity (Stephens and Partridge, 2015). Additionally, we consider the different
types of lake amenities — including lake views as well as access to boat ramps and
beaches. And, we also consider the role of industrialization and abandoned facilities.
We find strong evidence that, consistent with other studies which have found that
access to lake views and being very close to water is valuable to households, housing
values in immediate proximity to Lake Erie are higher. However, away from that,
the results are more mixed, perhaps due to the fact that the lake amenities are within
driving distance of all households in the region.
There is also evidence that households do notice industrialization and that it is
reflected in a price decrease for houses near manufacturing facilities and especially
for those located near the lake. However, the negative effect on price of being close
to air pollution or Superfund sites is much lower, suggesting that it may be the
visible nature of smokestacks that drives prices lower.
In what follows, we detail the previous literature. Next, we describe our empirical model and data; followed by the empirical results. The final section presents
some concluding thoughts and a discussion about the implications for the region
and policy.
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8.2 Literature Review
Valuing non-market attributes of a region such as natural or built amenities or pollution or environmental disamenities using the hedonic pricing framework has a long
history starting with Rosen (1974). By using a single housing market (such as a
metropolitan area), the assumption is that wages are held constant in a region and
that housing prices can be used to uncover the change in value associated with the
various attributes of a house, including proximity to natural amenities and industrial
and environmental disamenities, as consumers will maximize their utility by their
choice of a house (Rosen, 1974; Taylor, 2003; Palmquist, 2006).
In an early application of the hedonic method to look at access to lake amenities,
Brown Jr et al. (1977) found that property values decrease with distance from the
lake. Feather et al. (1992) examined the relationship between water amenities and
housing prices in Orange County, Florida, and saw evidence that the land value of
lakefront property is greater than property away from a lake, and that the effect of
being close to a lake diminishes with distance.
A number of other papers have also found a link between either access to lake
amenities or proximity to a lake and housing values, including Lansford Jr and Jones
(1995a,b), Nelson (2010), and Abbott and Klaiber (2013).Lansford Jr and Jones
(1995a,b) also found that adjacency to the lake is the strongest effect and that the
lake effect dies off quickly. White and Leefers (2007) looked at a rural housing
market in Michigan and found that the only natural amenity that affected housing
values in their study area was proximity to the major lake. Looking specifically at
the Northeast Ohio Lake Erie lakefront, Bond et al. (2002) found some evidence of
a willingness to pay a premium to live in housing that has a view of Lake Erie. However, they also qualify their results by noting that they fail to control for a number of
important factors including access to recreational amenities and proximity to urban
amenities and downtown Cleveland.
Among other natural amenities that may affect housing prices are open space
and parklands. A number of previous studies have looked at the effect of open space
on housing prices, including Smith et al. (2002) and Irwin (2002), among others.
Results from Poudyal et al. (2009) showed that access to larger urban parks was
associated with increased house values. In their study of urban areas in Finland,
Tyrväinen and Miettinen (2000) found that proximity to forests increases housing
sales prices, and there is a premium for being within view of those forests. Other
studies have shown that the benefits from certain natural amenities (including national monuments and other public open space) extend a significant distance beyond
their boundaries (Irwin, 2002; Schmidt and Courant, 2006).
In the environmental economics literature, the hedonic price method has been
used to quantify the negative effects of pollution and proximity to hazardous waste
sites and other environmental disamenities. Many studies have provided evidence
that housing values are negatively affected by proximity to environmental disamenities such as power plants, Superfund and other hazardous waste sites, and air pollution (Kiel and McClain, 1995; Smith and Huang, 1993; Chattopadhyay, 1999; Hite
et al., 2001; Beron et al., 2001; Ihlanfeldt and Taylor, 2004; Davis, 2011). In another
study focused on Ohio, Brasington and Hite (2005) looked at proximity to what they
call ‘hazards’ or sites that have been identified as possible brownfields or future Superfund sites. They found that proximity to such hazards is negatively correlated
with housing prices. Smith and Huang (1993, 1995) looked at 25 years of hedonic
analysis considering a link between housing prices and air quality which, in general,
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showed there is a positive relationship. However, a related study by Boyle and Kiel
(2001) found that the values on air quality are generally statistically insignificant;
perhaps due to the fact that air quality variables are correlated with both included
and omitted variables. This study also provided evidence that studies which included
multiple environmental variables tended to have higher significance, perhaps due to
fewer omitted variables, although they suggested that further research is needed.
Looking at the relationship between toxic releases as measured by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), Fonseca and
Noonan (2006) saw almost no statistical relationship between proximity to the nearest toxic release and housing price. However, they suggested that future work may
want to consider the amount of the releases, not just what is closest.
In other research, there is evidence that proximity to certain businesses or the
presence of congestion may be associated with changes in housing prices. For
example, proximity to industrial businesses is negatively correlated with housing
prices (Franklin and Waddell, 2003). Perhaps it is that people are more likely to be
concerned with smokestacks rather than with air quality or pollution, which they
may not be able to observe (unless it is coming out of the previously mentioned
smokestacks). Timmins and Murdock (2007) found that congestion was important
when considering the willingness to pay for access to recreational amenities. And,
hedonic methods have uncovered a link between the effects of traffic congestion and
housing prices (Wilhelmsson, 2000; Davis, 2004).
The work by McConnell (1990) suggested that there may be multiple drivers
of the price of houses close to natural amenities, including water. These factors
include the view, the recreational opportunities, and environmental benefits, if the
air quality is better close to the water, or environmental disamenities, if there is
industrialization or more pollution near the water. And, these factors can interact:
Stephens and Weinstein (2019) found that the positive impact from proximity to
natural amenities can be negatively affected by energy development.

8.3 Empirical specification
Following Rosen (1974), a general hedonic model is:
P(z) = f (H, A, ε)

(8.1)

where, H includes housing characteristics, A are community or locational characteristics (including amenities and disamenities), and ε is an standard error term.
In specifying our empirical model, we attempt to address the concerns raised in
the previous literature related to functional form and the potential omitted variable
bias from missing housing and community characteristics, especially when using
spatially-delineated variables (Rosen, 1974; Palmquist, 2006; Kuminoff et al., 2010;
Coulson, 2012). Following Kuminoff et al. (2010), we use spatial fixed effects, and
a somewhat flexible functional form, which they found was the most robust in the
face of omitted variable bias.
Thus, to estimate our model we use equation 8.2:
ln(Pi ) = β0 + Σh1 βh1 Hih1 + Σh2 βh2 Hih2 + Σh3 βh3 (Hih2 )2 + Σa βa Aia
+βcCi + βsc (Ci )2 + Ti + Si + εi

(8.2)
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In equation 8.2, the vector of housing characteristics is split into two vectors, H1
and H2 , due to the inclusion of quadratic terms of some of the variables. H1 contains
the total number of bathrooms, bedrooms, and dummy variables indicating if there
is a garage or fireplace. H2 consists of age, hundreds of square feet in the building,
and lot acres. The housing characteristics in H2 enter the equation both linearly and
as quadratic terms. The distance to downtown Cleveland (C) is split from the rest of
the original community characteristics vector and its square is also included in the
estimation equation. The rest of the community characteristics, namely the natural
amenities and industrial disamenities, are included in the final vector, A. T and S
are the time (sales year) and spatial (block group) fixed effects, respectively. The
year fixed effect will control for changes in the overall housing market, changes
in environmental conditions in the overall region, and policy changes that would
affect all houses in a given year. The block group fixed effect will control for other
neighborhood or community characteristics that do not change over time, including
local school quality and the quality of the neighborhood. In the next section, we
further describe the data and the variables used in this analysis.
When estimating the models, we will test the sensitivity of our results to the
inclusion of specific amenity and disamenity variables. We also correct for heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors.
We also test whether the results could be pooled across the decades using the
method outlined in Ohta and Griliches (1976), in which the standard error of the
regression (SEE) of the pooled, full model was compared to that of the separate, unpooled models (results not shown). The results indicate that use of pooled regression
of the data from all of the years is appropriate.

8.4 Data
This research focuses on six counties in the Greater Cleveland (Ohio) region,
Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, and Medina Counties. A map of the
study area is shown in Figure 8.1. This area includes the Cleveland Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and the adjacent Ashtabula Micropolitan Area which, together,
form a single regional labor market and, by assumption, a regional housing market. Thus, housing prices in this region can be used to uncover the marginal value
of non-traded amenities and disamenities. The market is likely comprised of several overlapping local markets. However, since they are all part of a single greater
metropolitan area, with connections by major roads and lack of physical features
that would separate the areas, we expect significant overlap in these markets and
believe the housing market is best modeled as a single regional market. This is consistent with the work by Irwin (2002) in looking at the housing market in Maryland.

8.4.1 Housing Transactions
We use sales data for single-family houses from the six-county region from 1992 to
2006 compiled from data provided by the Center for Urban and Regional Analysis
(CURA) at The Ohio State University and purchased from Corelogic Data Services.
The data are matched to parcel shapefiles using ArcGIS obtained from the six counties. Compared to relying on geocoding of addresses, this provides more accurate
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locations of the sales transactions, and increases the accuracy of our calculations
of spatially-defined variables such as distance to lake amenities and environmental
disamenities
(as explained below).
9
Our dataset includes the sale price of the house and the following housing characteristics, which are likely to be predictors of house attractiveness: lot acres and
hundreds of square feet in the building, total number of bathrooms, age of the house,
whether the house has a garage, and whether the house has a fireplace (generally a
sign of higher quality). The use of these characteristics is consistent with other hedonic studies and, based on the available data, provides the best set of controls for
heterogeneous housing characteristics. House prices are normalized in 2006 dollars
using the CPI for the Cleveland-Akron region in order to account for inflation. Since
we need accurate information on these characteristics for all transactions in the sample, we eliminate transactions with missing or zero values for the relevant variables
in the estimation. We also follow Klaiber (2008) in using approximately the 1st and
99th percentiles as the limits of the bounds of those transactions we retain. The final
dataset includes 303,907 transactions.

8.4.2 Amenities
Since we are interested in proximity to Lake Erie, we use ArcGIS to measure the
distance between each parcel in our transactions data and the closest point on the
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lake. We then construct a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the house is
within 100 meters of the Lake Erie, to proxy for those houses that are adjacent to
or have a view of the lake. Data on recreational amenities on Lake Erie, including
beaches and boat ramps, were obtained from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources. We measure the distance from each parcel in our transactions data to the
nearest Lake Erie beach and boat ramp.1 We combine the distance to beach and boat
ramp into a single variable, distance to nearest boat ramp or beach, due to the high
collinearity between the two distance measures (0.986). We also construct dummy
variables indicating whether or not a house is within 250 meters of a boat or beach,
i.e. within close walking distance of these amenities. The number of parking spaces
at the closest boat ramp is also included in the data and is interacted with the dummy
variable that indicates if a boat ramp is within 250 meters, to get a measure of the
number of parking spaces near a house. This will measure congestion related to the
boat facilities.
Additional data on public parks and recreational lands were provided by Ohio
Ducks Unlimited. We construct a measure of the number of park acres (in tens of
acres) within one kilometer of the parcel as a proxy for other natural amenities in
the neighborhood of a house.
We recognize that the recreational amenities could be endogenous. Unfortunately, detailed data on the actual construction date for each facility was not available. However, most of the public recreational infrastructure in the region was constructed before 1990, minimizing this endogeneity.
To control for proximity to urban amenities and business opportunities, we include a measure of the distance to downtown Cleveland. Downtown Cleveland contains or is near many of the urban amenities in the region including the sports stadiums for the major professional sports teams, as well as museums and restaurants.
Additionally, classical urban growth theory would suggest that housing prices are
(negatively) correlated with distance to downtown Cleveland, assuming that workers are generally commuting there (Muth, 1961; Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967).

8.4.3 Disamenities
Data on businesses, by location, in the region are available by two-digit NAICS
code, by year. These data are used to measure the number of manufacturing businesses, defined as businesses with NAICS code 31, 32, or 33, within one kilometer
of each parcel. Since these manufacturing businesses could be heterogeneous in
terms of building size and structure, we also tested several other specifications and
found similar results. We hypothesize that households are more likely to notice ugly
buildings or ‘smokestacks,’ thus the presence of a manufacturing facility in close
proximity to a house will be likely to be associated with lower housing prices. To
control for endogeneity, we include one-year lagged values of the numbers of businesses; for example, for a transaction in the year 2002, we use the number of nearby
manufacturing businesses in 2001.
To control for other local industrial disamenities, we utilize U.S. EPA toxic release inventory (TRI) data on aggregate toxic air releases, by company, by year. We
1

Because of available data, all distance measures here are straightline distances, not driving distances. Given the extensive road network in this highly urbanized region, straightline distances
should approximate driving distances. However, we recognize that there could be some differences
not controlled for here.
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then use ArcGIS to measures the distance between each parcel in our transactions
data to the releasing companies. To avoid counting small releases that may not be
obvious to households we only consider companies whose annual air toxic releases
total over 1000 pounds. We then aggregate the toxic releases (in tens of thousands
of pounds) within one kilometer of a parcel and create a measure of the amount
of toxic releases over 5000 pounds per year. We also tested other cut-offs, but the
results were similar. For the TRI data, we also lag the values by one year.2
To control for proximity to abandoned hazardous industrial sites, we measure the
distance to the nearest Superfund site in a particular year, using data from the U.S.
EPA. Then, we created a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the parcel
is located within one kilometer of a Superfund site and include that measure in our
models.
Table 8.1 contains summary statistics for the data used in our analysis.
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics, Northeast Ohio housing transactions
Variable

Mean

St. Dev. Min

Max

Log sales price in 2006 dollars
11.51 0.585 8.876
14.28
Price in 2006 dollars
118,178 76,964 7,159
1,587,000
Number of bedrooms
3.159 0.716 1
8
Number of bathrooms
1.615 0.694 1
6
House has a garage (0/1)
0.831 0.375 0
1
House has a fireplace (0/1)
0.234 0.423 0
1
House size (hundreds of square feet)
16.75 6.650 6
45
Lot size in acres
0.438 0.847 0.0500 15
Age of house
44.61 27.55 0
130
Distance to downtown Cleveland (km)
24.37 16.92 0.862
107.2
Distance to Lake Erie (km)
8.461 8.271 0.000106 51.69
Distance to nearest beach or boat access (km)
10.13 8.888 0.0300 55.53
Acreage of parks within 1 km (tens of acres)
1.059 4.212 0
121.8
Number of manufacturing businesses within 1 km 1.680 1.121 0
3
TRI air releases within 1 km (in 10,000s of pounds) 0.856 9.572 0
634.7
Notes: Number of sales within 100 meters of Lake Erie = 2,779. Number of sales with 250
meters of a beach of boat ramp = 769. Number of sales within 1 km of a Superfund site =
348. Number of sales within 1 km of a manufacturing business = 240,362. Number of sales
within 1 km of TRI releases = 27,410. Total number of Observations = 303,907. Number
of block groups = 1,938.

8.5 Results and discussion
The results of our hedonic analysis are presented in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. In all models,
the core housing characteristics are statistically significant and of the expected signs.
The number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, the presence of a garage or
fireplace, the building size and the lot size all are associated with an increase in the
price of the house. Also, as shown by the squared terms for building size and lot
acres, the residential housing price is increasing at a decreasing rate in terms of the
size of the house and the size of the lot. Additionally, as expected, older houses,
2

We recognize that the lag of one year may not fully account for the potential endogeneity of
our emissions and business variables. However, due to data availability, further lags would have
required us to drop many of the observations in our dataset.
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Table 8.2 Northeast Ohio hedonic basic regression results
Variable

Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)

Number of bedrooms

0.019***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.003)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.002
(0.001)
0.212***
(0.009)

Adjusted R-squared

0.815

0.019***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.003)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.213***
(0.009)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.034** -0.035**
(0.016)
(0.016)
0.050** 0.048**
(0.024)
(0.023)

0.019***
(0.001)
Number of bathrooms
0.077***
(0.001)
House has a garage (0/1)
0.061***
(0.002)
House has a fireplace (0/1)
0.027***
(0.001)
House size (hundreds of square feet)
0.023***
(0.000)
House size, squared
-0.000
(0.000)
Lot size in acres
0.078***
(0.003)
Lot size, squared
-0.005***
(0.000)
Age of house
-0.007***
(0.000)
Age squared
0.000***
(0.000)
Distance to downtown Cleveland (km)
-0.004*
(0.002)
Distance to downtown Cleveland, squared
-0.000**
(0.000)
Distance to Lake Erie (km)
0.006**
(0.002)
Lake Erie within 100 meters (0/1)
0.214***
(0.009)
Distance to nearest beach or boat access (km)
-0.005*
(0.002)
Beach within 250 meters (0/1)
-0.035**
(0.016)
Boat access with 250 meters (0/1)
0.012
(0.026)
Number of parking spots at nearby boating access
0.003***
(0.001)
Acreage of parks within 1 km (tens of acres)
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Number of manufacturing businesses within 1 km -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
TRI air releases within 1 km (in 10,000s of pounds) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Superfund site within 1 km (0/1)
-0.016
-0.016
-0.017
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
0.815

0.815

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1. Constant included but not reported for space. All regressions include year and block
group fixed effects. Number of observations = 303,858 in all models.

on average, have lower prices, however, the quadratic term is positive, suggesting
that the price is decreasing at a decreasing rate (as expected). As predicted by the
urban bid rent model, housing prices are decreasing with the distance to downtown
Cleveland.
Focusing on the lake amenities, we find strong evidence that being on or very
close to Lake Erie (within 100 meters) is significantly positively capitalized into
housing prices, and this is consistent across all models. Using the results from model
3, being within 100 meters of the lake is associated with a 21.4% increase in home
value. Based on the average home value in our sample, this is more than a $25,000
increase in home value. It could be that this value is picking up characteristics of
the lakefront homes that are not included in our analysis, given that houses on the
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water may be more luxurious, have Lake Erie piers, private beaches or foundations.3
However, discussions with local leaders confirmed that similar houses do sell for
more simply by being on the lake.
Table 8.3 Northeast Ohio hedonic additional regression results
Variable

Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)

Number of bedrooms

0.019***
(0.001)
Number of bathrooms
0.077***
(0.001)
House has a garage (0/1)
0.061***
(0.002)
House has a fireplace (0/1)
0.026***
(0.001)
House size (hundreds of square feet)
0.023***
(0.000)
House size, squared
-0.000
(0.000)
Lot size in acres
0.078***
(0.003)
Lot size, squared
-0.005***
(0.000)
Age of house
-0.007***
(0.000)
Age squared
0.000***
(0.000)
Distance to downtown Cleveland (km)
-0.004*
(0.002)
Distance to downtown Cleveland, squared
-0.000**
(0.000)
Distance to Lake Erie (km)
0.008***
(0.002)
Lake Erie within 100 meters (0/1)
0.233***
(0.009)
Lake Erie within 100 and 250 meters (0/1)
0.043***
(0.005)
Distance to nearest beach or boat access (km)
-0.007***
(0.002)
Beach within 250 meters (0/1)
-0.048***
(0.016)
Boat access with 250 meters (0/1)
0.001
(0.026)
Number of parking spots at nearby boating access 0.003***
(0.001)
Acreage of parks within 1 km (tens of acres)
0.001***
(0.000)
Number of manufacturing businesses within 1 km -0.006***
(0.001)
TRI air releases within 1 km (in 10,000s of pounds) -0.000***
(0.000)
Superfund site within 1 km (0/1)
-0.015
(0.021)
Number of manuf. bus. within 1 km if on the coast

0.019***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.002)
0.026***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.003)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.281***
(0.013)
0.043***
(0.005)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.048***
(0.016)
0.009
(0.026)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.021)
-0.037***
(0.007)

TRI air releases within 1 km if on the coast

0.019***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.002)
0.026***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.003)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.233***
(0.009)
0.043***
(0.005)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.048***
(0.016)
0.001
(0.026)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.021)

-0.005*
(0.003)
-0.049***
(0.017)
-0.053**
(0.026)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.021)

-0.000
(0.000)

Elevation if along the coast (DEM)
Adjusted R-squared

0.018***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.002)
0.050***
(0.002)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.025***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.081***
(0.003)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.007***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.004*
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.006**
(0.003)
1.296***
(0.155)

-0.002***
(0.000)
0.815

0.815

0.815

0.811

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1. Constant included
but not reported for space. All regressions include year and block group fixed effects. Number of
observations = 303,858 for models 4-5, 205,166 for Model 7.

In models 4-6 in Table 8.3, we also include a control for houses slightly farther
away (100 to 250 meters) and there is a smaller (approximately 4%), yet statistically
3

Looking at Google Maps, we saw that houses near Lake Erie seem very different than those only
a short distance away.
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significant, capitalization effect. This suggests that the lake effects may extend at
least a few blocks. However, away from those homes immediately located on or
near to Lake Erie, our results indicate there is at least a small premium on housing
prices from being farther away, as demonstrated by the positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the distance to Lake Erie variable in most models (even
when our control for those slightly farther away is included). For example, houses
prices are approximately 6-8% higher (or about $7,000 to $9,000 higher) if they are
10 kilometers away. The overall negative relationship between proximity and price
may be evidence that people like living in the Greater Cleveland area because they
can access Lake Erie when they want to enjoy its recreational and other benefits but
that, unless they live directly on the lake (or within walking distance), they are not
willing to pay to be close.
We further explore this by considering the proximity to beach and boat access. In
this case, there is an offsetting, but small, negative capitalization effect from living
farther from one of these access points, suggesting that people do not want to live
too far away. Yet, the negative and statistically significant price effect (3-4%) from
living within 250 meters of a beach, indicates that people would rather not live
too close to the congestion of a beach. Interestingly, while models 1 and 2 point
to positive price effects from being close (within 250 meters) to a boat access, it
appears that it is boat access with parking that is the most valuable. This may be
because boat owners (even those who live nearby) will drive to the boat access and
want to be able to park their car after launching their boat. Initially, we had thought
that the number of parking spaces could be seen as a measure of congestion, which
would likely make it less desirable (all else equal) to have a house nearby. But, in
addition to the convenience of parking at the boat ramp, it is also likely that there
are additional amenities associated with boat ramps with lots of parking spaces that
are not controlled for by our model; in other words, boat ramps with lots of parking
spaces might also be nicer boat ramps.
We also find a small, but positive and statistically significant, capitalization effect
from proximity to parks, consistent with other studies which have looked at a variety of open space types. This is further evidence that households in the region value
proximity to natural and recreational amenities. There is some concern that industrialization may be reducing the attractiveness of portions of the region. Consistent
with these hypotheses, we find evidence that proximity to manufacturing businesses
is negatively related to housing prices. In models 5 and 6, there is also evidence of
an additional negative impact on house prices near Lake Erie from nearby manufacturing facilities, suggesting that industrialization near the lake could drive down
prices more than similar industrialization farther away from the lake. Based on these
results, for the average house, prices are 4.2% lower for each manufacturing facility
near houses on Lake Erie, reducing prices by about $5,000.
The industrial legacy has also left abandoned hazardous waste sites, including
Superfund sites, and those manufacturing businesses and other industrial sites that
create air pollution that is tracked by the TRI. However, we observe a statistically
insignificant relationship between proximity to a Superfund site and home price,
perhaps due to the use of our spatial fixed effects. And, the coefficient on nearby
TRI air releases is very small, although it is negative and statistically significant.
In model 6, we explore whether air pollution near the coast has a bigger negative
impact (as we found for manufacturing). In this case, the coefficient is statistically
insignificant.
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8.5.1 Sensitivity analysis
Finally, on inspection of the housing along the Lake, it appears that much of the
high-end private development is in areas with cliffs rather than beach access. To test
for this, we considered a measure of elevation using Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
data in ArcGIS for those houses within 100 meters of the lake, results are in model
7. As shown, the relationship was negative but small (a reduction in price of about
0.2%) compared to the large capitalization effect from being next to the lake. This
suggests that the key effect is from being on or close to the lake, not whether there
is a beach or cliff.

8.6 Conclusion
Results from this analysis suggest that households in the Greater Cleveland region
value being on or close to Lake Erie, at least if they are close enough to have a
view or within walking distance. Beyond that, the results are more mixed. However,
away from those houses in close proximity to Lake Erie, the lake has little to no
effect on housing values, perhaps because everyone in the region can benefit from
the amenities being within driving distance.
Consistent with our hypothesis that industrial disamenities may play a role in
repelling households, we find evidence of a negative effect on house prices from
nearby manufacturing facilities, especially when houses are close to the lake. However, the effect is much smaller when we consider air pollution levels. Consistent
with previous research, this may be due to the fact that households are able to see
the smokestacks or industrial sites but may not necessarily notice pollution otherwise.
Overall, our findings suggest that, even in a highly industrialized region, natural and related built amenities are valued by households and increase their quality
of life. As the region transitions from its historic reliance on heavy industry and
manufacturing, it appears that investments in environmental quality and increased
recreational facilities, especially boat access, would be valued by residents. Additionally, as there is a large capitalization effect from being directly next to the lake,
perhaps due to the view, efforts to clean up past industrial sites could pay off.
While these results are based on the Greater Cleveland region, they should provide insight into the value of natural amenities and industrial disamenities in other
cities and regions located on coastlines or with other natural amenities who have an
industrial legacy. It appears that even in the face of that legacy, policies to enhance
quality of life enhancing amenities are worth pursuing.
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Chapter 9

The Impact of Controlled Choice School
Assignment Policy on Housing Prices: Evidence
from Rockford, Illinois
Tammy Batson

Abstract In 1996, in response to a court order, the Rockford School District implemented a Controlled Choice school assignment policy to desegregate their school
district. This paper investigates the impact of the Controlled Choice policy on the
housing prices within the city of Rockford. The extent to which the loss of certainty
in the school assignment process impacted housing prices within three policy zones
is examined using a hedonic model and data from 1993 to 2000. Once the quality of
the previously assured neighborhood school is added the results show that formerly
high quality schools lost an average of 9.3 percent of their value whereas homes
previously assigned to poor quality schools saw increases in values.

9.1 Introduction
For many people who are deciding to buy a home, the quality and proximity of
local schools is an important consideration. The theoretical framework supporting
this observation comes from the Tiebout (1956) model in which homeowners incorporate the quality of local public services into their decision when purchasing a
residential property. In the example of Rockford, traditional neighborhood school
assignment is replaced by a Controlled Choice assignment policy following a court
order after a desegregation lawsuit. Under this new policy, parents submitted a list of
preferred schools, which could include their neighborhood school. However, there
is no guarantee that they would receive their first choice. The inability of school
districts to provide everyone with their first choice left many homeowners uncertain
of school assignment and, therefore, unable to incorporate the quality of this local
public good into the value of their property. Many economists argue that changes to
school choice programs can be an informative source of changes in housing markets (Bogart and Cromwell, 1997; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Hoxby, 2000;
Oates, 1969, 1985). Using data from Rockford, Illinois housing transactions from
1993–2000, this paper investigates the connection between Controlled Choice and
the changes in the housing market.
Schools are an important component of the bundle of public services in a locality, and because of this, the relationship between public schools and housing prices
Tammy Batson
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA e-mail: tbatson@niu.edu
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has attracted considerable interest from researchers. The hedonic methodology used
by Rosen (1974) gathers cross-sectional data on neighborhood characteristics to
examine how taxes or public services are capitalized into the value of the house
(Black, 1999; Hayes et al., 1996; Reback, 2005). In Reback’s (2005) work, a school
choice program that allowed for inter-district choice in Minnesota is reviewed. Reback found houses appreciated significantly when students are given a choice to
attend a “preferred school,” but values declined in districts that accepted these transferred students. Some researchers have focused on housing data in which properties
are sold more than once over an observed time period to observe the link between
schools and housing prices (Bogart and Cromwell, 2000; Downes and Zabel, 2002;
Figlio and Lucas, 2004). Figlio and Lucas found that, in the Florida School System,
once school quality measures are made available to the public, this information has
a significant effect on housing prices. Housing prices are about 6% higher on average in areas where the local elementary schools received an “A” rating than prices of
houses where local schools received a “B” rating. What is attractive about the repeat
sales approach is that it allows analysts to ignore the fixed elements that determine
home prices, limits missing variable bias, and allows analysts to focus on the policy
change.
Results of this chapter show that home buyers under Controlled Choice have
evaluated this policy differently based on their proximity to a school, its historical
quality, and the zone assigned to residents by the district. Since giving all students
the school of their choice may conflict with racial guidelines, the certainty of school
assignment is difficult for many residents to accurately evaluate. Therefore, the capitalization effects on these houses decrease due to the uncertainty in school assignment. Using repeat sales, homeowners for whom the assignment policy changed
during ownership saw prices fall an average of 5.59%. In addition, when home
prices are reviewed introducing a spatial dummy variable indicating the zone each
home is assigned to, the policy impact ranges from a 1.49% to 9.19% decrease, depending on the zone. Finally, these interactions are included along with a new variable introduced to represent former school quality based on local scores relative to
the state average. This variable for school quality becomes very important; not only
is it significant at 1%, but all three policy-created zone variables appear to be significant factors in falling home prices. Houses located near formerly well-performing
schools lost, on average, 9.3% after the policy change. This is an indication that
properties formerly included a premium to neighborhood schools of an average of
2.9%, if the school performed at least one standard deviation above the district average. In contrast, some houses that located next to schools with lower school quality
had discounts capitalized into current values. Formerly poor-performing schools under neighborhood assignment combined with the zones result in some positive impacts to houses located close to schools performing two standard deviations lower
than the district average. This chapter is devoted to the examination of a school district ordered to desegregate its schools and how the element of uncertainty, as well
as the limiting of selection based on residency, caused capitalization effects. These
results emphasize that under Controlled Choice the removal of certainty in school
assignment make potential home buyers unable to evaluate school quality.
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9.2 Background
Rockford, Illinois is located about 70 miles west of Chicago in Winnebago County.
Rockford is the second-largest city in the state of Illinois with approximately
150,115 residents according to the 2000 census. The Rock River acts as a natural
divider of the city: the central city’s older housing and neighborhoods are located
west of the river, while a significant amount of recent growth has occurred on the
east side of the river. This geographical division has also led to some controversy
between the Westside and the Eastside residents. This controversy is often compounded by the single school district of approximately 27,000 students that serves
the entire central city.
Rockford School District #205 (RSD) is one of many districts that have dealt
with the challenge of desegregating their public schools after Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka (347 US 483) in 1954. The United States, for years, attempted
to integrate students with a form of school choice referred to as “freedom of choice.”
This, however, failed to attract African American students to white schools or white
students to African American schools. In 1976, a federal judge “ordered the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to begin enforcement proceedings
against certain Northern and Western school districts for violations of school desegregation requirements” (Times, 1976, p. 13) to increase efforts to desegregate
schools. RSD was included in the list of school districts required to take action to
desegregate the district. Along with many areas in the country, a number of initiatives were introduced in Rockford to bring about desegregation including changes in
school boundaries, magnet schools, and school bussing. The original results show
that in Rockford, by 1980, the number of elementary students attending racially
identifiable schools had declined. Following these improvements, and with similar
results occurring all across the country, many school districts included in the 1976
ruling were released from oversight. By 1981, RSD was dismissed from its desegregation lawsuits.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, with forced busing on the decline across the
country, the schools within the RSD began to look more like the neighborhoods that
surrounded the schools and therefore, showed signs of residential segregation. No
longer under the watchful oversight of the federal government, and in an attempt
to ease budget problems, the RSD subsequently made plans to close 10 schools
located on the west side of town which served primarily minority students. Local
residents, who had followed an ongoing Eastside/Westside of the river debate for
years, were already exasperated when the district decided to close a large Westside
high school in 1988. The decision one year later to close 10 elementary schools
and turn the aforementioned high school into a super elementary school, known
as Together Toward a Brighter Tomorrow, attracted considerable controversy. This
move by the RSD seemed to show a disregard for the earlier warnings they had
received from HEW and resulted in some Rockford parents creating a coalition
known as People Who Care.
In 1989, in response to the proposed closings under Together Toward a Brighter
Tomorrow, the People Who Care sued the district over the proposal on behalf of
African American and Hispanic students. The court found the school district guilty
of systematic discrimination against African American and Hispanic students, and
the closings were stopped (Taylor and Alves, 1999). United States Magistrate Judge
P. Michael Mahoney directed the district to make a number of improvements. First,
the school district was directed to close the achievement gap between white and
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minority students by 50%. Second, it was directed to meet strict racial quotas in
courses across the curriculum.1 The Court Remedial Order gave the district full
discretion in how to achieve these directives. In late 1996, the school board approved
a system known as Controlled Choice to facilitate the desegregation process for the
district.
Controlled Choice is a system that attempts to provide open choice while still
maintaining ethnic and racial integration. The system replaces neighborhood attendance districts with zones and allows families to choose schools according to their
zone. Alves and Willie (1990), the creators of the system, state that the policy allows
for parental choice so long as that choice does not upset the racial and ethnic balance
at the school in question. Only a few cities have adopted Controlled Choice, with
most programs patterned after a pilot program implementation in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cambridge plan developed into the following system: New families
would visit a central registration area where they would choose four schools and
rank them in order of preference. The district would then review the lists and every effort would be made to assign students to one of their top choices while still
ensuring all schools reflected the district’s racial and ethnic composition without exceeding capacity (Tan, 1990). Though not every student would be able to attend their
first choice, the policy succeeded in striking a balance between providing students’
families with some choice while ensuring school improvement overall (Yanofsky
and Young, 1992). At the beginning of the 1997/98 school year, the RSD had been
divided into three zones: Northeast, Southeast, and West.
Students are no longer assigned to neighborhood schools, but instead, parents are
asked to submit a list of preferred schools based on the new attendance zones. Families in the West Zone, where the minority population is concentrated, are allowed
to choose schools from any of the three zones. Families in the Southeast and Northeast Zones are asked to choose from two zones, their own zone or the West Zone.
The Racial Fairness Guidelines used for assignment are determined according to
the court’s remedial order (CRO). These guidelines defined racial balance as being
when the minority enrollment is plus or minus 15% of the minority student population of the district. Minority students in this court order are defined as African
American and Hispanic, with all other groups considered part of the majority in
terms of student assignment.
Under the former neighborhood school assignment, parents knew exactly what
school their children would attend based on where they purchased their house. After
Controlled Choice is implemented, it creates uncertainty even though the majority
of students received their first-choice school. Research conducted by Taylor and
Alves (2000) found that in 1999, only 24% of all Kindergarten students did not receive their first choice, while 8% of students did not receive one of their top three
choices. Prior to Controlled Choice, parents had certainty over the school their child
would attend once they purchased a home. After Controlled Choice, there was considerable uncertainty, in addition to many many students now faced increased travel
time to and from school as well as to after-school activities because many students
are assigned to schools located a significant distance from their residence. Parents
who were unhappy with the assignment for their children sorted themselves out of
the district as predicted by Tiebout (1956). This should change the demand to live in
different neighborhoods in Rockford. Families living in the West Zone have a wider
range of choice, while families living in the Northeast and Southeast Zones are lim1

These guidelines defined racial balance as being when the minority enrollment is plus or minus
15% of the minority student population of the district.
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ited to choosing among schools located within their zones or the West Zone.2 This
suggests there will be a higher preference for families residing in the West Zone because residents are offered a larger choice of schools. This should create a premium
for residing in the West Zone implying that, everything else being equal, the value
of homes in the West Zone would increase. Instead of parents finding the West Zone
more attractive because of its higher quality, they demand housing in the West Zone
due to its larger choice set compared to the other zones. As a result, the remaining
zones would theoretically see little-to-no premium in housing price after the implementation of Controlled Choice or a decline due to the increased uncertainty and
consequent reduced demand.

9.3 Methodology
The hedonic method is often difficult to estimate, based on constraints of the data
sample. Therefore, the repeat sales regression is a special case of the hedonic method
where one can create a hedonic price function to estimate implicit prices of characteristics of residential property when data are limited. Therefore, by focusing the
analysis on repeat sales, these unique comparables will allow for comparing the
value of a property to itself over time. This allows for the estimation of what a consumer is willing to pay for a good whose attributes have changed during the sample
and should help track the changing value given to this public good. This analysis
follows Bogart and Cromwell (2000), who, using several techniques including repeat sales, estimated the changes in prices due to new school assignment for some
residents after redistricting of the neighborhood schools. Properties are assigned
dichotomous variables based on whether or not they are considered part of the treatment group sold after November 1996, following the policy implementation.
The typical hedonic estimation regresses the value of a property against a set of
variables controlling for characteristics, location, and other factors that may affect
price:
ln(Pit ) = P[Zit , Lit , Dit ]

(9.1)

Here, P is the residential property of i value at time t, and Zit is a vector of physical attributes of property i at time t, such as the number of rooms, the lot size,
and whether or not the unit is attached. The location of the property, Lit , describes
the location of property i value at time t, with Dit describing the dummy variable
for the policy i at time t. This function is based on the basic assumption that the
price of a composite good is a linear function of the prices of its characteristics. As
Palmquist (1984) showed, the repeat sales technique allows for a considerably simplified model specification since many of the characteristics do not change over time
and are omitted for estimation. Repeat sales measures, initially proposed by Bailey
et al. (1963), provide an alternative estimation method based on price changes of
houses sold more than once. This model is frequently used to create price indices, a
technique that has been refined by Palmquist (1984) and Case and Shiller (1989). In
particular, if the restricted hedonic model in Equation 9.1 is differenced with respect

2

The rationale for this requirement is that the students from West Zone schools are mainly from
minority groups while the student bodies at Northeast and Southeast Zone schools are primarily
from non-minority groups.
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to consecutive sales of houses that have sold more than once in the sample period;
it follows that
lnPt+1 [Zit , Lit , Dit ] − lnPt [Zit , Lit , Dit ] = lnP[∆ DPC ]

(9.2)

What remains is a subset of variables observed to be those that change between
sales. The assumption in which relevant elements of Z and L are constant between
sales is supported since the time between sales is sufficiently short. With the creation
of dummy variables to indicate DPC =1 if a policy change occurred between sales
and DPC =0 for those houses otherwise as the same policy is in effect for both sales.
This clearly exogenous policy impact makes the use of repeat sales a very attractive
option. Equation 9.2 is then estimated as
lnPt+1 − lnPt = b2 DPC + e
= b1 + b2 DPC if DPC = 1

(9.3)

= b1 if DPC = 0
The estimated coefficients are then transformed using the technique created by
Halvorsen et al. (1980) and Kennedy et al. (1981) to interpret dummy variables that
are regressed against the natural log of the dependant variable as shown in Equation
9.4:
bi = 100(exp(bi −V (bi )/2) − 1)

(9.4)

Next, a matrix of dummy variables, denoted as DZonePC , is created to indicate the
Controlled Choice policy zone assigned to each household. It is assumed that these
zones are created arbitrarily as they are bounded by the Rock River and Broadway, a
road that bisects the north and south ends of Rockford. The study tests to determine
whether the impact to the district is experienced uniformly across the different zones
by estimating equation (2). Since this policy ties residential locations (Li ) to school
choice zones, with some zones having more choices than others, this policy effect
needs to be interacted with the different zones. Estimation of a model that fails
to account for the potential interactions among the independent variables may not
provide an accurate estimation of the true relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. Friedrich (1982) argues it is a low-risk strategy to determine
whether the product term is significant. If it is significant, it is kept in the model;
otherwise, an analyst can drop the product term out of the model. The inclusion of an
interaction term is nonadditive; therefore, the effect of one set of dummy variables
on the dependent variable varies according to the value of a second set of dummy
variables.
The second set of regressions can then be run as shown in Equation 9.5:
lnPt+1 − lnPt = f (b∗ ) = b1 + b2 dPC + b3 DZonePC + e

(9.5)

Finally, a crude measure of former school quality of the neighborhood school
previously assigned to each home is added. This may help to capture the response
by homeowners who had previously paid a premium or discount to be located near
a high or low quality school.
lnPt+1 − lnPt = f (b∗ ) = b1 + b2 dPC + b3 DZonePC + b4 SQ + e

(9.6)
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One possible critique of the repeat sales method is its failure to control for temporal market trends. Toward this end, the above equations estimates using a fixed
effects methodology as a check of robustness. Omitted variable bias occurs when
a study lacks crucial information primarily due to data set constraints (Leventhal
and Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Thus, the fixed effects model allows one to control for
variables that are unobserved and are more permanent or the same across houses. In
this case, the fixed effects model is used as a test for consistency. The fixed effects
model measures differences in intercepts for each group and allows a researcher to
include time dummies to control specifically for annual market fluctuations, while
the repeat sales approach does not.
lnPit = bit + bit (PC ∗ Zone) + γ2 Dy 2i + ... + γn Dyni + eit

(9.7)

This new indicator Dy2i =1 for sales occurring within the second year, and 0 if
otherwise, and Dy3i = ..., etc. for all years in the sample. These binary regressors
for each year help account for bias that may show up in the estimated coefficients
within the data.3

9.4 Data
The Winnebago Township House Sales is used to determine the number of houses
sold in Rockford and for what amounts. The core housing price data from Winnebago Township House Sales for the years 1993 to 2000 include the following:
the sale price every time a property is sold, households’ assessed values, tax codes,
neighborhood codes, addresses, and an assortment of other house characteristics.
The data, which consist of a little over 18,000 records, yield a mean house price
of $93,315, a standard deviation of $55,525, and a median house price of $82,227.
These house prices are adjusted to 2000 values using the consumer price index not
seasonally adjusted (NSA) calculated by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. The policy variable splits the data among the houses that sold before the policy
change in November 1996 and those sold after.
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics for houses in data set, before and after Controlled Choice
Houses sold before Nov. 1996 Houses sold after Nov. 1996
Mean Price
$95,947.50
$90,655.10
Median Price
$83,951.42
$80,594.09
Standard Deviation $56,344.60
$48,215.95
Notes: The Controlled Choice policy begins in Nov. 1996. Data is Winnebago County
housing data from 1993-2000.

Table 9.1 shows summary statistics for housing sale prices before and after Controlled Choice. The county database also includes parcel identifiers, making it possible to match sales of the same house over time. The data refocused contain only
repeat sales occurring in the RSD and only houses that sold twice within a minimum of 12 months between sales, and for greater than the NSA-Adjusted price of
3

The summary statistics for the characteristics are not shown due to the use of the repeat sales
model.
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$20,000. The resulting repeat sales data are 2,540 paired observations that contain
2,362 individual properties.4
Table 9.2 Dummy variable definitions and observations
Variable

No. of obs.

Repeat sales data sample size
Houses sold twice with former neighborhood assignment,
prior to change in assignment policy-neighborhood assignment policy (NAP)
Houses sold twice once prior to change in assignment policy and once
after-neighborhood assignment policy changed to controlled choice
assignment policy (NAPCCAP)
Houses sold twice after change in assignment policy-controlled choice
assignment policy (CCAP)

2,540
455
1,741
344

This repeat sales data set is divided into the school assignment policy that is in
place when the home is originally purchased (first sale) and sold (second sale). Table
9.2 shows the size of each group. Of the 2,540 pairs, 18% are bought and sold under
the neighborhood school assignment policy, 69% are bought under neighborhood
assignment and sold under Controlled Choice, and the remaining 13% bought and
sold under Controlled Choice.
Table 9.3 Summary statistics for each zone
Zone

Obs Mean

Std. Dev. Min

Max

West Zone (W)
599 71,480 37,922 20,230 477,173
Southeast Zone (S) 624 84,452 33,157 20,531 264,885
Northeast Zone (N) 1,317 125,627 64,426 21,502 581,480
Note: Winnebago County Housing Data in 2000 dollars.

Next, each home is assigned to its Controlled Choice zone according to its location with the use of ArcGIS® (an integrated collection of Geographical Information
System software). Table9.3 indicates the amount of observations available for each
zone as well as some differences in the mean value of housing in each zone. Analysis
of repeat sales data allows one to better control for housing characteristics.
Finally, the former school attendance boundaries are attached to the repeat sales
observations and merged with the Illinois Report Card data. Figure 9.1 presents
the RSD mean meet and exceed ratio during the Controlled Choice policy and the
years following. The 3rd grade reading scores in 2000/2001 reflect the first class
using the Controlled Choice assignment criteria as students apply for choice as they
enter kindergarten, the 6th grade, and the 9th grade. During the first 2 years, grades
improve. This may indicate that the desegregation policy has had a positive effect
on those students who chose to change out of their neighborhood schools. However,
despite the public support for school choice policies, it is possible that the decreases
experienced are a result due to the sort and may prevent these policies from working
as intended.
4

Properties sold in less than 12 months and for less than $20,000 are omitted because repeat
sales measures are estimated on the premise that house characteristics (that is, quality) have not
changed over time. Given the potential for renovation or other reasons for homes selling below this
threshold, these two restrictions are put in place. This is similar to Figlio and Lucas (2004) who
eliminate all sales of less than $10,000.
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Fig. 9.1 School quality measure of meet and exceed variable for third grade reading scores from 26
the Illinois Report Card Data 1997–2004
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of the district level variable used for meet and exceed 1996–1997(me97), meet and exceed of
the zone at the time of the second sale (mezo2nd), and meet and exceed of the attendance
zone at the time of the second sale (meatzo2nd).

Assessing the impact of a school choice policy on the quality of education is not
the main intention of this research. However, what is tested is how houses previously assigned to high quality schools are impacted under Controlled Choice, based
on the expectation that houses formerly attached to high quality schools will see the
largest price drop. The Illinois Report Card data, which is available for each elementary school in the district before and after the policy, indicate a students’ abilities to
meet and exceed established subject guidelines. In Figure 9.2, these variables are
summarized by zone and illustrate the decreasing measures of school quality experienced in the Northeast Zone (N) and increases in the West Zone (W).
Once the new policy has been implemented, parents will factor the new quality
of education into the utility of their current housing decision, giving rise to the following question: “Does the community feel school quality has decreased due to this
new assignment policy?” Theoretically, the new policy should cause school quality to increase since it is implemented to improve the education for both African
American and Hispanic children. If this coefficient is negative, it means that parents
consider school quality an important factor contributing to housing values. Therefore, given changes in school quality, with repeat sales data the within-district policy
effects are calculated. After merging data from the RSD assignment policy and the
housing data, it is possible to determine the within-district differences and changes
in housing values based on former school quality.
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Figure 3. School quality changes by zone. Variables are from Illinois report card data 1997,
1998, 1999, and 2000.

9.5 Empirical results
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andprice
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Table 9.4the
Regression
results
repeat
sales change
in housing
in Rockford
Variable

Difference ln(sale price) Difference ln(sale price)

Sale and policy

-0.055

negative, it means that parents consider school quality an important factor contributing to
-0.060

change
(NAPCCAP)
(-5.59)
(-6.15)
housing values.
Therefore,
given
changes in school
quality, with repeat sales data the within[0.005]**

[0.007]**

sold after
district policyBoth
effects
are calculated. After merging-0.012
data from the RSD assignment policy and
change (CCAP)

(-1.67)
[0.0096]
the housing Constant
data, it is possible0.036
to determine the within-district
differences and changes in
0.041
(3.46)
(3.85)
housing values based on former
school quality. [0.0063]**
[0.004]**
Observations
2540
2540
R2
0.0351
0.0357
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets []. Interpretation of log in ().
* denotes statistical significancce at 5% and ** at 1%.
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This suggests that the policy change in the district led to a decrease in housing
values. Given that choice removes the consideration of school quality from the location decision as outlined previously, this result is not surprising. The constant term
in the first regression contains both types of assignment policy; therefore, the second
regression (both are in Table 9.4) distinguishes between houses that are bought and
sold under the neighborhood assignment policy and houses that are bought and sold
under Controlled Choice. These results show that the marginal impact of switching from neighborhood assignment to Controlled Choice decreases homes’ values
about 6.15% compared to not experiencing a change. In addition, when Controlled
Choice policy is in place, houses appeared to decrease in value 1.67%, relative to the
3.85% increase estimate for homes under neighborhood assignment. This decrease,
however, is not significant, with a p-value of 0.202, indicating the decrease may
have occurred without Controlled Choice. Note that the R2 values of the first and
second regression are small; that is often seen in repeat sales analysis (i.e., 0.033
and 0.035, respectively). This, however, does not represent a threat to the validity
of these results as low R2 values are common in behavioral science research (Chau
and Hu, 2002; Cohen, 1988). Overall, the first and second regressions indicate a
nonpreference of the homebuyers for the new policy.
Table 9.5 Subset results by policy change and zone
Variable

Difference Difference Difference
ln(sale price) ln(sale price) ln(sale price)

Northwest Zone -0.049
-0.050
-0.028
(-5.40)
(-5.21)
(-3.49)
[0.013]**
[0.007]**
[0.015]
West Zone
0.029
0.031
0.041
(2.07)
(2.63)
(2.58)
[0.017]
[0.010]**
[0.031]
Constant
0.060
-0.001
0.038
(5.55)
(-0.39)
(3.20
[0.012]**
[0.006]
[0.013]**
Subsample
NAP
NAPCCAP CCAP
Observations
455
1741
344
R2
0.08
0.06
0.04
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets []. Interpretation
of log in (). * denotes statistical significancce at 5% and **
at 1%.

Because Controlled Choice creates three zones, the policy implication on housing
is likely not unilateral, but differential by zone. An additional set of dummies are
created based on the zones designated by the choice program in the district. As
mentioned previously, parents in the West Zone are able to pick any school in the
district, whereas parents in the Northeast and Southeast Zones are limited to their
own zone and the West Zone. Additionally, households that exist in the Southeast
Zone are more likely to be assigned to their neighborhood school since most of the
preferred schools are in the Northeast Zone. Table 9.5 contains in the first column
a regression where the data used are a subset of the repeat sales data where the
homes sold had the neighborhood assignment policy (NAP). The general trend for
Southeast Zone housing prices is positive at 5.55%, with no significant change in the
West Zone. The Northeast Zone appears to already experience a decrease of 5.21%
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in housing values. This may reflect anticipation of the change in attendance policy
since the district had been dealing with a desegregation lawsuit since 1990.
The second column in Table 9.5 examines the houses sold both before and after a
change in policy (NAPCCAP). This indicates that the change in policy has little impact on the houses in the Southeast Zone (constant), and the result is not significant.
However, the Northeast Zone and West Zone both have significant results at 1%
(p-value of 0.00 for the Northeast Zone and 0.001 for the West Zone). The houses
decrease in the Northeast Zone at 5.2% and increase in the West Zone at 2.43%.
Finally, the third column includes houses that are purchased after the Controlled
Choice assignment policy (CCAP) is in place. The only significant result is a general
trend showing an increase of 3.2% within the Southeast Zone. In contrast, the drop
in the Northeast Zone values of 3.49%, or the increase in the West Zone of 2.58%,
are results that are just under a significance level with p-values of 0.090 and 0.053,
respectively. This is an indication that, under this policy, zones are no longer a factor.
In essence, only the Southeast Zone saw any premium from having this policy in
place. This result coincides with the increased demand for housing in the Southeast
Zone that appears to be a result of the growth of the Hispanic population.
Table 9.6 Regression results from interactions of zone and change in policy
Difference ln of
sale price
-0.093
Northeast Zone-(NAPCCAP) (-9.19)
[0.007]**
-0.032
(-3.63)
Northeast Zone-(CCAP)
[0.008]**
-0.042
(-4.5)
West Zone-(NAPCCAP)
[0.008]**
-0.004
(-1.12)
West Zone-(CCAP)
[0.014]
-0.011
Southeast Zone-(NAPCCAP) (-1.49)
[0.010]
0.038
(4.51)
e Southeast Zone-(CCAP)
[0.028]

Variable

Meet and exceed 1997
(Me97)
Constant

0.041
(3.87)
[0.006]**

Difference ln of
sale price
-0.083
(-8.27)
[0.007]**
-0.021
(-2.60)
[0.008]*
-0.048
(-5.04)
[0.008]**
-0.006
(-1.36)
[0.014]
-0.026
(-3.05)
[0.010]**
0.02
(3.34)
[0.028]
-0.0011
(-0.12)
[0.0002]**
0.131
(12.98)
[0.018]**

Observations
2540
2540
R2
0.0855
0.1041
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets []. Interpretation
of log in (). * denotes statistical significancce at 5% and **
at 1%.

In Table 9.6, interaction dummies are used to determine the zone impact when
interacted with the policy. If the interactions exist and are not included in the estimation, this would introduce a specification error in the form of omitted variable bias.
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The first column demonstrates that having a change in the assignment policy results
in a drop in the real value of a house by 5.59%. However, in the regression, this drop
becomes larger, at 9.19%, for houses in the Northeast Zone. The West Zone has a
positive result associated with Controlled Choice, leading to a 2.94% increase for
housing this zone. This expanded choice and lower uncertainty should put upward
pressure on the housing prices in that zone. The results of regression three show
that, on average, all houses in the Southeast Zone, which have no change in policy,
show a 5.55% increase in value. This indicates that the omission of these interactions does lead to a bias in previous estimates in which the original dummy variable
indicating a change in school policy is dropped. Interestingly, here the Northeast
Zone dummy loses significance while the West Zone shows the positive impacts of
this new policy. This indicates that overall Controlled Choice had positive impacts
for the West Zone. The Northeast Zone’s drop in housing values is mainly due to
this change from neighborhood schools to Controlled Choice and depends less on
being in this zone.
In the second column in Table 9.6, a measure is added to indicate former school
quality. Here a variable constructed from elementary school level data are included
to describe the percentage of students who either meet or exceeded state standards
reported by the Illinois State Report Card data. The addition of this variable allows
for marked improvement in the R-squared to 0.1041. Figure 9.3 shows that inclusion of this variable for school quality influences the zone effects. This coefficient
indicates that a 1% change in this school quality measure leads to a 0.001% change
in housing value. This result may not seem like much of an impact; however, if one
evaluates the coefficient at one standard deviation away from the mean of 85%, there
is an impact to home buyers depending on former school quality.5 This variable for
school quality becomes very important; not only is it significant at 1% but all three
policy zone variables appear to be significant factors in falling home prices due
to a change from neighborhood school assignment. Houses located near formerly
high performing schools lost 9.3% after the policy change. This is an indication that
properties formerly included a premium for neighborhood schools of an average
of 2.9% if the school performed at least one standard deviation above the district
average. In contrast, some houses reside next to schools with lower school quality
and had discounts capitalized into current values. Thus, formerly poor performing
schools under neighborhood assignment, combined with some average decrease in
all zones, result in positive impacts to homes located close to schools, those performing two standard deviation slower than the district average saw a 5.9% increase
in both the Southeast and the West Zone.
In repeat sales analysis, all of the differences are computed (i.e., before and after
the implementation of Controlled Choice) and a single regression is calculated. Instead of thinking of each year’s observation in terms of how much it differed from
the prior sale for the same house, the focus is placed on the use of a fixed effect
model, that is, how much each observation differed from the average sales price in
each year. If one assumes fixed effects, time-independent effects are accounted for
each house and possibly correlated with the independent variables. By obtaining
multiple observations about each house and looking at the effect of price, the pernicious effect of omitted variable bias is eliminated, which is the intuition behind fixed
effect regression. Table 9.5 shows that the changes occurring within the Northeast
5

To compare changing school testing methods over time, I normalize this data with the state level.
The 85% means that before this change in policy, 85% of those who meet and exceed 3rd grade
reading scores in the RSD compare to those at the state
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Fig. 9.3 Graphical depiction of empirical results by zone

Note: Zone results base on former school quality and data from Table 9.6. All results in the figure
are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 9.7 Fixed Effect Regression Results-Interactions with D pczone
Variable
Northeast Zone-(CCAP)
West Zone-(CCAP)
Dy2= 1994
Dy3= 1995
Dy4= 1996
Dy5= 1997
Dy6= 1998
Dy7= 1999
Dy8= 2000
Constant

ln of Sales Price
-0.029
(.006)**
0.040
(.008)**
0.022
(.007)**
0.032
(.007)**
0.026
(.007)**
0.012
(.007)
-0.004
(.007)
-0.003
(.007)
0.013
(.0097)**
11.382
(.009)**

Observations
4857
Number of pid
2362
R2 -within, between, overall 0.05, 0.17, 0.10
Note: Robust standard errors in (). * denotes
statistical significancce at 5% and ** at 1%.

adopted an approach of using repeat sales. This control for heterogeneity in property characteristics allowed for the introduction of choice program dummies that
are significant to show reduced values of houses that experience a change in policy
of 5.59%. In Rockford, the policy aligned all schools to the racial composition of
the district while making improvements to the gap between the schools and the percentage of students meeting the state’s reading goals. However, house prices drop
approximately 9.3% when located near high quality schools following the removal
of the guaranteed attendance, unlike houses near former poor-performing schools
that have marginal positive effects due to the school choice policy.6 These results
indicate removal of neighborhood assignment removes any premium or discount
that previously had been capitalized into housing values. However, the next chapter
will examine the idea that this policy impact to housing is caused when residents
reevaluate the utility received from schooling. This sorting can lead to increased
segregation as homogenous patterns emerge as residents vote with their feet avoiding the RSD Controlled Choice guidelines.
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Chapter 10

Public High-School Quality and House Prices:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Edward Hearn

Abstract Are changes in local public-school quality capitalized into house prices?
In 2002, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School district CMS rezoned 50% of Charlotte
houses to different public schools after the court-ordered end of race-based busing. This chapter contributes to the literature on public-school quality and housing
prices by exploiting this natural experiment from Charlotte, NC. Using a differencein-differences model to identify the causal effect of reassignment into a better or
worse public high school on the sale prices of affected houses, my results indicate
that people willingly pay between $3,300 and $4,700 per percentage point increase
in passing rates on the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction’s End-ofCourse exams. This effect is limited to houses in neighborhoods experiencing large
increases in EOC passing rates after the 2002 reassignments. The positive effects
of school quality on selling prices increase non-linearly among houses experiencing
the largest increases in EOC passing rates. There is no solid evidence that moderate or small increases in EOC passing rates that occurred after the 2002 citywide
reassignment are capitalized into house prices in the affected school zones. There is
also no evidence to suggest negative price shocks exist for houses CMS reassigns to
low-quality public high schools.

10.1 Introduction
Are changes in local public-school quality capitalized into house prices? This is
the central question in Oates (1969) regarding the mechanism by which people’s
preferences for public goods are expressed. Individuals are predicted to move into
areas that reflect most closely their desires for public goods. Since people do not
pay for these public goods outright, variations in property taxes levied represent
differences in the costs to individuals of the amount and quality of local public
services they prefer. In most areas of the United States, property-tax-funded services
include public schools. Where public schools are of higher quality, houses zoned for
these schools are predicted to have higher prices relative to houses zoned for lowerquality schools, holding all else constant.
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Oates (1969), in the spirit of Tiebout (1956), finds that house prices capitalize
both property taxes and the value of the public services these taxes finance. Black
(1999) finds a positive relationship between house prices and public-school quality
for houses along school-zone boundaries in Massachusetts. Bayer et al. (2007) find
the same result for houses located along school-zone boundaries in the San Francisco Bay Area. Downes and Zabel (2002) and Figlio and Lucas (2004) conclude
that families reveal their preferences for better-quality public schools by sorting into
higher-priced houses assigned to these schools. Moreover, Hoxby (2000) finds that
cities with more school districts enjoy more productive public schools than cities
with fewer school districts. Parental sorting forces greater inter-district competition
among public schools when families have more public-school options.
Untangling the effects of school quality and sorting complicates the identification
of how school quality impacts house prices. Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2009)
control for sorting by examining how an exogenous change in school-attendance
zones in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana affects the price and time-to-sale of
affected houses. They find evidence that people pay higher prices for houses assigned to schools with better test scores. However, the East Baton Rouge rezoning
pales in comparison to the massive reassignment the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
(CMS) district implemented in 2002. In Charlotte, those neighborhoods reassigned
by CMS to better schools are predicted to experience positive price shocks relative
to neighborhoods retaining their pre-2002 assignments. People express their preferences for public schools of higher quality through the prices they pay for properties
assigned to better performing schools, holding property-tax rates constant. The converse should be true of neighborhoods CMS reassigned into worse schools. Homes
in these adversely affected neighborhoods should experience negative price shocks,
reflecting the implicit compensation required by residents to consume lower public
school quality.
Kane et al. (2006) use the CMS changes in school zones as a natural experiment
to investigate how differences in school quality affect house prices, independent of
sorting. They examine houses located along school-assignment borders and houses
that changed school assignments in Charlotte. The primary difficulty with their identification strategy is that they have a limited time frame in which to study the full
effects of the court-ordered rezoning. They used data through 2001, which was prior
to the citywide redistricting CMS instituted in 2002. Because it appealed the schoolbusing reversal all the way to the Supreme Court, CMS did not implement its school
reassignment plan until after the citywide rezoning that occurred in April 2002.1
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by exploiting this natural experiment from Charlotte, NC. I use this experiment to test whether people pay
more for houses assigned to better public schools. In 2002, CMS rezoned 50% of
Charlotte houses to different public schools (Hastings et al., 2006) after the courtordered end of race-based busing. CMS rezoned some neighborhoods into different
school zones, but left other neighborhoods’ school assignments unchanged. Thus,
the district-wide rezoning provides natural treatment and control neighborhoods for
an investigation of whether house prices reflect public-school quality.
Because the 2002 school reassignments were plausibly exogenous, they allow
for a sharper identification of citywide causal effects than does previous work. Most
studies of house-price capitalization use either boundary discontinuity designs or hedonic pricing models. My study has a cleaner identification strategy because Char1

On April 15, 2002, the Supreme Court refused to hear CMS’s appeal, thereby upholding the
original ruling to end busing.
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lotte has only one school district, unlike other large cities that have multiple school
districts within city limits. Mecklenburg County also has uniform property tax rates.
Since CMS is the sole school district in Charlotte, citywide changes in school attendance zones prior to the 2002-2003 academic year affected all Charlotte neighborhoods similarly. Most other studies do not have citywide levels of treatment within
one school district. Rather, these studies typically focus on houses located near a
school boundary (Black and Machin, 2011). I examine changes in the prices of all
houses in the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County, instead of just those houses
within narrow geographical bands around school-zone boundaries. In doing so, I am
able to capture citywide effects of school quality on house prices in a large urban
area.
I use a difference-in-differences model to identify the causal effect of reassignment into a better or worse public school on the sale prices of affected houses. I
focus exclusively on changes in the quality of high schools, whereas most studies
have examined changes in elementary-school quality. High schools typically have
larger catchment areas than elementary and middle schools. School catchment size
is important because it permits the inclusion of the many different neighborhoods
that CMS assigned to a single high school, and facilitates estimation of the effects
of school reassignments on house prices across the citywide price distribution. This
variation helps isolate the causal effect of school reassignment on the median house
price in a variety of neighborhoods. Also, high-school assignment is arguably more
important in terms of student outcomes than assignment to elementary or middle
school. High-school quality affects if and where a student attends college, whether
a student drops out of formal schooling, and even if a student turns to criminal activity (Billings et al., 2014). Parents (and students) pay close attention to the quality
of the high school to which their children (or they) are assigned. My results indicate that people willingly pay between $3,300 and $4,700 per percentage point
increase in passing rates on the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction’s
End-of-Course (EOC) exams. This effect, however, is limited to houses in neighborhoods experiencing large increases in EOC passing rates after the 2002 CMS
reassignments.
Because of this limitation, I also test for non-linear effects of changes in the
EOC passing rate. My results are similar to those of Chiodo et al. (2010), who conclude that the premium parents pay for houses in better-quality public school zones
increases as school quality increases. The positive effects of school quality on selling prices increase non-linearly among houses experiencing the largest increases in
EOC passing rates. There is no solid evidence that moderate or small increases in
EOC passing rates that occurred after the 2002 citywide reassignment are capitalized into house prices in the affected school zones. There is also no evidence to
suggest negative price shocks exist for houses CMS reassigns to low-quality public
high schools.

10.2 Data
I used data on house prices from the Charlotte, NC and surrounding-area Multiple Listing Service (MLS). The MLS is an online database containing house-price
postings from Realtors, mortgage brokers, property appraisers, and other real-estate
specialists. The Charlotte MLS contains data on houses that have been listed any-
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time within the past fourteen years. Because it is a rolling aggregate, the 2014 MLS
would include data back to 2000.
The data consist of observations of houses sold in Charlotte and Mecklenburg
County between 1997 and 2010. Only houses listed in the MLS are in these data,
however, over 90% of all houses for sale appear in the MLS.2 The data include both
quantitative and qualitative house attributes that fall into three categories: historical,
structural, and locational. Historical variables include the year of construction and
the selling date. Structural variables include the architectural style, square foot age,
type of residence, and so forth. Locational attributes consist of the house’s neighborhood, address, zoning code, assigned public schools, and tax location. The data
also include the list price and selling price of the house.
I separate these data into neighborhoods containing houses with sell dates before
and after April 15, 2002. On this date, implementation of citywide school reassignments took effect for the next school year after CMS lost its appeal to maintain
forced busing. I use selling price, rather than list price, because selling price represents the price that the buyer and seller willingly agreed upon. It is, therefore,
more indicative of the market price for a house. I follow the recent literature by not
limiting the sample to houses with three or more bedrooms. The resulting sample
consists of 46,957 houses in 969 neighborhoods. After cleaning the data, I end up
with a sample consisting of 44,729 houses in 838 neighborhoods.3 Table 10.1 contains average selling price and other summary statistics for these houses from the
MLS data. It also contains data on EOC test passing-rate averages and differences.4
Table 10.1 Summary statistics
Variable

N

House Price in 2010 $
Beds
Baths
Half-Baths
Total Heated Living Area
Acres
New
Age
Age2
Rezone
Post-2002

44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729
44,729

Mean

Std. Dev. Min

Max

House Attributes
309,372
3.6
2.3
1.0
2,358.3
0.3
0.2
23.1
845.4
0.4
0.8

260,133
0.7
0.7
0.2
982.2
0.3
0.4
17.7
1,363.6
0.5
0.4

10,909
1
1
1
106
0
0
1
1
0
0

6,645,636
8
6
5
13,359
9.41
1
149
22,201
1
1

26.7
-37.7
3.16
-37.7

95.4
34.5
34.5
-1.0

School Attributes
% Pass EOC
∆ EOC2001
∆ EOC2001 (Positive)
∆ EOC2001 (Negative)
2

43,833
43,348
10,292
4,530

66.9
3.0
17.5
-11.4

12.3
10.9
11.6
10.0

Houses may not appear in the MLS for a number of reasons: a house may be undergoing foreclosure proceedings and the seller does not want it advertised; a house may be purchased within
a family; or, the seller may simply not want to price compete with similar properties listed on the
MLS server. In any case, there appears to be no systematic bias in the prices of houses listed in the
MLS (Higgins, 2013).
3 I clean the data by eliminating observations with nonsensical values: negative ages, houses over
200 years old, zero bedrooms, more than 6 or no full bathrooms, lot sizes over 10 acres, and house
selling prices less than $1,000
4 EOC passing-rate data come from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction.
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From this sample, I identify neighborhoods that experienced public high-school
reassignments and those which experienced no such school reassignments. The former comprise the “treatment” group of neighborhoods and the latter the “control”
group. I consider separately two types of treatments: one where a neighborhood
experienced a negative shock to high-school quality as a result of high-school reassignment, and one where a neighborhood received a positive shock to high-school
quality. A positive school-quality shock occurred when CMS reassigned a neighborhood in 2002 to a better-performing high school. I refer to this group of neighborhoods as having been positively treated. Correspondingly, reassignment induced
a negative shock to neighborhood school quality when CMS rezoned the neighborhood into a lower-performing high school than it previously enjoyed. I refer to this
group of neighborhoods as having been negatively treated. Control neighborhoods
retained their pre-2002 school assignments.
As a measure of school quality, I use EOC test passing rates for every high school
in the CMS district. North Carolina state law requires students in grades 9 through
12 to take EOC tests at school-year’s end. These tests cover subject material from
ten specific courses in the fields of mathematics, science, English, and social studies.
I use scores from the Algebra I, English I, and Biology EOC tests for two reasons:
the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction mandates that all students in
these courses take EOC tests, and high-school students take English I, Algebra I,
and/or Biology courses during their 9th and 10th grades. Since the legal age to drop
out of high school in North Carolina is 16 years old (with a parent’s permission),
every student, regardless of ability, takes at least one of these courses. This means
that every student in CMS takes these three EOC tests. Taking high-school averages
across years in the three subject areas yields estimates of annual school quality based
on a population of high-school students before attrition. Since every student must
take these EOC tests before they can drop out, Algebra I, English I, and Biology
test scores contain information regarding student performance before self-selection
of the least-able students becomes an issue.
Table 10.2 Average EOC passing rates by subject and school, 1996-2002
High School
D.W. Butler
E.E. Wadell
East Mecklenburg.
Garinger
Independence
Myers Park
North Mecklenburg
Olympic
Providence
South Mecklenburg
West Charlotte
West Mecklenburg
Z.B. Vance

English I
62.8
50.1
62.4
51.0
70.4
70.7
78.1
49.8
81.3
71.6
39.4
54.9
67.5

Algebra I
40.0
29.9
41.6
23.9
35.7
30.4
33.4
25.4
59.7
35.7
15.5
53.5
26.7

Biology
66.2
54.9
62.8
33.8
60.2
68.8
64.0
48.7
80.5
64.4
37.1
45.8
58.7

Average
56.3
43.3
55.6
36.2
55.4
56.6
58.5
41.3
73.8
57.2
30.7
51.4
51.0

Table 10.2 aggregates EOC passing-rate averages across subjects by year leading up to Charlotte’s citywide rezoning. Using EOC test scores from 1996-1997
to 2009-2010 provides multiple years of data before and after April 15, 2002.
From these averages, I determine which neighborhoods experienced positive schoolquality treatments and which neighborhoods experienced negative treatments. I ex-
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pect average house prices in negatively treated neighborhoods to fall relative to
the prices of similar houses in their control-neighborhood counterparts, and average house prices in positively treated neighborhoods to rise relative to the prices of
control-neighborhood houses.
Table 10.3 Differences in mean prices: Positively and negatively treated and control houses
Positive Treatment Control Differences in
(N)
(N)
Groups
257,112.7
(1,554)
338,364.1
Post-2002
(9,223)
Differences in Years 81,251.4
Pre-2002

298,796
-41,683.3
(4,980)
323,118
15,246.1
(23,592)
24,322 56,929.4

Negative Treatment Control Differences in
(N)
(N)
Groups
225,253.3
(707)
232,903.3
Post-2002
(3,823)
Differences in Years 7,650
Pre-2002

298,796
-73,542.7
(4,980)
323,118
-90,214.7
(23,592)
24,322 -16,672

Table 10.3 shows that reassignment of a neighborhood into a better public high
school from a worse one increases that neighborhood’s average house price by
$56,929. A reassignment from a better public high school to a worse one, on the
other hand, has a negative effect on average price of $16,672. These results represent aggregated selling-price averages in all neighborhoods before and after the
April 15, 2002 Supreme Court decision and in both treatment and control neighborhoods.
Figure 10.1 depicts annual EOC test passing rates for houses in positively treated
and control neighborhoods. Before April 15, 2002, control neighborhood EOC
scores lie below those neighborhoods experiencing no rezoning by about ten percentage points. After April 15, 2002, this gap narrows substantially.
The graph illustrates that houses in positively-treated neighborhoods experience
significant improvements in school EOC passing rates, and this effect lasts over the
entire sample period after the rezoning. Figure 10.2 provides similar graphical evidence that houses in negatively treated neighborhoods suffer in school quality from
the CMS rezoning in the entire post-2002 period. The EOC passing rates in negatively treated neighborhoods actually lie above the control group annual averages,
but fall below the control-group averages after 2002. The negative shock to school
quality for negatively treated neighborhoods never recovers after the Supreme Court
decision.
Figure 10.3 presents monthly average selling prices of houses in both positively
treated and control neighborhoods from June 1997 until April 2010. During the era
of race-based busing (1997-2002), treatment and control trends are roughly parallel.
Even in 2000, where a lack of data makes monthly averages for both treatment and
control houses fluctuate significantly, monthly control averages lie above positively
treated averages. However, after the April 15, 2002 Supreme Court decision, positive treatment and control monthly averages tighten, and treatment averages begin
overtaking control averages. Eventually, almost all the monthly averages of house
prices in positively treated neighborhood lie above their control group counterparts.

52
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2.6 Tables and Figures

Fig. 10.1 EOC passing rates for positively treated and control houses
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Figure 2.1: EOC Passing Rates for Positively Treated and Control Houses

Fig. 10.2 EOC passing rates for negatively treated and control houses
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Figure 2.2: EOC Passing Rates for Negatively Treated and Control Houses

Figure 10.4 plots monthly average selling prices for houses in negatively treated
and control neighborhoods. The pattern in monthly house price averages observed
prior to 2002 remains unchanged after 2002. Negatively treated houses never
achieve price parity with control-group houses. There is no visual evidence in the
scatter plot to suggest that the Supreme Court decision on April 15, 2002 had any
impact on houses reassigned to lower-quality high schools relative to non-reassigned
houses.
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Fig. 10.3 Log house sale prices of positively treated and control houses
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Figure 2.4: Log House Sale Prices of Negatively Treated and Control Houses

Figure 10.5 minimizes the monthly averages and plots positively treated and control house price trends. During the era of race-based busing (1997-2002), treatment
and control trends are roughly parallel, so there is no strong visual evidence that
Charlotteans moved into houses in higher quality school zones prior to the Supreme
Court decision. There is a small drop in the control neighborhood house price trend
from the pre-2002 period to the post-2002 period. This magnifies the upward jump
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in trend prices for the positively treated neighborhoods between the two periods. By
plotting a simple linear fit, in the pre-2002 and post-2002 periods for both positively
treated and control houses, the graphical evidence of a positive effect suggests a
small but distinct degree of household sorting into homes that CMS reassigned into
better schools. Further, the slope of the post-2002 positively treated house trend
steepens. The effects of school rezoning in the wake of the Supreme Court case may
not have all occurred immediately after April 15, 2002. These effects could have
been spread out over several subsequent years.
56

Fig. 10.5 Trends in log house sale prices of positively treated and control houses
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Figure 2.5: Trends in Log House Sale Prices of Positively Treated and Control Houses

Conversely, graphical evidence of house price capitalization of school quality is
not apparent from the plot in Figure 10.6 of the price trends for negatively treated
and control houses. There is almost no change in the trend line for negatively treated
houses before and after April 2002. The only difference between the two fitted lines
is that the slope of the trend line for negatively treated houses becomes slightly
less positive after April 15. This graph predicts no significant effects from the CMS
school reassignment on house prices in negatively treated neighborhoods. It appears
that Charlotteans experiencing a negative school-quality shock did not move to get
into a better area. This makes sense considering, as the next section details, these
Charlotteans had a chance to win a school choice lottery and gain admittance to a
higher quality school within CMS with out having to pay a house price premium.
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Fig. 10.6 Trends in log house sale prices of negatively treated and control houses
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Figure 2.6: Trends in Log House Sale Prices of Negatively Treated and Control Houses

10.3 Estimation Strategy
10.3.1 Exogeneity of CMS school-zone reassignments
There are two justifications for interpreting the CMS school reassignments as an
exogenous change in the Charlotte housing market: the nature of the legal battle to
end busing and the structure of the CMS school-choice plan. The legal battle began in 1997 when a parent sued CMS over its race-based busing policy. In 1999,
CMS administrators proposed a new school-choice plan which the elected school
board rejected in January 2000. From February until June 2000, CMS proposed,
debated, and was in the process of instituting a second school-choice plan that was
identical to the plan the school board subsequently implemented in 2002. However,
in November 2000 the fourth circuit court of appeals in Richmond (VA) reversed
its previous ruling and reinstated forced busing. CMS then scrapped its reassignment plan and went back to race-based busing (Charlotte Observer, 2001). The first
attempt to legally overturn race-based busing had failed.
In early 2001, a group of parents sued CMS over its race-based student-assignment
policy in an attempt to keep legal battle alive. As the case languished in the fourth
circuit court, CMS initiated a third reassignment plan that was approved in July
2001, pending the fourth circuit court’s decision. On July 15, 2001 the appellate
court reversed again and ruled that CMS must dismantle race-based busing (Charlotte Observer, 2001). CMS immediately appealed this decision to the Supreme
Court. The school board put implementation of the school-choice reassignment plan
on hold until the Supreme Court ruled on whether to hear the appeal.
The lead-up to the Supreme Court’s decision took nearly a year. Uncertainty over
whether the Court would hear the case abounded. Predictions were mixed: some
legal experts said the Supreme Court would not take the case, while others noted
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that the Court had not heard a school desegregation case in many years and, so,
would agree to hear it.
The plaintiffs’ case was comprised of two issues: the first challenged the constitutionality of race-based school assignment policies and the second addressed the
issue of whether CMS should have to pay the suing parents’ legal fees. The dual
nature of the case rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to say with any confidence
whether the Supreme Court was going to take the case or defer to the fourth circuit
court’s ruling to overturn race-based busing.5 As Vanderbilt School of Law Centennial Professor James Blumstein stated, “To say anything is clear in this area is an
overly optimistic statement” (Smith, 2002).
Given the legal background of the court case from 1997-2002, Charlotte homeowners’ expectations of the Supreme Court decision would have been even less
certain than the legal experts’. All of this uncertainty dissolved after April 15, 2002.
The Supreme Court ruled on that day not to hear CMS’s appeal. This ruling effectively upheld the fourth circuit court’s 2001 decision which forced CMS to dismantle race-based busing. The Supreme Court’s decision essentially codified the
new school-choice plan, which had already been put in place prior to the final decision, and resolved any lingering doubts Charlotteans might have had about whether
there would be school reassignments for the 2002-2003 school year. According to
the Charlotte Observer, parents were simply relieved that the uncertainty had been
resolved (Smith and Helms, 2002).
Although most parents were likely familiar with earlier proposals and reassignment plans before April 15, 2002, what parents knew about the 2002 plan’s structure
clouded their expectations concerning new school assignments. The school board
used a lottery system, in conjunction with a parental-choice plan, to rezone students
(Hastings et al., 2006). Parents gave CMS their preferences for the top three schools
they wanted their student(s) to attend. Concurrently, CMS assigned Charlotte homes
into “neighborhood” schools at all levels of education. CMS rezoned 35% of all
houses into different high schools and guaranteed students a seat in their neighborhood school, along with transportation to and from neighborhood schools. There
was no longer a racial basis for school assignments based on county demographics
in which, as was the case under forced busing, CMS could rezone any houses to any
public school at any time for the ensuing school year.
The board assigned school seats by lottery if the number of parental requests
outnumbered available seats in a high school (assuming that the school the parents chose was not their neighborhood school). Because of the lottery, parents
had a chance to enroll their child at a high-performing public high school even if
their neighborhood was not assigned to that school. This was true for everyone in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, including students just entering CMS (Rothacker
and Smith, 2002).
Furthermore, the lottery only applied if a school was oversubscribed. If parents
did not “win the lottery” for their first-choice school, they also had a chance to
enroll their child in their second- or third-choice school by the same lottery assignment mechanism. Students who did not receive their first-choice assignments
joined “waiting pools,” while CMS drew their second or third choices from citywide lotteries. CMS conducted the first round of school-choice lotteries and mailed
reassignment letters to homes on February 28, 2002 (Rothacker and Smith, 2002).
Parents had until March 22, 2002 to appeal reassignment decisions.
5

Another reason for a lack of confident predictions before the April 15 Court decision was that
only four of nine justices must vote affirmatively for the case to be taken by the Supreme Court.
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Many parents complained about the school assignments before this deadline.
This forced CMS to revamp its plan, which it did twice after parents received initial assignments but before the Supreme Court decision. The school board voted to
give higher priority to students in waiting pools whose first choice was their pre2002 school, but who had been reassigned to another public school. This alteration
occurred on March 8, 2002 after the initial round of rezoning decisions (Helms,
2002b).
The lotteries concluded on March 22, 2002. Subsequently, just four days prior
to the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear its appeal, CMS altered the plan again by
allowing high-school juniors to remain in their pre-2002 public schools, regardless
of previous reassignment decisions (Helms, 2002a). After April 15, 2002, the school
board made no further changes to the school-choice reassignment plan.
Charlotteans knew about the school choice plan but did not know whether it
would be implemented until after the Supreme Court decision. Because of this uncertainty and given prior school reassignment failures, parents would have had little, if any, incentive to move to another house based on predictions about CMS
neighborhood reassignments. Even if parents did not get their first-choice school
straightaway, there was a possibility that they would “win the lottery” or benefit
from a last-minute reassignment plan alteration and their student would be assigned
to their first-choice school. After CMS implemented its reassignment plan, 74%
of parents got their first-choice school for the 2002-2003 school year (Smith and
Helms, 2002).
The choice plan’s provision that parents could enter the assignment lottery for
any high school in Mecklenburg County became a problem, however, because highquality public high schools quickly became over-subscribed. While most parents
got their first-choice schools in the 2002-2003 school year, many high schools with
high EOC passing rates had to turn away “choice-in” students in subsequent years.
The odds of being denied entry versus gaining a seat at these high schools ranged
from 11:1 to 43:1 by the 2003 school year and became longer in subsequent years.
Concurrently, CMS schools with low EOC passing rates suffered diminishing enrollments and increased poverty levels as students who won the lottery for reassignment into better schools disenrolled (Helms, 2003).
By 2005, CMS began considering alterations to the school choice lottery to
deal with the dual problems of over-crowding in high-performing high schools and
shrinking student populations in low-performing high schools. The school board
announced its solution in Fall 2005 for the 2006-2007 school year. CMS elected
to keep the lottery in place so parents still had the option to transfer to non-oversubscribed schools. But, CMS dramatically scaled back the options of which high
schools parents could choose for their children (Helms, 2005b). The school board
removed 75% of county high schools from its reassignment options list due to oversubscription (Helms, 2005a). The only remaining options were those high schools
under-subscribed prior to Fall 2006. Because these high schools also had the lowest
EOC passing rates citywide, most parents sent their kids to neighborhood schools
(Helms, 2006). There was no longer an incentive for parents to participate in the
choice lottery after the 2005-2006 school year. The only way for parents to secure
a seat at a high EOC-passing-rate high school was to move into that school’s catchment area.
To examine the possibility of bias arising from the selection of neighborhoods
for school reassignments based on pre-2002 school quality, I estimated Probit regressions of three alternative school-quality measures on the likelihood of a house
being reassigned to a better or worse school. First, I found that the marginal effect
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of a one-standard-deviation increase in the three-subject EOC composite test passing rate diminished the probability of a house being rezoned into a better school
zone after 2002 by 4.5%. As an alternative measure of school quality, I also used a
composite EOC test-performance measure for the other seven subject areas the NC
Department of Public Instruction covers with such tests. The estimated effect was
small and not statistically significant. The last school-quality measure I used was
average SAT score. The marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in this
score resulted in an increase in the probability of receiving a positive treatment by
4.4%. The size and precision of these effects before CMS reassigned neighborhoods
were not large enough to indicate a systematic bias by the school board of reassigning neighborhoods assigned previously to lower-quality schools into better school
catchment areas.
I repeated this analysis for houses in neighborhoods that were reassigned to
lower-quality schools. The marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in
the EOC passing rate led to a decrease of 7.1% in the probability of negative treatment. The marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in SAT score decreased the likelihood of reassignment to a worse-performing school by 3.3%. The
seven-test composite EOC’s marginal effect was 6.1% and also statistically significant. The magnitudes of these effects, while larger than for positively rezoned neighborhoods, are still not large enough to suggest a systematic bias toward reassigning neighborhoods initially assigned to high-quality schools to lower-performing
schools in the lead up to the Supreme Court decision.
The direction of the bias indicates that, if endogeneity was present in the selection of neighborhoods receiving positive treatment, then removing the bias would
increase the effect of school reassignments on house prices after April 15, 2002.
That is, if CMS was more likely to pick worse performing students for reassignment
into better performing schools, that would diminish those schools’ quality. This reduction in the quality of better high schools from endogenous selection would also
reduce the importance of positive sorting on house prices in newly reassigned neighborhoods.
The converse is true of negatively treated neighborhoods. If CMS was more likely
to pick higher performing students for reassignment into worse performing schools
(before 2002), the quality of schools in negatively treated neighborhoods would
have increased. This increase in school quality would have mitigated any negative
sorting effects on house prices in those neighborhoods. Endogeneity in school reassignments biases the results towards finding no effects. This fact, and the small magnitudes of the Probit results, suggest that endogenous assignment of CMS houses to
positive and negative treatments is not of great concern.

10.3.2 Model Specification
I use a difference-in-differences model to identify the causal effect of a change in
school quality on house price. My initial specification is
yi jt = α + γ(rezone j ) + θ (post2002t
+δ (rezone j ∗ post2002t ) + Xi′jt β + Ztζ + εi jt

(10.1)
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where yi jt is the log of average selling price of house i in neighborhood j and year
t, α is the intercept term, rezone j is a dummy variable equal to one if a house lies in
a neighborhood that CMS rezoned, post2002t is a dummy variable equal to one if a
house sells after the end of school year 2001-2002 (with April 15, 2002 designated
as the threshold date), Xi jt contains house and/or neighborhood characteristics, Zt
contains year fixed effects, and εi jt is a random error term. The coefficient δ on the
interaction of the two dummy variables measures the causal effect of a neighborhood
high-school rezoning on house prices. I identify which houses received a positive
treatment and which houses received a negative treatment based on their respective
neighborhoods’ school reassignments. Since the school reassignment occurred at
the neighborhood level, I do not include fixed effects for neighborhoods because
these would be perfectly collinear with the rezone j variable.
To further refine the degree to which changes in EOC test passing rates influence
house prices, I interact the treatment dummy variable with the change in an EOC
test-score measure:
yi jt = α + π(∆ EOC j,2001 ) + θ (post2002t )
+τ(∆ EOC j,2001 ∗ post2002t ) + Xi′jt β

(10.2)

+ Ztζ + εi jt

All variables are defined as before, with the exception of the newly added variable
∆ EOC j,2001 . This variablerepresents the difference in 2001 between neighborhood
j’s pre-2002 public high-school passing rate on the three-subject EOC composite
and neighborhood j’s post-2002 public high-school passing rate on the same EOC
test composite. Neighborhoods not reassigned in 2002 have zero change because
there is no difference in passing rates. Rezoned neighborhoods register non-zero
differences for this variable because their EOC passing rates change with their new
school assignments. Parents knew the public high school into which CMS rezoned
their students. In order to assess the school quality shock their children would experience, parents would have had to assess the difference between the 2001 EOC
passing-rate differences because students take EOC exams in early June. Therefore,
the pertinent comparison of EOC passing rates between pre-2002 and post-2002
public high school assignments would have been the 2001 difference in EOC passing rates. I interact the difference in the 2001 EOC passing rates with the treatment
variable to estimate the effect of an increase in the size of the school-quality shock
on house prices. If CMS did not reassign a neighborhood, then houses in that neighborhood experienced no school-quality shock. These houses remain in the control
group as they would under the dichotomous specification of the treatment using the
rezone dummy variable.

10.4 Empirical Results
10.4.0.1 Initial Results
Column 1 of Table 10.4 contains the results of estimating Equation 10.1 using the
data for positively treated houses. There are no statistically significant treatment
effects on the prices of houses in neighborhoods that CMS transferred to schools
of higher quality. This holds for the results from estimating a model containing just
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the causal variables and a model containing hedonic house variables and year fixed
effects.
Table 10.4 The effect of the 2002 CMS rezoning on log selling price of positively treated houses
Full Sample†
(Std. Errors)
.0534
(.0484)
-.1044
rezone
(.0967)
.0785
post2002*rezone
(.0884)

post2002

acres
beds
baths
half-baths
new
age
age2
constant

.0016
(.0148)
-.0363
(.0432)
.0411
(.0374)
.2559***
(.0365)
.2288***
(.0131)
.4114***
(.0249)
.3309***
(.0264)
.0298
(.0287)
-.0082***
(.0027)
.0002***
(3.01e-5)
12.44*** 10.27***
(.0546) (.1125)

Repeat-Sales Sample
(Robust Standard Errors)
.0518**
(.0259)
-.0901***
(.0332)
.0760
(.0515)

.0792*
(.0454)
-.0741***
(.0234)
.0378
(.0340)
.2740***
(.0387)
.2473***
(.0133)
.3287***
(.0166)
.3445***
(.0567)
-.0108
(.0263)
-.0163***
(.0023)
.0003***
(2.96e-5)
12.53*** 10.58***
(.0184)
(.0935)

Year FE
N
Y
N
Y
F(k, N-k)
6.53
119.26
6.42
112.08
N
39,349 39,349
2,250
2,250
Notes: † indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood
level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively.

Results from estimating Equation 10.1 for houses in negatively treated neighborhoods are reported in the first column of Table 10.5. Here, again, there are no
statistically significant effects on average house price of having been rezoned into a
lower quality public high school. This is true whether or not I control for hedonic
variables and year fixed-effects. I conclude that the results from the difference-indifferences model provides no evidence that people pay less for houses reassigned
into worse school zones.
I replace the rezone dummy with a measure of the difference between positivelytreated neighborhoods’ pre-reassignment and post-reassignment high schools’ 2001
EOC passing rates to estimate Equation 10.2. The first column of Table 10.6 contains the results. Estimates of these treatments in both the basic and hedonic regressions indicate positive and statistically significant house-price effects after accounting for the magnitude of the difference in EOC passing rates. Using the hedonic
results, the marginal effect of an increase in the EOC passing rate in a positively
treated neighborhood increases the average house price by about $4,711 per onepercentage point increase in EOC passing rate. This effect is large and statistically
significant at the 1% level, and provides evidence that people price in the size of the
school-quality increase when purchasing (and selling) a house.
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Table 10.5 The effect of the 2002 CMS rezoning on log selling price of negatively treated houses
Full Sample†
(Std. Errors)
.0534
(.0484)
-.2247
rezone
(.0805)
-.0642
post2002*rezone
(.0695)

post2002

acres
beds
baths
half-baths
new
age
age2
constant

.0192
(.0137)
-.0591
(.0399)
-.0344
(.0372)
.3094***
(.0402)
.2310***
(.0155)
.3833***
(.0217)
.2800***
(.0245)
-.0004
(.0308)
-.0128***
(.0027)
.0002***
(3.68e-5)
12.44*** 10.48***
(.0547) (.1050)

Repeat-Sales Sample
(Robust Standard Errors)
.0518**
(.0259)
-.1548***
(.0482)
.0040
(.0711)

.0595
(.0444)
-.0434***
(.0344)
-.0161
(.0499)
.3535***
(.0463)
.2493***
(.0151)
.3132***
(.0174)
.2736***
(.0540)
-.0314
(.0296)
-.0230***
(.0026)
.0004***
(3.62e-5)
12.53*** 10.73***
(.0184)
(.1000)

Year FE
N
Y
N
Y
F(k, N-k)
5.55
106.58
8.00
95.39
N
33,102 33,102
1,880
1,880
Notes: † indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood
level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively.

The first column of Table 10.7 provides estimates using data for negatively
treated neighborhoods in a model where I interact the treatment dummy variable
with the difference in EOC passing rates. These estimates contrast with the evidence associated with the previous results for positively treated houses. There is no
evidence to suggest that people pay less for houses CMS rezones into worse schools.
Even after I account for EOC passing rate differences, the conclusion is the same as
with the treatment indicator variable: no statistically significant results of negative
treatment.
These results are similar to results for East Baton Rouge (Zahirovic-Herbert and
Turnbull, 2009). These authors found that a one-standard-deviation increase in test
performance scores resulted in a 2.5% increase in average house price. Their results
for negatively treated neighborhoods, however, were inconclusive, as they are here.
As striking as these results are, they may, in fact, represent a lower bound on
Tiebout movement in the wake of the 2002 CMS school reassignments. The lotteries
predating April 15, 2002 were the largest, but CMS kept the lottery system in place
until October 2005, when they dramatically limited lottery system school choices
(draws occurred once per year). At the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year,
CMS radically scaled back lottery assignments. In so doing, CMS effectively gutted
its choice lottery in favor of assigning students solely to high schools closest to
their residence (Helms, 2005c). For this reason, some parents may have applied to
the lotteries each year instead of purchasing a new (higher-priced) home in a better
quality school zone. CMS transferred students into their school of choice if they
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Table 10.6 The effect of changes in EOC passing rates on log selling price of positively treated
houses
Full Sample†
(Std. Errors)
.0292
(.0457)
.0018
∆ EOC2001
(.0061)
(post2002* .0090***
∆ EOC2001 ) (.0031)

-.0064
(.0138)
.0014
(.0033)
.0045***
(.0014)
.2614***
acres
(.0349)
.2346***
beds
(.0131)
.4035***
baths
(.0202)
.3227***
half-baths
(.0240)
.0200
new
(.0284)
-.0073***
age
(.0024)
.0002***
age2
(2.61e-5)
12.41*** 10.26***
constant
(.0515) (.0926)
post2002

Repeat-Sales Sample
(Robust Standard Errors)
.0372
(.0241)
.0059***
(.0018)
.0079***
(.0026)

.0766*
(.0433)
.0019
(.0014)
.0052***
(.0018)
.2819***
(.0402)
.2559***
(.0134)
.3210***
(.0166)
.3517***
(.0545)
-.0252
(.0255)
-.0137***
(.0022)
.0003***
(2.94e-5)
12.49*** 10.52***
(.0170) (.0904)

Year FE
N
Y
N
Y
F(k, N-k) 10.57
132.42
24.54
113.45
N
38,802 38,802
2,226
2,226
Notes: † indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood
level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively.

won the yearly lottery without their parents having to relocate. Lotteries represented
an alternative mechanism for parents and students to fulfill their preferences for
higher quality education without having to pay a house price premium for it. In
this way, Tiebout sorting may have been attenuated by the presence of the annual
school choice lottery. Household sorting may also have been deferred until after the
2005-2006 school year, when CMS effectively scrapped its lottery system in favor
of neighborhood school assignments.
This idea gains credence from recent work on the educational outcomes for students who “won the lottery” for their first-choice school. On average, students who
were selected for reassignment from low-quality schools to high-quality schools
through the lottery showed increases in post-secondary achievements. In contrast,
students already in high-quality school zones who won lotteries for their first-choice
schools exhibited declines in the quality of post-secondary outcomes (Deming et al.,
2014). Since lottery draws occurred annually from 2002-2005, parents in lowperforming school zones had a yearly incentive to apply for their first-choice school
through the lottery system rather than moving between school zones.
As a robustness exercise, I repeat the analysis above using an alternative sample
of MLS data. I do so to try and capture neighborhood fixed effects without the
problem of multicollinearity arising between fixing effects at the neighborhood level
and my difference-in-difference variables. I match addresses before and after April
15, 2002 to form a repeat-sales sample. This significantly cuts down on sample size,
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Table 10.7 The effect of changes in EOC passing rates on log selling price of negatively treated
houses
Full Sample†
(Std. Errors)
.0384
(.0463)
.0143***
∆ EOC2001
(.0053)
(post2002* -.0034***
∆ EOC2001 ) (.0042)
post2002

acres
beds
baths
half-baths
new
age
age2
constant

.0120
(.0132)
.0018
(.0038)
-.0019
(.0022)
.3144***
(.0408)
.2341***
(.0155)
.3848***
(.0218)
.2802***
(.0245)
.0011
(.0304)
-.0128***
(.0028)

Repeat-Sales Sample
(Robust Standard Errors)
.0493*
(.0251)
.0086***
(.0028)
-.0020***
(.0047)

.0573*
(.0442)
.0027
(.0044)
.0003
(.0039)
.3552***
(.0464)
.2492***
(.0150)
.3133***
(.0175)
.2755***
(.0540)
-.0324
(.0295)
-.0235***
(.0026)

.0002***
.0004
(4.14e-5)
(3.66e-5)
12.43*** 10.46*** 12.53*** 10.73***
(.0524)
(.1049)
(.0177)
(.1000)

Year FE
N
Y
N
Y
F(k, N-k) 6.09
108.17
6.11
95.35
N
33,040
33,040
1,880
1,880
Notes: † indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood
level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively.

but allows me to control for unobserved fixed effects at the neighborhood level.
Using identical houses before and after the end of race-based busing also allows
a more exact causal interpretation to my estimates, since individual houses do not
change much over time. I also control for household attributes and year fixed effects.
The second columns of Tables 10.4 and 10.5 contain repeat-sales sample estimates from Equation 10.1. Like the full-sample estimates, the repeat-sales sample treatment effects are not statistically significant either with or without hedonic
household-level variables and year fixed effects. The second columns of Tables 10.6
and 10.7 present results that resemble those from the full-sample regressions. A positively treated house experiences a marginal effect of $3,313 per percentage point
increase in the EOC passing rate of its assigned public high school. This premium
is smaller than, but roughly similar to, the estimate from the full sample. Estimated
premiums for negatively-treated houses are, like the full sample, not statistically
significant.
The estimated effects of both the dummy-variable and EOC-interacted treatments
are robust in both the full and repeat-sales MLS samples. Because school quality
is so closely intertwined with neighborhood characteristics, controlling for the latter isolates the effects of the treatment from the post-busing school reassignments.
There is no consistent evidence that the rezonings affected citywide house prices.
Positive EOC-interacted treatments, on the other hand, are always positively signed,
statistically significant, and of roughly the same magnitudes. There is scant evidence
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of negative EOC-interacted treatment effects. By controlling for the magnitude of
the school-quality shock, it becomes clear that families relocate based on how much
school quality they gain or lose as measured by the differences in school EOC passing rates.

10.4.1 Non-Linear Treatment Results
Following Chiodo et al. (2010), I test for non-linear treatment effects. To do so, I use
split-sample regressions by dividing the EOC-interacted treatments in my full and
repeat-sales samples into three bins based on quantiles of the differences in 2001
EOC passing rates. The “Bottom” bin represents differences up to the 25th quantile
of the distribution of EOC passing-rate differences. This bin represents houses that
experienced a small positive or negative school-quality shock. I bin “Middle” as
EOC passing rate differences from the 25th to the 75th quantiles. There are surprisingly few passing-rate differences that fall into the middle of the distribution, and
this is why I aggregate the middle two quartiles in filling the middle bin. Finally,
the “Top” bin contains EOC passing-rate differences above the 75th quantile of the
2001 EOC test-score difference distribution.
Table 10.8 The effects of non-linear changes in EOC passing rates on log selling price, positively
treated houses
Bottom‡
Middle‡
Top‡
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Full Sample†

-.0036
(.0047)

N

33,008

-.0117**
Repeat-Sales Sample
(.0053)

-.0061*
(.0036)

.0048***
(.0012)

29,650

33,161

.0017
(.0047)

.0053***
(.0019)

N
1,931
1,738
1,878
Notes: † Indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively. ‡ Bottom, Middle, and Top represent the bins of
<25th, 25th-75th, and >75th quantiles of the differences in
2001 EOC passing rates between positively-treated neighborhoods’ pre-2002 and post-2002 high school assignments.

As Table 10.8 shows, the top bins of the EOC-interacted treatment drive most
of the regression results from the previous sections. There is weak evidence from
both the full and repeat-sales samples that, in the middle and bottom bins, there is
a negative effect on house prices from positive treatment. This evidence, however,
is inconsistent across samples. The results for “Top” treatments are all positively
signed, statistically significant, and resemble the results of Chiodo et al. (2010).
Houses experiencing the largest increases in school quality pay premia for better schools. Houses experiencing small-or medium-sized increases in EOC passing rates display no evidence of price effects. This translates into price premia for
houses for which high school reassignment results in EOC passing-rate increases of
25 percentage-points or more. These price premia are essentially equal to those in
the EOC-interacted results from Table 10.6.
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Table 10.9 The effects of non-linear changes in EOC passing rates on log selling price, negatively
treated houses
Bottom‡
Middle‡
Top‡
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Full Sample†

.0134
(.0138)

N

-.0019
(.0038)

-.0036**
(.0017)

29,725

30,333

29,270

-.0033
Repeat-Sales Sample
(.0211)

-.0012
(.0054)

.0014
(.0050)

N

1,791

1,694

1,716

Notes: † Indicates standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. *, **, *** indicate p< .10, .05, .01, respectively. ‡ Bottom, Middle, and Top represent the bins of
<25th, 25th-75th, and >75th quantiles of the differences in
2001 EOC passing rates between positively-treated neighborhoods’ pre-2002 and post-2002 high school assignments.

Because CMS took away all of its top quality high schools as lottery choices after
2005, the only way to get into a high EOC-passing-rate school was to move houses
prior to the 2006-2007 school year. The marginal effects may reflect this movement.
For the full sample, there is a price premium of $4,734 for a one-point increase
in EOC passing rates and for the repeat-sales sample there is a price premium of
$2,694. Most of the effect of CMS’s neighborhood reassignment policy probably
occurs after there is not the mitigating impact of a lottery to win admittance to any
public school in Mecklenburg County.
Table 10.9 presents split-sample results of EOC-interacted treatment estimates
for houses in negatively treated neighborhoods. The evidence is much weaker than
in Table 10.8. The only statistically significant treatment effect has the correct sign,
but is sample-specific, and, so, is not generalizable.

10.5 Heterogeneity Test: Condominium Prices
As a further check on the robustness of my results, I regress the same sets of covariates and treatments I used previously on condominium prices. Since families with
school-aged children are more likely to own detached houses rather than condominiums, sorting along school quality lines should not affect condominium prices
to the same extent. Gallagher et al. (2013) proposed a similar test. They posit that the
prices of small houses do not capitalize differences in public school quality because
people in these houses generally do not have school-aged children. If small houses
are less likely to contain public school students, then condominiums are similarly
unlikely to contain families with public school children.
I control for neighborhood and fixed effects by matching condominium sales by
address before and after the end of race-based busing on April 15, 2002. This limits
my sample size because condominiums’ neighborhoods are unlisted in the MLS data
prior to 2003. However, matching controls for confounding neighborhood and locational attributes. Since I cannot narrow my sample to condominiums least likely to
have school-aged kids (i.e., one-room condominiums), families with public school
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students may reside in some of my sample properties. Any bias in this direction,
though, works to the benefit of a statistically non-significant result. Because families would sort into condominiums located in better public school zones for what
would probably be a much lower price premium than for detached houses in these
zones, treatment estimates will tend toward being significantly different than zero.6
My results include less structural attributes of condominiums than of houses.
The excluded variables do not translate from house attributes to condominium attributes. For instance, lot size is solely a detached-housing attribute. I also include
total heated living area instead of the number of bathrooms, since inclusion of both
bathrooms and bedrooms provides less variation. Condominiums vary by size, but
few have more than two bathrooms or three bedrooms.
Table 10.10 The effect of the 2002 CMS rezoning on log selling price of condominiums
Positively Positively Negatively Negatively
Treated Treated Treated
Treated
.1652***
(.0523)
.1897**
rezone
(.0918)
.0497
post2002*rezone
(.1480)
-.1697***
beds
(.0589)
.8037***
total heated living area
(.0613)
-.1513*
new
(.0798)
-.0180***
age
(.0046)
.0002***
2
age
(4.15e-5)
11.52*** 11.27***
constant
(.0553) (.1986)
post2002

.1899**
(.0814)
-.0031
(.1052)
.0477
(.1716)

.1899**
(.0815)
-.1758
(.2759)
-.0564
(.5093)

.1658***
(.0527)
-.3228***
(.0634)
-.0640
(.1722)
-.0868
(.0579)
.7411***
(.0530)
-.1454*
(.0763)
-.0226***
(.0047)
.0002***
(5.30e-5)
11.21***
(.1986)

F(k, N-k)
2.65
44.20
2.15
76.02
N
161
161
141
141
Note: *, **, *** indicate p<.10, .05, .01, respectively. Huber-White
standard errors.

Table 10.10 provides the results of estimating equation (1) using data on the selling prices of condominiums in Charlotte from 1997-2010. For both positively and
negatively treated units, there are no statistically significant effects of school-zone
changes on selling prices. This is true for both basic (columns 1 and 3) and hedonic
(columns 2 and 4) regressions. Also, some of the signs of estimated hedonic coefficients are different than their household counterparts. Condominium purchasers
have different preferences than house purchasers in the data, and this may be why
the coefficients on characteristics like “new” and “beds” have different signs than
the coefficients on these variables in the house regressions.
6

This bias works identically for foreclosed houses. To the extent that banks price these properties
to sell quickly, parents can move into a foreclosed house in a higher-quality school zone at a lower
price than a non-foreclosed house (Saccacio, n.d.). While I cannot identify foreclosed houses in
my MLS sample, omitting foreclosures induces a bias toward finding statistically non-significant
treatment estimates.
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Table 10.11 The effect of changes in EOC passing rates on log selling price of condominiums
Positively Positively Negatively Negatively
Treated Treated Treated
Treated
.1555***
(.0511)
.0103***
∆ EOC2001
(.0022)
(post2002*
.0039
∆ EOC2001 )
(.0036)
-.1457**
beds
(.0654)
.8122***
total heated living area
(.0640)
-.1626*
new
(.0671)
-.0178***
age
(.0044)
.0002***
age2
(4.17e-5)
11.50*** 11.21***
constant
(.0533) (.1933)
post2002

.1813**
(.0795)
.0039
(.0032)
.0040
(.0050)

.1791**
(.0824)
-.0165***
(.0057)
-.0188
(.0119)

.1627***
(.0538)
.0097*
(.0054)
-.0163
(.0095)
-.0305
(.0657)
.6740***
(.0582)
-.1234
(.0788)
-.0228***
(.0050)
.0002***
(4.97e-5)
11.14***
(.2244)

F(k, N-k)
4.81
44.49
7.76
67.57
N
161
161
137
137
Note: *, **, *** indicate p<.10, .05, .01, respectively. Huber-White
standard errors.

Results from estimating Equation 10.2 are reported in Table 10.11. The estimates
are nearly identical to those of Table 10.10. The only statistically significant effect
from a change in school EOC score occurs for negatively-treated condominiums,
and it is only marginally statistically significant. Recall that the results from negatively treated houses indicated only one statistically significant result, by way of
the neighborhood-attribute sample. There is scant consistent evidence for a negative
treatment effect for either houses or condominiums.

10.6 Conclusion
The results reported here indicate that houses receiving positive, EOC-interacted
treatments in assigned-school quality experienced increases in prices. This effect
is non-linear, however, and is precisely estimated only for those houses in neighborhoods which experience a twenty-five percentage-point or higher jump in their
school EOC passing rates. Negative treatment effects are never consistently statistically significant, and neither are positive or negative treatment estimates from
equation (1). Simply put, Charlotteans paid premia for houses reassigned to higher
quality high schools, given the quality increased enough. On the other hand, there
is no convincing empirical evidence that Charlotteans receive price discounts for
houses reassigned to lower quality high schools after April 2002.
There would have been no incentive to sell a house in a negatively treated neighborhood, especially during the first three years of the school choice plan. A school
choice lottery provided Charlotteans a method by which they could potentially get
their students into high-quality high schools without incurring a house price pre-
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mium from moving to a house in a higher EOC-passing school’s neighborhood.
However, after CMS took away 75% of the high school parents with public highschool kids could apply for, including all of the public high schools with the best
EOC passing rates in the city, the effects of house-price capitalization are obvious
in those high-performing schools’ zones. Furthermore, my results suggest that most
of the house-price premia occurs after a threshold level of increase in EOC-passing
rates. The marginal effects on house prices in the “Top” bin of EOC passing rate
differences are essentially the same as the marginal effects on house prices in the
EOC-treatment regressions.
Robustness checks confirm these conclusions. Using full and repeat-sales samples of MLS data confirms that, although the results vary in magnitude, they are
qualitatively consistent: the marginal effects of an EOC passing rate increases house
prices in positively treated neighborhoods. This result is non-linear in both samples
I analyze. My findings are broadly consistent with Zietz et al. (2008) and Liao and
Wang (2012) who find evidence, using quantile regressions, that houses from different quantiles of the price distribution value identical private amenities differently.
The rezoning of a house into a higher-performing school zone has no effect on house
price unless the newly assigned school is sufficiently better than the previously assigned school.
A comparison with average private school tuition rates sheds light on the willingness to pay house-price premia for better quality public schools. In Charlotte,
there are eighteen denominational and non-denominational private high schools.
The average annual tuition for the twelfth grade in all of the private high schools
was $13,180 in 2012. The maximum private high-school tuition is $21,200 and the
minimum is $6,307 (Colwell and Thurmond, 2012). Parents with the ability to move
houses would do so rather than pay private tuition every year. Parents with students
newly entering or having recently entered high school would benefit more from a
move to a significantly better school zone rather than from sending their children
to private school. However, this may not be the case for parents with students in
their last year or two of high school. In this case, it may be more cost-effective to
enroll their students in private schools, depending on how much of an additional
post-threshold increase in EOC-passing rates parents seek.
Possible extensions of this study would involve using the MLS data in several different ways. Future work could examine school-reassignment effects on the prices
of small houses (those with fewer than three bedrooms). These properties should
exhibit smaller premia for public-school quality. I could also incorporate additional
measures of high-school quality, such as graduation rates or SAT scores. Unlike
the three-subject EOC-composite measure, however, these alternative school-quality
metrics are subject to selection biases because they reflect only those students who
have elected to not drop out of high school or who take the SAT. A natural extension
of this paper would be to investigate the yearly effects of the rezoning variable in
an event-study framework. This type of analysis could examine the annual shifts
in house prices over the time frame following the 2002 Supreme Court decision to
more exactly estimate how changes in CMS policy impacted area house prices. The
application of MLS data to examine the effects of the CMS post-busing rezoning on
Charlotte house prices would enable empirical investigations of these questions and
many others.
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Chapter 11

Hospitals and Housing Prices in Small Towns in
Wisconsin
Russell Kashian, Michael Kashian and Logan O’Brien

Abstract Research has determined that hospitals often have significant impacts on
real estate housing prices. The objective of this study is to refine and add to the
growing literature on the proximity-based effect that hospitals have on surrounding
home values due to their semi-obnoxious characteristics. By limiting this inquiry to
the population of all home sales in Wisconsin Cities and Villages with a population
of under 10,000 persons and hospital with an emergency room, other desirable (and
undesirable) externalities are limited. The results suggest that, when controlling for
the individual housing qualities, proximity to the hospital is desirable.

11.1 Introduction
Hospitals often have significant impacts on real estate housing prices. The development of a hospital can have positive effects, whether it be increasing the rate of
economic development, or access to healthcare, especially urgent health care at an
emergency room. Facilities that provide desirable services like these are often referred to as ‘yes-in-my-backyard (YIMBY) facilities’ and generally yield increased
home values based on proximity to a YIMBY facility. Living too close to a hospital
can also produce negative externalities for residents, through hospital-related traffic as well as noise pollution from ambulances, emergency helicopters, etc. Other
facilities that cause negative externalities are referred to as ‘not-in-my-backyard
(NIMBY) facilities’ and usually correlate with lowered property values based on
proximity to them (Peng and Chiang, 2015). Facilities, like hospitals for example,
that provide the positive resources as well as the undesirable externalities are known
as ‘semi-obnoxious facilities.’ Other examples of semi-obnoxious facilities include
large sports stadiums, airports, and police/fire stations, among many others. Ideally
for homebuyers, living near an ER/Hospital brings valuable accessibility, but living
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too close brings undesirable externalities. Therefore there is a zone in which property values are maximized, based on an ideal distance from the nearest hospital.
The objective of this study is to refine and add to the growing literature on
the proximity-based effect that hospitals have on surrounding home values due to
their semi-obnoxious characteristics. Drawing from a database of over 3,000 homes
within a two mile radius of each hospital, we were able to determine the effect on
house values through proximity to the main entrance of the hospital. This study expands the body of housing research by assessing the impact of hospitals on local real
estate without the clutter of other external variables, and utilizes spline variables for
distance from the hospital to allow for non-linearities. Surprisingly, the results show
that the home sales price is maximized nearest to the hospital.
The remainder of this paper continues as follows: related literature review, explanation of the models and methodologies, summary of the data, interpretation of
the empirical results, and conclusions.

11.2 Literature Review Methods
Hedonic analysis describes commodities as consisting of differentiated characteristics, which together determine total value. Hedonic analysis has roots in the early
20th century in non-housing studies, however it has since expanded into use for
real estate, more specifically, the analysis of housing. The concept for the empirical hedonic analysis developed around the idea that goods, previously thought of as
homogenous, are actually comprised of a multitude of differentiated components.
Through this concept researchers use hedonic analysis to estimate the contribution
derived from the components of a unit and the value offered by the components
to the overall value of the unit (Rosen, 1974). Importantly, hedonic analysis captures the implicit and explicit contributions of the characteristics that comprise the
commodity. To do this, a majority of hedonic models explain total value (e.g., sale
price) as either a semi-log or a linear combination of the attributes comprising the
commodity.
Each characteristic of a commodity provides a unique level of utility to buyers.
As a commodity, any home then provides a total utility based on the values the
differentiated characteristics take on (Harding et al., 2003). The market for singlefamily housing units does not contain a supply of homogeneous homes, but rather
it contains the demand for and supply of differentiated attributes determined on the
purchasing side of the market (Epple, 1987).

11.2.1 Housing Characteristics
Outside of proximity to semi-obnoxious facilities, the value of individual housing
characteristics is important in determining the overall value of properties (Harding et al., 2003). In an analysis of roughly 125 studies, the number of bedrooms,
bathrooms, and square feet generally yielded positive coefficients, the home age
commonly had a negative coefficient, and none of the studies found a negative coefficient for the lot size or presence of a garage (Sirmans et al., 2006). Comparing
hedonic research results directly to one another is often difficult, because several
methods for measuring and incorporating housing attributes exist in a hedonic anal-
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ysis, including binary dummy variables, complex dummy variables, and utilizing a
count to indicate more than one unit.

11.2.2 Community Amenities
Location can be a benefit or a detriment to a home’s value. Determining how location causes the impact on the value of a house can be difficult. In turning the location
into a variable, the impact of the location can become influenced by other variables
(Malpezzi, 2002). This study was limited to exurban and smaller suburban communities throughout Wisconsin that contain an ER/Hospital, because larger, more
condensed urban communities are affected by other attractions and facilities that
subsequently have their own effect on home values.

11.3 Data and Empirical Model
The data was limited to single-family home sales within two miles of a hospital,
located within towns or cities with a minimum of 674 residents and a maximum of
39,114 residents, for the years from 2013 to 2019. This approach yielded a sample
of 3,013 home sales with complete information on all variables.
Following Peng and Chiang (2015), the distance from the nearest hospital, measured in miles, was split into splines with the provided distances in a fixed range
(less than .25 miles, or between .25 and .5 miles), such that coefficients could be interpreted as slopes within the range. Peng and Chiang (2015) present a single set of
spline variables but, given that the ranges are necessarily arbitrary, we instead considered splines with only two ranges (less than .5 miles to at least .5 miles), three
(less than .33 miles, and .33 to .66 miles), four (less than .25 miles), five (less than
.2 miles) or 10 ranges (less than .1 miles). This experimentation allows the identification of appropriate ranges. Splines for ranges above one mile were considered and
rejected since only 157 home sales, approximately 5% of the entire sample, were in
that range.
As is standard in hedonic models, we regress the natural logarithm of housing
prices against a series of independent variables, such that coefficients () can be interpreted with a 1 unit change in an independent variable yielding a proportional
change in the dependent variable. The specific formulation is:
ln(price) = α + β (X) + η (year, month) + ε

(11.1)

where price is the sales price, β a vector of coefficients, X a series of independent
variables including the hospital distance spline variables, η is a vector of coefficients
for year and month dummy variables utilized to control for any fixed effects of
either, and ε is the error term.
For this study, we were concerned that hospitals might be located near the center
of these small cities and towns such that measured distance from the hospital might
actually measure the distance from the city or town center. To control for this possibility, a variable is included for the distance from the town or city post office to the
hospital, using the assumption that the post office is in fact located at the center.
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Table 11.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Price
Hospital Distance
Post office distance to hospital
Square feet of house
Full baths in house
Half baths in house
Bedrooms in house
Attached garage (proportion)
Population in town/city

$124,260
.449 miles
.771 miles
1,761
1.626
.327
3.146
.541
7,721

72,090
.294
.514
698.5
.682
.484
.774
.498
8345

Note: n=3,013.

Descriptions for the variables are provided in Table 11.3. Note that square feet
and population are entered in quadratic form in the regression to allow for declining
marginal effects.

11.4 Regression Results
Regression results for either 3, 4 or 5 splines are presented in Table 11.4. Results
for 2 or 10 splines are not provided because, for the prior, both coefficients were
insignificant, while for the latter only 3 of 10 coefficients were significant, and these
did not yield any clear pattern, meaning the significant coefficients were not contiguous with each other.
Overall explanatory power is reasonable for each regression, with R2 statistics
above .5 in each. Other results are also as expected, with larger homes yielding
higher prices with a declining marginal effect, and with full and half baths and
attached garages yielding significantly higher sales prices. The distance between the
hospital and the post office provides a positive, significant coefficient, which might
be due to hospitals located further from the city center being newer and in newer
developments. In unreported results, the year fixed effects suggest prices tended to
rise over time, while the month effects show peak selling prices between June and
September.
Turning to the splines themselves, none are significant with either 3 or 5 splines,
but three are significant in the regression with 4 splines, which is also the regression
with the highest R2 statistic. Those results suggest that price declines for houses
further away from the hospital, with the largest effect for houses within .25 miles
of the hospital, and with the effect dissipating thereafter and becoming insignificant
for houses more than .75 miles from the hospital.

11.5 Discussion
The analysis here sought to understand the relationship between the distance to the
nearest hospital in rural and exurban locations in Wisconsin and the home selling
price. The results for control variables were quite reasonable and consistent with
prior research. The distance result is surprising, in that we found home price drop-
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Table 11.2 Selling price regression
Variable

3 Splines 4 Splines 5 Splines

Hospital distance range 1 of 3 0.015
(0.120)
Hospital distance range 2 of 3 0.007
(0.060)
Hospital distance range 3 of 3 0.026
(.033)
Hospital distance range 1 of 4
Hospital distance range 2 of 4
Hospital distance range 3 of 4
Hospital distance range 4 of 4

-0.511**
(0.205)
-0.220**
(0.094)
-0.135**
(0.062)
-0.034
(0.037)

Hospital distance range 1 of 5

0.174***
(0.019)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.229***
(0.016)
0.129***
(0.017)
-0.008
(0.013)
0.232***
(0.016)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

-0.242
(0.279)
-0.122
(0.129)
-0.073
(0.085)
-0.096
(0.064)
0.015
(0.039)
0.175***
(0.019)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.230***
(0.016)
0.128***
(0.017)
-0.008
(0.013)
0.229***
(0.017)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

✓
3,013
0.540

✓
3,013
0.539

Hospital distance range 2 of 5
Hospital distance range 3 of 5
Hospital distance range 4 of 5
Hospital distance range 5 of 5
Post office
Square feet
Square feet2
Full baths
Half baths
Bedrooms
Attached garage
Population
Population2

0.171***
(0.019)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.230***
(0.016)
0.129***
(0.017)
-0.008
(0.013)
0.233***
(0.016)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

Year and Month Fixed Effects ✓
Observations
3,013
R2
0.538

ping at a decreasing rate as the distance increases from the hospital, with the largest
effect being on the closest spline (0 to .25 miles).
It was expected that close proximity to a hospital would reduce selling price
due to the high levels of noise and traffic associated with hospitals. Further, each
hospital in the sample had an emergency room, so noise and traffic are expected.
The results suggest instead that proximity to the hospital is desirable. There are two
plausible and complementary explanations for this finding. First, hospital employees
may value locations within short walking distance to the hospital. Second, given the
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hospitals are in rural and exurban location, they may be small and generate relatively
infrequent noise from ambulances or helicopters. Nonetheless, it is still possible that
home locations in very close proximity to these hospitals (e.g., across the street)
are associated with reduced home prices, but there are an insufficient number of
observations for those locations in this data.1
A limitation of this study is that it does not include urban locations. Parallel tests
of home real estate markets and hospital location in medium and large urban areas
might yield very different results.
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1

The closest the analysis comes to testing very close location is the regression with 10 splines.
The coefficient on location within one-tenth of a mile of the hospital is negative (-.697) and insignificant.

